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The Regulation of Mining and Mining Waste  








This article reviews EU law relating to the regulation of mining 
and mining waste, liability for environmental damage caused by mining, 
remedies for environmental damage caused by mining, mine closure 
obligations and the nature of financial guarantees required to ensure the 
proper performance of environmental obligations, as well as developments 
in EU law which have resulted in the elucidation of human rights available 
at a supranational level to those subjected to severe pollution from mining 
activities. It notes that much of the world’s mineral resources are located in 
developing countries which have less sophisticated environmental 
regulations and greater potential to experience environmental and social 
disasters from mining activities than the EU, proposes the regulation of 
mines of international significance on a more global scale, and speculates 
whether the relatively sophisticated EU mining regulatory system can 
provide an embryonic model for this. 
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Despite the importance of mining in meeting the need for minerals 
and its contributions to economic and social development, concerns about 
aspects of its performance prevail. Mining and the use and disposal of 
mining wastes have sometimes caused significant environmental and social 
damage. Some communities and indigenous groups living near mines have 
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alleged human rights abuses.
1
 In the EU, spectacular mining accidents in 
Spain (Aznalcollar) and Romania (Baia Mare) linked to burst tailings dams 
illustrated the environmental risks in disposing of mining waste and 
highlighted the need for major reforms in mining laws.
2
 It is not always 
clear that mining benefits host countries economically and socially because 
the minerals sector often operates in countries where there is poor 
governance with which it is sometimes associated.
3
 The International 
Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) has recognized that mining faces 
governance and operational problems.
4
 This concern is particularly apposite 
because the majority of the world’s potential mineral resources are located 
in developing countries.
5
 ICMM recognizes that corporate responsibility to 
shareholders does not exonerate mining companies—whether operating in 
their home countries or abroad—from their responsibilities to the 
environment and to local communities liable to be adversely affected by 
mining operations.
6
 The EU has also addressed mining issues. In the last 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. See Taskin and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 46117/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 126, 138 
(2005) (finding a violation of Article 6 § 1 and Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms); see also Jo M. Render, Mining and 
Indigenous Peoples Issues Review, INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON MINING AND METALS, 18–
20, available at http://www.icmm.com/page/1161/mining-and-indigenous-peoples-issues-
review (then follow “Download PDF” hyperlink) (describing the recognition of human 
rights issues with indigenous groups).  
 2. See, e.g., Marlise Simons, Big Sludge Spill Poisons Land in Southern Spain, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 2, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/05/02/world/big-sludge-spill-poisons-
land-in-southern-
spain.html?scp=1&sq=Big%20Sludge%20Spill%20Poisons%20Land%20in%20Southern%2
0Spain&st=cse (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (describing the effects of the Aznacolar mining 
accident) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment). 
 3.  See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON MINING AND METALS, MINING, 
PARTNERSHIPS FOR DEVELOPMENT TOOLKIT 19–24 (Alastair Sharp-Paul & Liz Jacobsen eds., 
2011) [hereinafter ICMM], available at http://www.icmm.com/mpdtoolkit (then follow 
“Download PDF” hyperlink) (describing the challenges of mining in a country with poor 
governance). 
 4.  See Our Work, ICMM, http://www.icmm.com/our-work (last visited Nov. 3, 2011) 
(describing the aims of ICMM’s work) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 5.  See BP, STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY 7 (June 2009), available at 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_public
ations/statistical_energy_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2009_downloads/statistical_r
eview_of_world_energy_full_report_2009.pdf (mapping the proven oil reserves at the end of 
2008). North America (70.9) and Europe and Eurasia (142.2) had 213.1 thousand million 
barrels of proven oil reserves, while South and Central America (132.2), Asia and the Pacific 
(42), Africa (142.2), and the Middle East (754.1) had 1070.5 thousand million barrels of 
proven oil reserves. Id.  
 6. See generally Sustainable Development Framework, ICMM, 
http://www.icmm.com/our-work/sustainable-development-framework (last visited Nov. 7, 
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twenty years or so, a transformation has taken place in the EU mining 
industry largely in response to stringent EU requirements relating to 
environmental protection and accident prevention.
7
 This article presents a 
broad overview of the current status of the law in the EU relating to mining 
and mining waste, illustrates the many possibilities for enforcing mining 
legislation at Member State and supranational levels, argues that there is a 
case for the supranational regulation of mining and mining waste, and 
speculates whether the EU regulation of mining can serve as an embryonic 
model for this on a global scale.  
 
II. How EU Law Works 
 
To appreciate how EU law governs the environmental aspects of 
mining, it is important to understand how it applies in the EU.
8
 The EU 
itself is neither a conventional international organization nor a federal state: 
it is a supranational organization of twenty-seven Member States with its 
own legal order.
9
 This can be characterized as an integrated legal order, 
which means that the Member States
10
 share responsibility with the EU for 
ensuring that EU laws are effectively and properly executed.
11
 The EU has 
the power to enact legislation binding on all Member States and the 
authority to enter into international agreements.
12
 The most frequently used 
legislation in the environmental field is the Directive, of which at least 700 
                                                                                                                                      
2011) (describing the Sustainable Development Framework ICMM members are required to 
implement) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment). 
 7.  See, e.g., JIM WALKER & STEVE HOWARD, FINDING THE WAY FORWARD: HOW 
COULD VOLUNTARY ACTION MOVE MINING TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT? 10–11 
(2002) (describing the forces for change in the mining industry); see also NATALIA 
YAKOVLEVA, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE MINING INDUSTRIES 80 (2005) 
(describing the corporate governance policy with respect to disclosure of social policies). 
 8.  For a description of how EU law works, see generally JAN H. JANS & HANS H.B. 
VEDDER, EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2012) and KLAUS-DIETER BORCHADT, THE ABC 
OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW (2010), available at 
http://europa.eu/documentation/legislation/pdf/oa8107147_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2011). 
 9.  See BORCHADT, supra note 8, at 21–24 (describing fundamental principles of the 
EU legal order). 
 10.  The EU Member States are France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands (since 1951), Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom (1973), Greece (1980), 
Spain, Portugal (1986), Austria, Finland, Sweden (1995), Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta (2005), Romania, and 
Bulgaria (2007). See Countries, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2011) (listing the EU Member States) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 11.  See BORCHADT, supra note 8, at 115 (stating that Member States must implement 
law and enforce it in their national courts). 
 12.  See id. at 80–82 (describing the sources of EU law). 
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deal with environmental matters.
13
 A Directive is a type of legislation that 
has to be implemented in the national legal orders of Member States in a 
manner as to guarantee that the objectives prescribed in it are attained in 
that State.
14
 Member States have a choice or discretion as to how this is 
ensured.
15
 The authorities responsible for implementing a Directive in 
practice are called “competent authorities.”
16
 When a European Directive 
confers rights on individuals, these rights have to be made available by 
Member States in clearly binding domestic legislation, and individuals must 
be empowered to enforce their rights before national courts.
17
 This makes 
EU law more powerful than international law. The EU Commission or 
another Member State can sue a Member State before the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) when it is not complying with its European obligations.
18
 




Although it is almost heretical to say so, a major advantage that has 
improved the quality of EU environmental law is that it is made at a 
supranational level by the European Council of Ministers (Council of 
Ministers) and the European Parliament.
20
 The Council of Ministers is a 
                                                                                                                                      
 13.  See generally Summaries of EU Legislation: Environment, EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/environment/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2012) 
(summarizing environmental directives) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 14.  See BORCHADT, supra note 8, at 89.  
 15.  See id. 
 16.  A competent authority is a body with legal authority to act on behalf of the 
Member State to ensure that EU law is administered and enforced. It can operate at national, 
regional, or local levels. 
 17.  The ECJ has held that the provisions of a Directive must be implemented with 
unquestionable binding force and with the necessary specificity, precision, and clarity to 
satisfy the principle of legal certainty, which requires that, in the case of a Directive intended 
to confer rights on individuals, the persons concerned must be enabled to ascertain the full 
extent of their rights. See Case C-197/96, Comm’n v. France, 1997 E.C.R. I-1496, I-1501 
(holding that France failed to uphold its obligation to ensure equal employment, vocational 
training, promotion, and working conditions for women); Case C-207/96, Comm’n v. Italy, 
1997 E.C.R. I-06869, I-06869 (finding that Italy violated Community laws by retaining laws 
that prohibit the employment of women); JAN H. JANS, ROEL DE LANGE, SACHA PRECHAL & 
ROB WIDDERSHOVEN, EUROPEANISATION OF PUBLIC LAW 63–96 (2009) (describing the 
doctrine of direct effect, which states that Community law confers rights on individuals 
independently of the legislation of Member States). 
 18.  See BORCHADT, supra note 8, at 87–112 (describing how obligations are enforced). 
 19.  See id. at 103–12. The ECJ’s official name was changed from the “Court of Justice 
of the European Communities” to the “Court of Justice” after the Treaty of Lisbon came into 
force on December 1, 2009 although it is still called the European Court of Justice. The 
Court of First Instance was renamed as the “General Court,” and the term “Court of Justice 
of the European Union” officially designate the two courts. 
 20.  See id. at 98–103 (describing the EU’s legislative process). 
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body of only twenty-seven people (one Environmental Minister from each 
Member State) who are much more isolated from national politics, lobby 
groups, and parliamentary scrutiny and control than they would be if 
involved in legislating domestically.
21
 Consequently, they are more 
amenable to persuasion on the objective merits of proposals and (because 
less politically accountable in their own countries) are less accommodating 
to vested interests than they would be if operating at a national level. 
Furthermore, although the European Parliament has equal legislative power 
with the Council of Ministers under the co-decision procedure, almost all 
EU environmental legislation is passed under a consultation procedure, 
whereby the European Parliament has limited legislative powers amounting 
only to limited powers to delay legislation.
22
 The result is that the EU 
legislature, insulated from the pressures of domestic politics, is often able to 




     
III. Mining, Mining Waste, and Human Rights 
 
The EU ensures that mines and mining waste are managed properly 
by a combination of environmental, health and safety, and human rights 
law. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),
24
 the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter of Fundamental 
Rights),
25
 and the European Social Charter,
26
 all of which bind EU Member 
                                                                                                                                      
 21.  See id. at 53–61 (describing the composition and presidency of the Council of 
Ministers). 
 22.  See Andreas Follesdal & Simon Hix, Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the 
EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik, 44 J. COMMON MKT. STUDIES 533, 535 (Sept. 
2006), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-
5965.2006.00650.x/pdf (describing how the consultation procedure contributes to the 
democratic deficit). 
 23.  It is arguable that the allegedly undemocratic EU legislative process is one of the 
reasons why the EU was able to adopt the Climate Change Package and assume world 
leadership in climate change adaption. See European Commission, What is the EU Doing on 
Climate Change?, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/brief/eu/index_en.htm (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2011) (describing that the EU is a leading force in combating climate change) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
 24.  See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. No. 194 (entered into force June 1, 2010) [hereinafter CPHRFF], 
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm (listing protected 
human rights); see also Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, May 11, 1994, C.E.T.S. No. 5 (entered into force Nov. 
1, 1998), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/155.htm (amending 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). 
 25.  See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 51, 2000 O.J. (C 
364) 1, 21 [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights]. The Charter of Fundamental Rights 
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States
27
 and the institutions of the EU,
28
 guarantee certain human rights that 
can be impaired by mining activities.
29
 The vindication of these rights 
requires EU Member States and/or the EU itself as appropriate to protect 







                                                                                                                                      
is only binding on Member States when they are implementing EU law. The United 
Kingdom, Poland, and the Czech Republic have opted out of the Charter. There is 
considerable debate concerning what effect the Protocol containing this opt-out will actually 
have. See, e.g., PAUL CRAIG, THE LISBON TREATY: LAW, POLITICS, AND TREATY REFORM 
238–40 (2010) (stating that one reading of the Protocol is that it is merely interpretative and 
will have limited legal consequences). 
 26.  See European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, E.T.S. 35, available at 
http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/035.htm; Revised European Social 
Charter, May 3, 1996, E.T.S. 163, available at 
http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/163.htm [hereinafter Social 
Charter]; Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of 
Collective Complaints, Nov. 9, 1995, C.E.T.S. No. 158, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/158.htm (establishing a complaints 
procedure). All EU Member States are party to the ECHR and to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. See European Social Charter, supra note 26; Revised European Social Charter, supra 
note 26. Although all Member States have signed and ratified the original or revised 
European Social Charter, not all have subscribed to all obligations in it or allowed rights to 
NGOs to complain of State violations. Id. Many States outside the EU are also party to the 
ECHR and to the European Social Charter. Id.; CPHRFF, supra note 24. 
 27.  Although all are binding on Member States, some States have not accepted all 
aspects of the ECHR or the European Social Charter. See European Social Charter, supra 
note 26; Revised European Social Charter, supra note 26; CPHRFF, supra note 24. 
Meanwhile, the obligations of the UK, Poland, and the Czech Republic with respect to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU remain unclear. See The European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: the Commission’s Strategy for Implementation, INTERNATIONAL 
AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE SECTION, SN/IA/5963 (May 13, 2011), 
http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN05963.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2011) (stating 
that the compatibility of UK law and the Charter is a matter of concern) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 28.  See Treaty on European Union art. F(2), Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html#0001000001 
(“The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 
1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as 
general principles of Community law.”). 
 29.  See, e.g., Social Charter, supra note 26, art. 22 (declaring a right to take part in the 
determination and improvement of working conditions and the working environment). 
 30.  See, e.g., id. arts. 3, 11 (declaring rights to safe and healthy working conditions 
and to the protection of health). See also supra note 28.  
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A. The European Convention on Human Rights 
 
Under Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the EU 
considers fundamental rights granted on the basis of the ECHR to be 
general principles of Community law.
31
 This is not the place for extensive 
elaboration on the nature and extent of obligations incumbent upon States 
under the above instruments: suffice it to say that the obligations imposed 
on State parties to the ECHR have been interpreted to provide substantive 
rights to individuals affected by serious or imminent environmental damage 
as well as the procedural rights needed to realize substantive rights.
32
 These 
procedural rights can be found in Articles 6 (right to a fair trial) and 13 
(right to an effective remedy).
33
 No less than six of the eighteen 
environment-related cases that have come before the ECHR have involved 
                                                                                                                                      
 31.  In practical terms, this means that the EU as an institution is bound by the ECHR, 
and, as a consequence, since the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009, the European Court 
of Human Rights in Strasbourg is able to deal with cases relating to the EU. See Martin 
Lassen-Vernal & Brendan Sweeney, Lisbon Treaty Boosts Human Rights in Europe, THE 
DANISH INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS http://humanrights.inforce.dk/news/ 
lisbon+treaty+boosts+human+rights+in+europe (last visited Nov. 3, 2011) (commenting on 
the augmentation of human rights in Europe effected by the Lisbon Treaty) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). Note that 47 States 
and the EU are now parties to the ECHR. 
 32.  See, e.g., Tatar v. Romania, App. No. 67021/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search “Case Title” for “Tatar 
v. Romania”) (finding a violation of Article 8 because the government did not provide 
people living in the neighbourhood with sufficient information about the risks associated 
with a company using cyanide to extract gold); Budayeva and Others v. Russia, App. No. 
15339/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 195 (2008), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search “Case Title” for “Budayeva and Others v. Russia”) 
(holding that the State had violated Articles 8 and 2 by failing to take ex ante regulatory 
measures to control risk and to warn of life threatening emergencies and to hold an ex post 
judicial enquiry when the risk of a mud slide causing deaths transpired); Taskin and Others 
v. Turkey, App. No. 46117/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 138 (2005) (finding a violation of Articles 6 
and 8 for allowing continued use of sodium cyanide in mine production and inadequate 
enforcement of laws); Fadeyeva v. Russia, App. No. 55723/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 138 (2005), 
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search “Case 
Title” for “Fadeyeva v. Russia”) (finding a violation of Article 8 when woman suffered from 
polluting emissions because the government failed to strike a fair balance between the 
interests of the community and the applicant’s effective enjoyment of her right to respect for 
her home and her private life); Moreno Gomez v. Spain, App. No. 4143/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
¶¶ 60–63 (2004), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en 
(search “Case Title” for “Gomez v. Spain”) (finding a violation of Article 8 because 
authorities did not address noise from nightclubs); Oneryildiz v. Turkey, App. No. 48939/99, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 118 (2004), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/ 
search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search “Case Title” for “Oneryildiz v. Turkey”) (finding a 
violation of Article 2 because the State had not adequately warned inhabitants of dangers 
from landfill). 
 33.  CPHRFF, supra note 24, arts. 6, 13. 
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environmental and health and safety problems caused by mines or mining 
waste disposal facilities,
34
 as too has the most important case decided by the 
Committee of Social Rights.
35
 
Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR (the right to the 
peaceful enjoyment of property) has been invoked against a State party that 
did not act where an illegally built structure devalued the applicant’s 
property and interfered with her right to light and her view.
36
 Article 2 of 
the Convention (the right to life) has been interpreted to require States to 
provide an adequate regulatory framework and to take the necessary 
practical measures to safeguard the life and health of persons living near an 
illegally operated landfill.
37
 Article 8 (the right to private and family life) 
has been interpreted to impose a duty on States to warn the public of 
dangers to health and safety from dangerous facilities, including a mine 
waste facility,
38
 a duty to ensure that the health of citizens is not directly 
and seriously endangered by the adverse environmental effects of 
potentially dangerous facilities, including mines,
39
 a duty to provide 
                                                                                                                                      
 34.  See Environment-Related Cases in the Court’s Case Law, European Court of Human 
Rights, at 3–4 (Dec. 2011), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/0C818E19-C40B-
412E-9856-44126D49BDE6/0/FICHES_Environnement_EN.pdf (summarizing key decisions 
involving human rights and the environment). 
 35.  See Decision on the Merits, Marangopoulos Found. for Human Rights v. Greece, 
Complaint No. 30/2005, Eur. Comm. Soc. Rts. ¶ 195 (2006), available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/complaints/CC30Merits_en.pdf 
(interpreting Article 11 of the Charter as including the right to a healthy environment). The 
European Committee of Social Rights rules on State compliance with the European Social 
Charter under the 1988 Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter and the 1996 
European Social Charter (revised). See Revised European Social Charter, supra note 26. 
 36.  See Antonetto v. Italy, App. No. 15918/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2000) (condemning a 
Member State for failure to protect a landowner’s property rights by not enforcing laws 
against an illegally erected building for seventeen years). 
 37.  See Oneryildiz, App. No. 48939/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. A landfill is not essentially 
different, in legal terms, from a mining waste facility. 
 38.  See Tatar v. Romania, App. No. 67021/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009) (finding that the 
State’s failure to provide for an appropriate regulatory system ensuring effective and 
proportionate measures to deal with mine pollution and the risks from a gold mine 
constituted a breach of Article 8); Guerra v. Italy, App. No.14967/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 60 
(1998) (finding that the State’s failure to provide a warning system against industrial 
accidents from a fertilizer factory constituted a breach of Article 8). 
 39.  See Dubetska and Others v. Ukraine, App. No. 30499/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 122–23 
(2011) (finding that applicants suffered health problems and damage to their house and 
living environment as a result of a nearby coal mine and factory, that the government owed a 
duty to take appropriate remedial measures, and that there was a violation of Article 8); see 
also Budayeva and Others v. Russia, App. No. 15339/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 201 (2008), 
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search “Case 
Title” for “Budayeva and Others v. Russia”) (holding that actions that violated Article 2 
because of failures to provide adequate health and safety measures also constituted a 
violation of Article 8); Marangopoulos Foundation, ¶ 122 (explaining that specific 
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appropriate regulatory systems and to take appropriate and effective action 
to prevent imminent threats from serious pollution to the health and safety 
of persons in their territories,
40
 a duty to enforce environmental and other 
laws designed to ensure respect for rights guaranteed by the Convention in 
cases of severe pollution,
41
 and a duty to provide appropriate remedies for 
                                                                                                                                      
obligations of employees exist under Article 8 to effectively handle occupational accidents, 
including a written evaluation of occupational risk); Oneryildiz v. Turkey, App. No. 
48939/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 160 (2004), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search “Case Title” for 
“Oneryildiz v. Turkey”) (finding a violation of Article 8 based on the same facts that 
warranted a violation of Article 2). See generally Office of the High Commission for Human 
Rights, Consultation on Human Rights and Access to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation 
(May 11, 2007), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/water/docs/ 
consultationReportmay07.pdf (summarizing the relationship between clean water and 
enjoyment of the right to life and health); KEVIN WATKINS, UNITED NATIONS DEV. 
PROGRAMME, BEYOND SCARCITY: POWER, POVERTY AND THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS, HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT (Bruce Ross-Larson et al. eds., 2006), available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR06-complete.pdf (discussing the relation between human 
development and access to clean drinking water). 
 40.  See Budayeva, App. No. 15339/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 199–201 (finding a duty to 
warn local resident of nearby dangers); Oneryildiz, App. No. 48939/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 75 
(same). 
 41.  See Moreno Gomez v. Spain, App. No. 4143/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 61–63 (2005), 
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search “Case 
Title” for “Gomez v. Spain”) (finding Spain condemned for a breach of Article 8 for not 
enforcing noise control laws against night clubs); Dees v. Hungary, App. No. 2345/06, Eur. 
Ct. H.R. ¶ 24 (2011) (finding Hungary in violation of Article 8 for not properly regulating 
heavy traffic which caused noise nuisance and other ill effects); Mileva and Others v. 
Bulgaria, App. Nos. 43449/02, 21475/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 97, 101–02 (2010) (finding 
Bulgaria in breach of Article 8 for failing to respond properly to the applicants’ complaints 
about noise nuisances and for not enforcing noise abatement orders); Dubetska and Others v. 
Ukraine, App. No. 30499/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 120 (2011) (stating that the State should have 
been aware of environmental dangers from state-owned factories); Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 
App. No. 16798/90, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 58 (1994) (finding Spain’s failure to provide a remedy 
for serious pollution caused by a wastewater treatment plant constituted a violation of 
Article 8); Fadeyeva v. Russia, App. No. 55723/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 89 (2005), available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search “Case Title” for 
“Fadeyeva v. Russia”) (finding that the state is required to take positive actions to secure 
rights for its residents); Giacomelli v. Italy, App. No. 59909/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 98 (2007) 
(finding that the failure of administrative authorities to comply with municipal 
environmental laws on environmental impact assessment and to enforce court orders 
suspending the operation of a hazardous waste plant constituted a violation of Article 8); 
Guerra v. Italy, App. No.14967/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 53 (1998) (finding a State duty to collect 
and disseminate information about environmental dangers); Taskin and Others v. Turkey, 
App. No. 46117/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 126 (2005) (finding a violation of Article 8 where State 
authorities deliberately defied final judicial decisions); Tatar v. Romania, App. No. 
67021/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009) (finding that the state has a duty to regulate activities 
dangerous to the environment and human health). 
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individuals whose rights have been infringed by serious pollution.
42
 The 
European Court of Human Rights has enforced these duties against party-
States when the individuals bringing suit had not obtained a remedy from 
their national courts and/or regulatory authorities; individuals have also 
enforced Convention rights in domestic courts in those Member States that 




B. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
 
 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union came 
into effect following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 
December 1, 2009.
44
 Enshrining a broad range of political, social, and 
economic rights for EU citizens and residents into EU law, it has the same 
legal value as the European Union Treaties.
45
 The EU is required to act and 
legislate consistently with the Charter, as must Member States when 
implementing EU law.
46
 The Charter applies to Member States only when 
they are implementing EU law; it does not extend the competences of the 
EU beyond those given to it elsewhere in the EU Treaties.
47
 Much of the 
Charter is based on the ECHR, the human rights case-law of the ECJ, and 
                                                                                                                                      
 42. See Dubetska and Others v. Ukraine, App. No. 30499/03, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 123 
(2011) (stating that the state should have been aware of environmental dangers from state-
owned factories); Hatton v. UK, App. No. 36022/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 96 (2003) (“There is no 
explicit right in the Convention to a clean and quiet environment, but where an individual is 
directly and seriously affected by noise or other pollution, an issue may arise under Article 
8.”). 
 43. The United Kingdom and Ireland, for example, have incorporated the Convention 
into their domestic legal systems; rights must therefore be respected by public authorities 
and the courts in these jurisdictions. See Human Rights Act 1998, 1998-42, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42; European Convention on Human Rights Act 
2003, IRISH HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, http://www.ihrc.ie/enquiriesandlegal/ 
europeanconvent.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 44.  See Treaty of Lisbon: Taking Europe into the 21st Century, EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (stating that the 
Treaty of Lisbon came into force on Dec. 1, 2009) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 45.  See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community art. 6, § 1, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, 13 
(“The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of 7 December, 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, 
which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.”). 
 46.  See Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 25, art. 51, § 1 (requiring the EU 
and Member States to “respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application 
[of the Charter’s provisions] in accordance with their respective powers”). 
 47.  See id. art. 51, § 2 (“This Charter does not establish any new power or task for the 
Community or the Union, or modify powers and tasks defined by the Treaties.”). 
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existing provisions of EU law.
48
 Several of the rights contained therein, like 
the same or similar rights in the ECHR, can be relied upon to secure 
environmental rights or to protect the environment impacting on human 
rights: for example, Article 2 (the right to life), Article 3 (the right to 
physical and mental integrity), Article 7 (the right to respect for private and 




 Outside the human rights context in the strict sense, the ECJ is 
competent to adjudicate on compliance by Member States with Community 
law obligations in areas regulated by the EU such as environmental 





C. The European Social Charter  
 
 The European Social Charter is a Council of Europe Treaty 
guaranteeing social and economic rights: it is the counterpart of the 
European Convention of Human Rights, which guarantees civil and 
political rights. The European Committee of Social Rights hears cases 
involving alleged violations of the European Social Charter. Individuals 
cannot yet bring an action against a Member State for infringing their social 
rights but non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have a right to complain 
against States that have accepted the Collective Complaints Protocol for 
infringing guaranteed social rights.
51
 All EU Member States have signed 
and ratified the original or revised Social Charter, but not all have accepted 
every provision of the Charter, the revised Charter, or the rights of NGOs to 
complain against them.
52
 Nonetheless, for those that have accepted the 
                                                                                                                                      
 48.  See CRAIG, supra note 25, at 199–206 (describing the relationship between the 
ECHR, EU law, and the Lisbon Treaty). 
 49.  See CPHRFF, supra note 24, arts. 2, 3, 7, 17. 
 50.  See generally European Court of Justice, Annual Report 2010, at 81–93 (June 1, 
2011), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-
05/ra2010_version_integrale_en.pdf (summarizing the subject matter of new and completed 
cases). 
 51.  See Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter, supra note 26 (allowing 
NGOs to submit claims); Robin Churchill & Urfan Khaliq, The Collective Complaints 
System of the European Social Charter: An Effective Mechanism for Ensuring Compliance 
with Economic and Social Rights?, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 417, 426–28 (2004) (describing the 
requirements for NGOs to be a complainant organization). 
 52.  See The 9 Most Frequently Asked Questions About the European Social Charter, 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/ 
Presentation/FAQ_en.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2011) (stating the positions of the member 
states) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment). Amongst EU States, only Poland, Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdom 
have not signed the Collective Complaints Protocol as of February 2011. See Acceptance of 
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entire Charter and the standing of NGOs to complain, the Charter is an 
additional weapon in the armory for environmental protection in the EU.  





 complained to the Committee of Social Rights 
that a Greek lignite mining company, of which the State was the majority 
shareholder, had violated, inter alia, the right to protection of health in 
Article 11 of the Charter.
55
 Noting the complementary relationship between 
the right to health in Article 11 of the Charter and the right to life in Article 
2 of the ECHR, the Committee ruled that the right to health included the 
right to a healthy environment
56
 and that the measures required under 
Article 11 should be designed to remove causes of ill-health resulting from 
environmental threats.
57
 The Committee held that Greece had violated 
Article 11 by not enforcing national and international environmental 
protection legislation effectively, by not monitoring pollution from the 
mine, and by not ensuring that its environmental inspectorate was properly 
equipped to fulfill its tasks.
58
 Greece was condemned for failing to take 
sufficient account of the environmental effects of mining and for failing to 
develop and enforce an appropriate regulatory regime to prevent and 
                                                                                                                                      
Provisions of the Revised European Social Charter, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 7 (1996), 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/presentation/ProvisionTableRev_en.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2011) (listing which provisions nations have accepted) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 53.  See Complaint, Marangopoulos Found. for Human Rights v. Greece, Complaint 
No. 30/2005, Eur. Comm. Soc. Rts. ¶ 11 (2005), available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/ 
monitoring/socialcharter/complaints/CC30CaseDoc1_en.pdf (alleging that Greece has not 
complied or has unsatisfactorily complied with Articles 2(4), 3(1), 3(2), and 11 of the 
European Social Charter of 1961); see also Mirja Trilsch, European Committee of Social 
Rights: The Right to a Healthy Environment, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 529, 534–38 (2009) 
(discussing Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights v. Greece).  
 54.  The Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights is a Greek non-governmental 
organization for the research, study, defence, promotion, and protection of human rights. See 
MARANGOPOULOS FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.mfhr.gr/?ln=1 (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment). 
 55.  See Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights v. Greece, Decision on the 
Merits, ¶¶ 12–13 (alleging a violation of Article 11); see also Social Charter, supra note 26, 
art. 11 (applying Articles 1–10 to Part II of the Additional Protocol). Article 11 of the 
revised Charter is identical to Article 11 of the unrevised Charter except for the addition of 
the words “as well as accidents” at the end of the third paragraph. 
 56.  See id. ¶ 195 (finding that the right to health includes the right to a healthy 
working environment).  
 57.  See id. ¶ 202 (stating that “measures required under Article 11 should be designed, 
in the light of current knowledge, to remove the causes of ill-health resulting from 
environmental threats such as pollution.”). 
 58.  See id. ¶¶ 208–16 (stating obligations on Member States with respect to mining 
activities permitted). 
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combat public health risks from lignite mining.
59
 The Committee also found 
that Greece had failed to provide for the enforcement of worker health and 
safety regulations by supervisory measures because of a lack of inspectors 
and available data.
60
 Mirja Trilsch has commented that the Marangopoulos 
ruling “essentially removes the right to a healthy environment from the 
constrained realm of so-called third-generation rights and introduces it into 




IV. Liability for Damage by Mining and Mining Waste under the 
Environmental Liability Directive 
 
A. The Scope of Liability 
 
Directive 2004/35/EC on environmental liability with regard to the 
prevention and remedying of environmental damage (the ELD) came into 
force in 2007.
62
 It is aimed at implementing the “polluter pays” principle 
whereby the party responsible for pollution is liable to pay damages to 
remedy the environmental damage caused.
63
 At the time of its enactment, 
the ELD was heralded as “a comprehensive liability regime for damage to 
the environment.”
64
 It was enacted to deal with “pure ecological damage” 
as distinct from “traditional damage,” i.e., personal injury, damage to 
property, and economic loss.
65
 The objective is to ensure that operators pay 
for ecological damage caused by their activities either by remedying it 
                                                                                                                                      
 59.  See id. ¶¶ 194–221. 
 60.  See id. ¶¶ 222–31 (finding a violation of Article 3(2) of the European Social 
Charter). 
 61.  Trilsch, supra note 53, at 536. 
 62.  See generally Directive 2004/35, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 56 (CE) [hereinafter ELD], 
available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:143:0056:0075:en:PDF. 
 63.  See id. art. 1 (stating that the purpose of the Directive is to establish a framework 
of environmental liability based on the polluter pays principle.)  
 64.  Questions and Answers Environmental Liability Directive, EUROPA, (Apr. 27, 
2007), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/157&format= 
HTML (last visited Nov. 3, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment). 
 65.  See ELD, supra note 62, pmbl. ¶ 14 (“This Directive does not apply to cases of 
personal injury, to damage to private property or to any economic loss and does not affect 
any right regarding these types of damages.” Private rights to damages are available under 
the municipal laws of Member States. See id. art. 3.3 (“[T]his Directive shall not give private 
parties a right to compensation as a consequence of environmental damage or an imminent 
threat of such damage.”). 
THE REGULATION OF MINING AND MINING WASTE IN THE EU 191 
themselves or paying public authorities for doing so.
66
 The ELD does not 
confer a right to compensation (an expression which includes damages) for 
environmental damage or an imminent threat of such damage on private 
parties.
67
 Nor does it affect rights to compensation for traditional damage 
under any relevant international agreement governing civil liability for the 
same damage.
68
 It was extended to cover extractive waste from mines and 
quarries by Directive 2006/21/EC on the management of waste from 
extractive industries (the MWD).
69
  
Although the ELD specifically targeted the “many contaminated 
sites in the Community,”
70
 its drafters were particularly anxious to avoid 
the problems the USA experienced with respect to their contaminated sites 
where transaction costs devoured much of the funding for environmental 
remediation.
71
 Operators of the dangerous, or potentially dangerous, 
occupational activities listed in Annex III to the ELD are strictly liable for 





 operators carrying out activities not listed in Annex III 
are only liable for any fault-based damage to nature that they cause, and are 
                                                                                                                                      
 66.  See id. art. 1 (stating that the purpose of this Directive is to establish a framework 
of environmental liability based on the polluter-pays principle to prevent and remedy 
environmental damage). 
 67.  See id. art. 3.3 (stating that compensation for environmental damage is not 
available to private parties); id. pmbl. ¶ 14 (“This Directive does not apply to cases of 
personal injury, to damage to private property or to any economic loss and does not affect 
any right regarding these types of damages.”). 
 68.  See id. pmbl. ¶ 11 (stating that the Directive is aimed at preventing and remedying 
environmental damage and does not affect compensation for traditional damage granted 
under any relevant international agreement regulating civil liability); id. art. 4.2–4.4 
(limiting the Directive’s application).  
 69.  See id. art. 15 (“The management of extractive waste pursuant to Directive 
2006/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the 
management of waste from extractive industries” shall be added to Annex III of Directive 
2004/35/EC), thereby making mining waste one of the activities for which operators are 
strictly liable under the ELD.  
 70. Id. pmbl. ¶ 1. 
 71. See White Paper on Environmental Liability, at 29, COM (2000) 66 final 1 (Feb. 
9, 2000) (referring to the high transaction costs of cleaning up superfund sites in the United 
States). Transaction costs have ranged from 80% of total costs in 1992 to 33% in 1997. See 
JAN PAUL ACTON & LLOYD S. DIXON, SUPERFUND AND TRANSACTION COSTS: THE 
EXPERIENCES OF INSURERS AND VERY LARGE INDUSTRIAL FIRMS 24–28 (1992), available at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R4132.html (finding the overall transaction costs for 
CERCLA clean-up activities as consistently high for all actors); see also SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
WATER RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, Summary of the March 12, 1997 Hearing by the 
House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, U.S. EPA, http://www.epa.gov/ 
superfund/policy/congress/summ0312.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2011) (stating a need to 
reduce transaction costs incurred in the Superfund programme) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 72. See ELD, supra note 62, art. 2.1 (defining “environmental damage”). 
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not liable at all for damage to water or soil unless Member States use their 
discretion to extend the strict liability regime to them.
73
 An “operator” is 
defined as any natural or legal, public or private, person who operates or 
controls the occupational activity or to whom national legislation delegates 
decisive economic power over the technical functioning of such an activity, 
including the holder of a permit, authorization for such an activity, or the 
person registering or notifying such an activity.
74
 A large number of 
activities connected with mining are listed in Annex III.
75
 A holder of an 
IPPC or waste licence for mining and related waste activities in the EU is 
subject to the ELD because activities listed in Annex III to the ELD include 
any installation subject to a permit in pursuance of Directive 96/61/EC, 
concerning integrated pollution prevention and control.
76
 So also is the 
operator of certain waste management operations
77
 and the person who 
discharges or injects dangerous substances into inland surface water or 
groundwater if these activities require prior authorizations under EC 
Directives.
78
 Water abstraction and impoundment subject to prior 
                                                                                                                                      
 73. See id. pmbl. ¶ 2 (stating that that the “polluter pays” principle should help 
determine who bears the costs of cleaning up environmental damage); id. pmbl. ¶ 8 (stating 
that the directive applies to environmental damage caused by occupational activities which 
present a risk for human health or the environment); id. art 3.1 (finding a strict liability 
principle will apply to all activities referred to in Annex III without prejudice to Community 
legislation or national legislation). Note that several Member States have extended strict 
liability regime to activities which are not listed in Annex 111. See Report from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EUROPA 3 (Nov. 12, 2010), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/liability/pdf/com_2010_0581.pdf (reporting on the 
transposition and implementation of the Directive in practice and finding that nine Member 
States had extended the strict liability regime to other activities by 2010). 
 74. See ELD, supra note 62, art. 2.6 (stating the directive’s definition of operator). 
 75. See id. Annex III. 
 76. See id. Annex III, § 1 (listing all activities listed in Annex I of Directive 96/61/EC 
with the exception of installations or parts of installations used for research, development, 
and testing of new products and processes to strict liability under ELD). Although Directive 
96/61/EC, which is mentioned in Section 1 of Annex III, and some amendments thereto have 
been codified by Directive 2008/1/EC and will soon be replaced by Directive 2010/75/EU 
on industrial emissions, the extraction and processing of minerals and the storage of mineral 
waste are subject to IPPC and to the new IED. See generally Directive 2010/75, 2010 O.J. (L 
334) 17 (EU). 
 77. See ELD, supra note 62, Annex III, § 2 (stating that waste management operations 
include the collection, transport, recovery, and disposal of waste and hazardous waste, 
including the supervision of such operations and after-care of disposal sites, subject to 
permit or registration in pursuance of Directive 75/442/EEC on waste and Directive 
91/689/EEC on hazardous waste). It is important to note that Directive 2008/98/EC 
specifically repeals Directive 91/689/EEC. See Directive 2008/98, pmbl. ¶ 43, 2008 O.J. (L 
312), 3, 7 (EC) [hereinafter Waste Framework Directive] (repealing Directive 91/698/EEC). 
 78. See ELD, supra note 62, Annex III, §§ 3–5 (indicating this directive covers both 
inland and groundwater discharges but omitting marine discharges). 
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authorization under Directive 2000/60/EC (the Water Framework Directive, 
or WFD) establishing a framework for water policy,
79
 and the use, storage, 
processing, release into the environment, transport of dangerous substances, 
and the transport of dangerous or polluting goods regulated by specified EC 
Directives, also fall within the activities listed in Annex III.
80
 These 
activities are often associated, to a greater or lesser extent, with almost all 
mining. Furthermore, activities dealing with mining waste were 
unambiguously added to Annex III by Article 15 of the MWD.
81
 
Consequently, it is hard to think of any aspect of mining or mining waste, 
and its listed associated activities, for which the operator of a mine is not 
strictly liable under the ELD.  
“Environmental damage” is somewhat narrowly defined in Article 
2.1 of the Directive as follows: direct or indirect damage to the aquatic 
environment covered by the WFD, direct or indirect damage to species and 
natural habitats protected at Community level by Directive 79/409/EEC on 
the conservation of wild birds (the Birds Directive), by Directive 
92/43/EEC on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and 
flora (the Habitats Directive),
82
 and direct or indirect contamination of land 
which creates a significant risk to human health.
83
 The ELD does not cover 
environmental damage to all marine waters as defined in the Marine 
Strategy Framework Directive 2008/56/EC; however, this omission is being 
re-examined.
84
 Member States have discretion to augment ELD liability to 
                                                                                                                                      
 79. See generally Directive 2000/60, art. 11, 2000 O.J. (L 327), 1 (EC) [hereinafter 
WFD].  
 80. See ELD, supra note 62, Annex III, §§ 6–8 (regulating, inter alia, the discharge of 
pollutants into water, water abstraction, water impoundment, procedures that release 
substances into the environment, and transportation practices).  
 81. See Directive 2006/21, art. 15, 2006 O.J. (L 102), 15, 27 (EC) [hereinafter MWD] 
(adding to ELD, Article 15 “[t]he management of extractive waste pursuant to Directive 
2006/21/EC”).  
 82. See ELD, supra note 62, art. 2.1 (stating the directive’s working definition of 
environmental damage as damage to the aquatic environment, species, and natural habitats, 
and land and plant damage with the exception of adverse effects where Article 4, Section 7 
of the WFD applies).  
 83. See Gerd Winter, et al., Weighing up the EC Environmental Liability Directive, 20 
J. ENVTL. L. 1, 11 (2008), available at http://www-user.uni-
bremen.de/~gwinter/envirliability.pdf (observing that “land contamination is only 
considered as damage if creating significant risk to human health”).  
 84. For regulatory frameworks and practices currently governing environmental 
damage at sea, see European Commission, Public Consultation on Oil and Gas Offshore 
Safety, EUROPA (May 11, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/energy/oil/consultations/2011_05_11_ 
oil_gas_offshore_safety_en.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2011) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). See European Commission, Public 
Consultation: Improving Offshore Safety in Europe, EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
energy/oil/consultations/doc/20110511_public_consultation_offshore_safety.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2011) (suggesting that the extension of the ELD to Marine Waters will be 
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cover damage to species and natural habitats protected under their national 
nature conservation laws.
85
 Furthermore, under general EU environmental 
law, Member States have the power to maintain or adopt national 
provisions over mining activities; this allows each state to allocate a higher 
level of protection to the environment than the Directive requires—




B. Exemptions from Liability under the ELD 
 
The ELD provides for a number of exemptions from liability 
relevant to mining.
87
 There is no liability for previously identified adverse 
effects resulting from the act of an operator which was expressly authorized 
by regulatory authorities in accordance with provisions implementing 
Articles 6(3), 6(4), and 16 of the Habitats Directive, or Article 9 of the 
Birds Directive, or, in the case of habitats and species not covered by 
Community law, in accordance with equivalent provisions of national 
nature conservation laws.
88
 Note, however, that the adverse effects 
excluded must have directly resulted from an authorized act and that they 
must have been previously identified.
89
 When the ELD Directive came into 
force, many operators of existing mining and mining-related activities 
                                                                                                                                      
examined) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the 
Environment). 
 85. See ELD, supra note 62, arts. 2.3(c), 16(1) (allowing Member States to include 
provisions beyond the scope of the Directive’s coverage). See Report from the Commission 
to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions, EUROPA 3 (Nov. 12, 2010), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/liability/pdf/com_2010_0581.pdf (reporting on the 
transposition and implementation of the Directive in practice and finding that fourteen 
Member States had done this by 2010). Since then Ireland and the UK have also extended 
their national definitions of “protected species and natural habitats” to include species and 
habitats unprotected by EU law. Id. 
 86. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
Mar. 30, 2010, 83 C.E.T.S. 49, art. 193 (“The protective measures adopted pursuant to 
Article 192 shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more 
stringent protective measures. Such measures must be compatible with the Treaties. They 
shall be notified to the Commission.”). But see DONNA GOMIEN, SHORT GUIDE TO THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 69–71 (2005), available at 
http://www.humanrights.coe.int/aware/GB/publi/materials/1062.pdf (stating that 
retrospective criminal legislation, however, is liable to violate Article 7 of the ECHR). 
Consequently, EU Member States, who are all parties to the Convention, must respect this 
principle. The Constitutions of Member States may also constrain the enactment of 
retroactive legislation. See e.g., IR. CONST., Art. 15.5.1° (giving an example of a Constitution 
that constrains retroactive legislation). 
 87. See, e.g., ELD, supra note 62, art. 4 (stating some exceptions to liability). 
 88. See id. art. 2.1(a). 
 89. See id. 
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governed by IPPC legislation did baseline studies identifying the effects of 
their existing projects on protected habitats and species to ensure that they 
would not be liable under the Directive for damage caused before then.  
Article 4 provides that the ELD does not cover environmental 
damage, or an imminent threat of damage, resulting from what can broadly 
be termed acts of war or civil insurrection, acts of God, damage covered by 
International Conventions listed in Annex IV and Annex V, or in Article 
4.3, activities regulated under the Treaty establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community, and damage caused by activities the main purpose of 
which is serving national defence, international security, or for the sole 
purpose of protecting from natural disasters.
90
 Under Article 4.5, ELD 
liability for pollution of a diffuse character will only apply where it is 
possible to establish a causal link between the damage and the activities of 
individual operators.
91
 Predictably, this exception has been restrictively 
interpreted by the ECJ. In Raffinerie Mediterranee (ERG) SpA v. Ministero 
dello Sviluppo economico (Raffinerie Mediterranee 1), the ECJ ruled that 
only a weak causal link between an operator’s activities and diffuse 
pollution needs to be established for a competent authority to require the 
operator to clean up the pollution.
92
 The court also held that the burden of 
proof relating to the alleged causation of diffuse pollution lies with the 
operator, not the enforcing authority.
93
 
Moreover, although the ELD only came into force on April 30, 
2007, and although it appears to exclude pre-April 2007 damage,
94
 the ECJ 
in Raffinerie Mediterranee 1 held that the ELD can apply to environmental 
damage caused by an emission, event, or incident that occurs after that date 
                                                                                                                                      
 90. See id. art. 4.  
 91. See id. art. 4.5.  
 92. See Case C-378/08, Raffinerie Mediterranee (ERG) SpA v. Ministero dello 
Sviluppo economico, 2010 E.C.R. I-01919, ¶ 138 [hereinafter ECR, Raffinerie Decision 1] 
(applying the “polluter pays” principle to diffuse pollution caused before but continuing after 
the Directive comes into force); Joined Cases C-379 & 380/08, Raffinerie Mediterranee 
(ERG) SpA v. Ministero dello Sviluppo economico, 2010 E.C.R. I˗02007 [hereinafter ECR, 
Raffinerie Decision 2] (finding for broad liability under ELD).  
 93. See ECR, Raffinerie Decision 1, ¶ 49 (finding that “the burden of proof . . . lies 
with the operator”). Valerie Fogleman points out that a Member State cannot place that 
burden of proof on the enforcing authority because the ELD bars transposition of the 
Directive by less stringent domestic legislation. See Valerie Fogleman, First Environmental 
Liability Directive Cases from European Court of Justice, COMMERCIALRISKEUROPE.COM 
(June 4, 2010), http://www.commercialriskeurope.com/cre/190/57/First-Environmental-
Liability-Directive-cases-from-European-Court-of-Justice/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2011) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). If the 
burden of proof was on the enforcing authority, it would be more difficult for it to enforce 
the ELD; therefore, enforcement would be less stringent. Id.  
 94. See ELD, supra note 62, pmbl., ¶ 30 (“Damage caused before the expiry of the 
deadline for the implementation of this Directive should not be covered by its provisions.”). 
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if it results from activities commenced before, but continued after, that 
date.
95
 This conclusion is especially relevant for those Member States 
(including the UK and Ireland) that had not transposed the Directive by the 
April 30, 2007 deadline because, due to the supremacy of EU law over 
domestic law when provisions conflict,
96
 operators whose activities cause 
environmental damage, or an imminent threat of such damage, between 
April 30, 2007 and the date their national transposing legislation eventually 
came into force are liable for remediating environmental damage under the 
Directive although not under their domestic law.
97
  
Article 8.3 provides that an operator is not liable if he or she can 
prove that (a) the damage or imminent threat was caused by a third party 
and occurred despite the fact that appropriate safety measures were in place 
or (b) that the damage resulted from compliance with a compulsory order or 
instruction given by a public authority unless the order or instruction was 
consequent upon an emission or incident caused by the operator’s own 
activities.
98
 Indeed, in these cases, because the operator will be blameless, 
Article 8.3 of the ELD requires Member States to enable an operator to 
recover its costs in dealing with the environmental damage or imminent 
threat of same.
99
 Presumably, the objective is to encourage innocent 
operators to take action to prevent environmental damage without worrying 
about the costs. The exemption from liability in Article 8.3(b) is a welcome 
provision because some common law systems provide that public 
authorities are not liable for damages arising from the manner in which they 
                                                                                                                                      
 95. See ECR, Raffinerie Decision 1, ¶ 54 (“Under Article 17 and Article 19(1) of the 
Environmental Liability Directive, the directive does not apply to damage caused by an 
emission, event or incident that took place before 30 April 2007.”). “Nor does it apply to 
damage caused by an emission, event or incident which takes place subsequent to that date 
when it derives from a specific activity that took place and finished before that date.” Id. 
 96. See Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585, 599 (stating that 
“subsequent unilateral measure cannot take precedence over Community law”); see also 
Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle für 
Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, Grounds ¶ 3 (finding that Constitutions of 
Member States cannot prejudice the primacy of European law), and Case 167/73, 
Commission v. France 1974 ECR 359 (stating that Member States must rescind national 
legislation contrary to Community law). 
 97. See ELD, supra note 62, art. 20 (stating that “[t]his Directive shall enter into force 
on the day of the publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,” and, since this 
Directive was published on April 30, 2004, the Directive entered into force April 30, 2004, 
but Member States had a maximum of three years to transpose it into their national laws, a 
deadline some missed). See ELD, supra note 62, pmbl., ¶ 30 (“Damage caused before the 
expiry of the deadline for the implementation of this Directive should not be covered by its 
provisions.”). 
 98. See id. art. 8.3. 
 99. See id. 
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Article 8.4 provides that Member States have discretion to provide 
for defences for an operator which can demonstrate that it was not at fault 
or negligent and that the damage was caused by (a) an emission or event 
expressly authorized by an authorization envisaged in Annex III to the 
ELD
101
 or (b) an emission, activity, or any manner of using a product in the 
course of an activity which the operator demonstrates was not considered 
likely to cause environmental damage according to the state of scientific 
and technical knowledge at the time when the emission was released or the 
activity took place.
102
 The latter defence is the conventional “state of the 
art” defence.
103
 The ELD states that Member States “may allow the operator 
not to bear the cost of remedial actions taken pursuant to [the ELD].”
104
 
Fogleman considers that “[t]he use of the past tense of verb supports an 
interpretation of the ELD that the operator must remedy environmental 




C. Liability for Taking Preventive and Remedial Measures 
 
An operator of a mining or associated activity that is listed in 
Annex III who causes environmental damage, or produces an imminent 
threat of environmental damage, is required to take preventive
106
 and 
                                                                                                                                      
 100. See, e.g., Environmental Protection Agency Act 1992 (Act No. 7/1992) § 15 (Ir.), 
available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1992/en/act/pub/0007/index.html (providing for 
extensive agency immunity against damages for the manner in which it carries out its powers 
and duties under the Act); see also Waste Management Act 1996 (Act No. 10/1996) § 67 
(Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1996/en/act/pub/0010/index.html 
(providing immunity to the agency and local authorities against actions for damages in 
relation to the manner in which they carry out their powers and functions under the Act). 
 101.  See supra notes 76–80. Note that mining waste activities are listed in Annex III.  
 102. See ELD, supra note 62.  
 103. See Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EUROPA 3 
(Nov. 12, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/liability/pdf/ 
com_2010_0581.pdf (reporting on the transposition and implementation of the Directive in 
practice and finding that fewer than half of the Member States had provided for both 
defenses). 
 104. ELD, supra note 62, pmbl. ¶ 20, art. 8.  
 105. Valerie Fogleman, The Environmental Liability Directive and its Impacts on 
English Environmental Law, 2006 J. PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 1443, 1454 [hereinafter Fogleman, 
Environmental Liability Directive]. 
 106. See ELD, supra note 62, art. 2.10 (defining “preventative” as action to prevent or 
minimize an imminent threat of damage).  
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remedial
107
 actions under Articles 5 and 6 of the ELD respectively and to 
pay the costs of such actions.
108
 A decision issued by a competent authority 
requiring preventive or remedial measures must state the exact grounds on 
which it is based, be notified to the operator, and must inform it of any legal 
remedies available under municipal laws and of the time limits for availing 
of these.
109
 Member States are obliged by Article 15 to cooperate with each 
other, including, when appropriate, exchanging information where 
environmental damage affects or is liable to affect more than one Member 
State with a view to ensuring that preventive and, if necessary, remedial 
action is taken.
110
 The Member State where the damage originated is 
obliged to provide “sufficient” information to any other States potentially 
affected.
111
 When environmental damage occurs that was not caused in a 
Member State, this Member State may report this to the EU Commission 
and to any other Member State concerned, make recommendations for the 
adoption of preventive and remedial measures, and seek to recover costs 
incurred in relation to the adoption of preventive and remedial measures.
112
 
These costs are recoverable from the operator of the Annex III activity.
113
  
                                                                                                                                      
 107. See id. art. 2.11 (defining “remedial measures” as any action to restore, 
rehabilitate, or replace damaged natural resources or impaired services or to provide an 
equivalent alternative to them as envisaged in Annex II).  
 108. See id. pmbl. ¶ 18 (stating that the “polluter pays” principle requires the “operator 
causing the environmental damage . . . to bear the cost of necessary preventative or remedial 
measures”); id. pmbl. ¶ 21 (“Operators should bear the costs relating to preventative 
measures . . . .”); id. art. 5.4 (“The competent authority shall require that the preventative 
measures are taken by the operator . . . .”); id. art. 6.3 (“The competent authority shall 
require that the remedial measures are taken by the operator . . . .”); 
 109. See id. art. 11.4 (stating the measures Member States must take when decisions 
requiring preventative or remedial measures are taken).  
 110. See id. art. 15.  
 111. See id. art. 15.2.  
 112. See id. art. 15.3. Obligations on Member States to not only cooperate with each 
other but to also take one another’s observations into account also exists under the EIA, 
IPPC, and IED Directives and in general international environmental law, such as under the 
Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats 1979, the 
Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents 1992, and the Convention 
on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context 1991. See, e.g., Case C-
418/04, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2006 E.C.R. I-10951, 10994. See also Robin Churchill & 
Joanne Scott, The Mox Plant Litigation: the First Half-Life, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 643, 646 
(July 2004) (noting specifically the obligations of a State to provide information to another 
State on proposed activities liable to damage the marine environment under article 9 of the 
Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic 1992). 
 113. See ELD, supra note 62, art. 5.4 (stating “the competent authority shall require 
that the preventative measures are taken by the operator” and if the operator cannot be 
identified “the competent authority may take these measures itself . . .”); id. art. 6.3 (“[T]he 
competent authority shall require that the remedial measures are taken by the operator” or if 
the operator fails to the take these costs “the competent authority may take these measures 
itself, as a means of last resort . . . .”). 
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Articles 5.4 and 6 impose a mandatory obligation on competent 
authorities to require operators to take preventive measures and remedial 
measures respectively.
114
 This is a very strict obligation to enforce these 
articles which is binding on Member States.
115
 When the operators 
responsible for environmental damage cannot be identified, or when 
operators fail to take preventative or remedial measures, or are not required 
to pay ELD costs, States are empowered to take preventive or remedial 
measures themselves; however, they are not obliged to do so.
116
 The 
Council of Ministers deleted this obligation from a draft ELD.
117
 Such an 
obligation may, as discussed elsewhere in this article, exist elsewhere under 
municipal laws, other EU laws, the ECHR, the European Social Charter, the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, and even under various international 
conventions.
118
 The value of imposing mandatory obligations is that 
Member States are subject to direct enforcement action in the ECJ if they 




D. Preventive Measures 
 
The obligation to take “necessary preventive measures” arises when 
environmental damage has not yet occurred but there is an imminent threat 
of such damage.
120
 For damage to be “imminent” there must be a 
“sufficient” likelihood that it will occur in the “near” future.
121
 The 
competent authority must require that preventive measures are taken by the 
operator.
122
 The operator must take those measures “without delay,” and 
Member States must transpose the Directive requiring the operator to 
inform the competent authorities of all relevant aspects of the situation as 
soon as possible, where appropriate, and certainly whenever the imminent 
threat has not been dispelled by the operator’s preventive measures.
123
 
                                                                                                                                      
 114. See id. art. 5.4 (finding “the competent authority shall require” that operators take 
action); id. art. 6 (stating “the competent authority shall require that the remedial measures 
are taken by the operator”). 
 115. See Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585, 603 (holding that 
Member States are bound to enforce Community laws). 
 116. See ELD, supra note 62, art. 5.4 (“[T]he competent authority may take these 
measures itself.”). 
 117. See Common Position 58/2003, 2003 O.J. (C 277 E) 10 (EC). 
 118. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing the options a Member State 
has to report environmental damage that was not caused in that Member State).  
 119. See Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa, 1964 E.C.R., at 603–04 (holding that Member 
States are bound to comply with obligations in Directives). 
 120. ELD, supra note 62, art. 5.1. 
 121. Id. art. 2.9. 
 122. See id. arts. 5.3(b), 5.4 (empowering Member States to require preventive action).  
 123. Id. art. 5.2.  
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There appears to be some flexibility for Member States not to require 
operators to inform competent authorities immediately upon suspicion or 
discovery of an imminent threat of damage or before preventive (though not 
remedial) action is taken.
124
 A competent authority may also, “at any time,” 
order the operator to take the necessary preventive measures without delay, 
require it to provide information on any imminent or suspected threat of 
damage, give instructions on the necessary preventive measures, and itself 
take the necessary preventive measures and require the operator to pay the 
costs of such measures.
125
 If the operator fails to comply with the 
obligations to take preventive measures or cannot be identified or is not 
required to bear the costs under the ELD, the competent authority may (not 




E. Remedial Measures 
 
Article 6.1 of the ELD requires operators to notify the competent 
authority “immediately” of all relevant aspects of the situation when 
environmental damage occurs. Moreover, the operator must take all 
practicable steps to immediately control, contain, and remove or otherwise 
manage the relevant contaminants and/or other damage factors in order to 
limit or prevent further environmental damage and adverse effects on 
human health or further impairment of services.
127
 The operator must take 
the necessary remedial measures in accordance with Article 7.
128
  
Article 7 envisages that the operator takes primary responsibility 
for determining proposed remedial measures to competent authorities in 
accordance with Annex II unless the competent authority has already taken 
remedial action itself,
129
 and Article 11.2 provides that it is the duty of the 
                                                                                                                                      
 124. See id. (stating that when there is an imminent threat operators should inform 
“when appropriate”). But see art. 6.1 (requiring that when actual damage occurs, the 
competent authority is to be notified “without delay”). 
 125. See id. art. 5.3. 
 126. See id. art. 5.4.  
 127.  See id. art. 6.1 (“Where environmental damage has occurred the operator 
shall . . . take: all practicable steps to immediately control, contain, remove or otherwise 
manage the relevant contaminants and/or any other damage factors . . . to limit or to prevent 
further environmental damage and adverse effects on human health or further impairment of 
services . . . .”). 
 128.  See id. art. 7 (providing that the necessary remedial measures must be identified by 
operators in accordance with Annex II, must be approved by the competent authority, which 
may also decide priorities for sequential actions where there are multiple instances of 
damage, and must involve stakeholders mentioned in Art. 12, paragraph 1).  
 129.  See id. arts. 6.2(e)–6.3 (“The competent authority may . . . (c) require the operator 
to take the necessary remedial measures . . . . If the operator fails to comply . . . the 
competent authority may take these measures itself, as a means of last resort.”). 
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competent authority to determine remedial measures to be taken with 
reference to Annex II.
130
 It is therefore envisaged that operators have a 
role—but not the final say—in proposing remedial action. Annex II 
establishes the framework for determining the most appropriate measures 
for remedying environmental damage.
131
 In all cases, Article 6.2 empowers 
the competent authority to require operators to provide supplementary 
information on any damage, to itself take, or to require operators to take, all 
practicable steps immediately to control, contain, remove, or otherwise 
manage the relevant contaminants and/or other damage factors, and to give 
instructions on the necessary remedial measures.
132
 
Competent authorities are obliged to invite observations from 
stakeholders referred to in Article 12(1) (affected persons and certain 
NGOs) to submit their observations and to take them into account when 
remedial (but not preventive) measures are being determined.
133
 Member 
States are free to augment this obligation by expanding public participation 
rights.
134
 One issue which has arisen in practice concerning the obligation 
to empower affected persons to make observations on proposed remedial 
measures is defining who is an “affected” person. In one case in the 
author’s experience, a competent authority refused to allow a defendant in a 
trespass action, who was alleged to have illegally dumped materials on an 
operator’s lands, to participate in the decision-making on proposed 
remediation measures although the alleged trespasser was potentially liable 




                                                                                                                                      
 130.  See id. art. 11.2 (requiring the competent authority to establish which operator 
caused the damage and determine which remedial measures shall be taken in reference to 
Annex II). 
 131.  See id. Annex II (detailing remedies for environmental damage). 
 132.  See id. art. 6.2. 
 133.  See id. art. 7.4 (requiring invitation and consideration of opinions from persons 
potentially affected by the damage or remedial action). The potential for unsubstantiated 
allegations of damage is much greater when preventive measures are concerned and, in any 
case, it appears to be the policy to leave more control over the situation to the operator when 
the damage is imminent, and more control to the competent authorities, and more 
opportunities for NGO and stakeholder participation, when damage has actually occurred. 
See id. arts. 6–8 (delegating primary responsibility for remedial action to competent 
authorities, providing for NGO and stakeholder input in remedial action, and placing 
primary responsibility for preventative measures on the operator). 
 134.  See id. art. 16.1 (permitting member nations to adopt more stringent provisions for 
the prevention and remediation of environmental damage).  
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F. Rights of NGOs and the Public to Request Action to Remediate 
Environmental Damage 
 
Article 12.1 of the ELD provides that natural or legal persons 
(including NGOs) (a) adversely affected or likely to be adversely affected 
by environmental damage or (b) having a sufficient interest in 
environmental decision-making relating to the damage or, alternatively, (c) 
alleging the impairment of a right, if the administrative law of a Member 
State makes this a pre-condition, are entitled to submit observations relating 
to instances of environmental damage or imminent threats of such damage 
of which they are aware and may ask the competent authorities to take 
action under the Directive.
135
 Member States may determine the 
requirements for (a) and (b) above for natural and legal persons, but 
environmental NGOs meeting any standing requirements under national 
law must be deemed to have a sufficient interest and rights capable of being 
impaired for the purposes of (c) above.
136
 
Article 12.2 provides that requests for action must be accompanied 
by relevant information and data supporting observations submitted relating 
to the alleged environmental damage.
137
 It is not sufficient merely to allege 
that there is damage or threatened damage—some evidence of the reality of 
such damage must be provided.
138
 Where the request for action and 
accompanying observations show, “in a plausible manner,” that 
environmental damage exists, the competent authority is obliged to consider 
them and to give the relevant operator an opportunity to make his views 
known with respect to the observations and request for action submitted.
139
 
It is clear that there is scope for competent authorities not to consider 
requests for action which are frivolous, vexatious, or without substance or 
                                                                                                                                      
 135.  See id. art. 12.1 (specifying parties permitted to submit observations of 
environmental damage, imminent environmental damage, or proposed remedies).  
 136.  See Case C-263/08, Djurgården-Lilla Värtans Miljöskyddsförening v. Stockholms 
kommun genom dess marknämnd, 2009 E.C.R. I-9967, ¶ 75 (concluding that national 
legislation that guarantees access to justice only to environmental non-governmental 
organizations with at least 2000 members is unacceptable). Member States may not make the 
qualifications for recognition as an NGO too restrictive. Id. ¶ 74 (“Any restriction whose 
effect is to hinder rather than to facilitate access to administrative and judicial procedures for 
environmental organisations must, even more evidently, be rejected.”). 
 137.  See ELD, supra note 62, art. 12.2 (“The request for action shall be accompanied 
by the relevant information and data supporting the observations submitted in relation to the 
environmental damage in question.”). 
 138.  Id.  
 139.  See id. art. 12.3 (requiring competent authorities to consider observations and 
requests for action where a plausible case is made that environmental damage exists and to 
give operators an opportunity of commenting on such observations and requests for action). 
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foundation.
140
 On the other hand, Article 12.3 does not oblige the 
competent authority to consider the request for action if a plausible case is 
made that there is an imminent threat of damage as distinct from actual 
damage.
141
 In fact, Article 12.5 provides that Member States are free to 
stipulate that no such obligation exists where the threat of damage is merely 
imminent.
142
 Member States are obliged under Article 12.4 to ensure that 
decisions taken with respect to observations, and the reasons for them, are 
communicated to the observers.
143
 Article 12.5 permits Member States not 




Article 13.1 provides that the persons referred to in Article 12.1 
must have access to a court or other impartial tribunal to challenge the 
substantive and procedural legality of the competent authority’s decisions, 
acts, or failure to act.
145
 This obligation to provide access to justice is 
already an obligation on the EU and on Member States under the UNECE 
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus 
Convention).
146
 The right of individuals and NGOs to intervene in 
administrative decision-making concerning remediation of environmental 
damage is somewhat limited and does not include a right to take direct 
action against the operator to compel remediation. The domestic laws of 
some EU Member States may, however, provide for such a right.
147
 
                                                                                                                                      
 140.  See id. (allowing the competent authority to dismiss cases lacking plausible 
evidence of environmental damage). 
 141.  See id. art. 12.3 (empowering competent authorities to take observations into 
account and to consider requests for action where environmental damage “exists,” not when 
it is imminent). 
 142.  See id. art. 12.5 (“Member States may decide not to apply paragraphs 1 to 4 . . . to 
cases of imminent threat of damage.”). 
 143.  See id. art. 12.4 (“The competent authority shall . . . inform the persons referred to 
in paragraph 1, which submitted observations to the authority, of its decision to accede to or 
refuse the request for action and shall provide the reasons for it.”). 
 144.  See id. art. 12.5 (“Member States may decide not to apply . . . to cases of imminent 
threat of damage.”). 
 145.  See id. art. 13.1. The persons referred to in Article 12(1) are natural and legal 
persons affected or likely to be affected by environmental damage, or having a sufficient 
interest in decisions on environmental damage or, alternatively, alleging the impairment of a 
right where the law of the Member State requires this for standing. 
 146. See Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, 
http://live.unece.org/env/pp/welcome.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2011) (“The Aarhus 
Convention grants the public rights and imposes on Parties and public authorities obligations 
regarding access to information and public participation and access to justice.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
 147.  See ELD, supra note 62, art. 13.2 (“This Directive shall be without prejudice to 
any provisions of national law which regulate access to justice . . . .”); Irish Local 
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V. Liability on Member States to Remediate Environmental Damage by 
Mining  
 
As indicated above, the ELD imposes no direct obligation on 
Member States or competent authorities themselves to take preventive or 
remedial action for environmental damage, including damage from mining 
waste.
148
 The primary obligation to take such action and to pay the costs, as 
defined in the ELD, lies with “operators.”
149
 Individuals and NGOs with 
standing under Article 12 of the ELD may judicially review a Member 
State’s decision not to act against an operator, but they have no rights under 
the ELD to compel competent authorities to prevent or remediate the 
environmental damage when the operator fails to do so.
150
 A question then 
arises as to what happens when there is no operator as defined in Article 2.6 
of the ELD,
151
 or when an operator is unable, for financial or other reasons, 
to prevent or remediate the environmental damage, or when the 




Article 3.2 of the ELD provides that the ELD shall operate without 
prejudice to more stringent Community legislation regulating any of the 
                                                                                                                                      
Government (Water Pollution) (Amendment) Act, (Act No. 21/1990) §§ 8, 9 (Ir.) (permitting 
under sections 11 and 12 any person, whether or not he has a personal or proprietary interest 
in the matter, to apply to court for an order compelling a polluter to remediate environmental 
damage causing or liable to cause water pollution). Similar rights exist under section 28 of 
Air Pollution Act 1987 and sections 57 and 58, as amended, of the Waste Management Act 
1996. 
 148.  See ELD, supra note 62, arts. 6.1–6.3 (placing the primary responsibility for 
remedial action with the operator rather than Member States or competent authorities). 
 149.  See id. (stating that the operator has the primary responsibility to take remedial 
action). Note that all Member States surveyed by 2010 had extended the definition of 
operator. See Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EUROPA 3 
(Nov. 12, 2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/liability/ 
pdf/com_2010_0581.pdf (reporting on the transposition and implementation of the directive 
in practice and finding that all but one of the EU Member States which had transposed the 
directive had expanded the definition of operator in their domestic laws by 2010). 
 150.  See id. art. 13 (providing judicial review for parties with standing under Article 
12.1, but not providing for power to coerce action on the part of competent authorities).  
 151.  See id. art. 2.6 (defining operator as any natural or legal, private or public person 
who operates or controls the occupational activity or to whom decisive economic power over 
the technical functioning of such an activity has been delegated, including the holder of a 
permit or authorization). 
 152.  This could be the case if the damage was caused and completed before April 30, 
2007, or if, for some reason, a mining activity was not regulated under Annex III of the 
ELD. See id. art. 19.1 (providing a remedy for Member States after April 30, 2007). 
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activities falling within its scope.
153
 Compliance with obligations under 
international law, under the ECHR, the European Social Charter, and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights discussed above could also require Member 
States to remediate environmental damage or deal with imminent threats of 
such damage caused by mining.
154
 In addition, there are a number of 
requirements under various Directives which could be relied upon 
(depending on the circumstances) to compel Member States themselves to 
prevent or remediate damage caused by mining or mining waste activities, 
including damage caused by closed or abandoned mines, for which no 
operator, or no operator with the capacity or financial resources to prevent 
or remediate, can be found. The next part of this article will deal with some 
of the more important Directives. 
 
A. Directive 98/83/EC on the Quality of Water Intended for Human 
Consumption  
 
Directive 98/83/EC on the quality of water intended for human 
consumption provides that if there is a non-compliance with the standards 
for the quality of drinking water imposed under the Directive, the Member 
State concerned must investigate the cause and ensure that the necessary 
remedial action is taken as soon as possible to restore the quality of the 
water.
 155
 Where water constitutes a potential human health hazard,
156
 
Member States are required to take appropriate action.
157
 The Commission 
enforces the quality standards in this Directive against Member States.
158
 
                                                                                                                                      
 153.  See id. art. 3.2 (“This Directive shall apply without prejudice to more stringent 
Community legislation regulating the operation of any of the activities falling within the 
scope of this Directive and without prejudice to Community legislation containing rules on 
conflicts of jurisdiction.”). 
 154. See supra notes 24–30. 
 155.  See Directive 98/83, pmbl. ¶ 25, art. 6, 1998 O.J. (L 330) 32, 34, 36 (EC) 
(imposing mandatory standards for microbiological and chemical parameters in water 
intended for human consumption).  
 156.  Id. art. 8 (obliging Member States to ensure that substances used in water for 
human consumption do not directly or indirectly constitute a public health hazard).  
 157.  See id. art. 7.1 (requiring States to ensure that drinking water at least meets the 
requirements in Annex 1); id. art. 19 (requiring Member States to take the necessary 
measures to ensure that the water meets the standards in the Directive).  
 158.  See Comm’n v. United Kingdom, Case C 337/89, 1992 E.C.R. 1-6103 (ruling that 
the obligation to comply with the standards in Directive 80/778/EEC (which Directive 
98/83/EC replaced) is strict and can only be excused in the circumstances provided for in the 
Directive, thus effectively ruling that failure in practice to meet required standards is 
inexcusable). See Comm’n v. Belgium, Case C 42/89, 1990 E.C.R. I-2821 (holding that 
Belgian authorities were not entitled to plead financial considerations for failure to ensure that 
lead in drinking water met standards prescribed in Directive 80/778/EEC). It also held that 
 
206 3 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV’T 177 (2012) 
If mining and waste activities cause a contravention of drinking 
water quality standards prescribed in the Directive, and if there is no other 
source of drinking water readily available, a Member State itself might be 
obliged to take the necessary preventive and remedial action with respect to 
the polluting activity in order to ensure compliance with obligations in the 
Directive and indeed to ensure respect for the human rights to water and 
sanitation, the rights of bodily integrity, and the rights to respect for family 
and private life.
159
 In practice, Irish and English authorities have done this 
when drinking water sources have been contaminated.  
 
B. Directive 92/43/EEC on the Conservation of Natural Habitats and of 
Wild Fauna and Flora  
 
Obligations relating to habitats protected under the Habitats and 
Birds Directives may require a State itself to take proactive measures, 
including remediation of a protected habitat damaged by mining, to ensure 
that the habitat is conserved and/or restored.
160
 Article 6.2 of the Habitats 
Directive obliges Member States to take “appropriate steps” to avoid 
deterioration of natural habitats and the habitats of species and the 
significant disturbance of species in designated areas.
161
 This requires 
                                                                                                                                      
derogations with respect to poison or microbiological requirements are not permissible because 
of the risk to human health involved. Id. 
 159.  See G.A. Res. 64/48, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/48, 3 (July 26, 2010), available at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/64/L.63/Rev.1 (“The right to safe and 
clean drinking water and sanitation is a human right that is essential for the full enjoyment of 
life and all human rights.”). See generally M. A. SALMAN & SIOBHAN MCINERNEY-
LANKFORD, THE WORLD BANK, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER: LEGAL AND POLICY 
DIMENSIONS (2004); HENRI SMETS, ACADEMIE DE L’EAU, LE DROIT À L’EAU POTABLE ET À 
L’ASSAINISSEMENT EN EUROPE—THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIGHT TO SAFE DRINKING 
WATER AND SANITATION IN EUROPE (2011); Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit 
of Water: Evaluating Water as a Human Right and the Duties and Obligations it Creates, 4 
NW. U. J. OF INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS 331 (2005). 
 160.  See Council Directive 92/43, art. 6.2, Annex III, 1992 O.J. (L 206) 7, 49 (EEC) 
[hereinafter Habitats Directive] (obliging Member States to establish necessary conservation 
measures in special conservation areas and to take appropriate steps to avoid the 
deterioration of natural habitats and the habitats of species and to avoid the significant 
disturbance of species in those areas). Note that over 14% of the EU is protected under the 
Habitats Directive and that many special conservation areas are often areas where mining 
activities are liable to take place. See also Directive 79/449/EEC, O.J. (L 103), which is now 
codified as Directive 2009/147/EC (O.J. (20/7)). Article 7 of the Habitats Directive extends 
the protections in Articles 6(2), (3), and (4) of the Habitats Directive to areas classified 
under Article 4 of the Directive 79/447/EEC from the date they are classified so that the 
protections described above apply equally to designated bird habitats and other habitats.  
 161.  See id. The Habitats Directive protects birds and a wide range of rare, threatened, 
or endemic species of flora and fauna, including over 450 animals, 500 plants, and over 200 
rare and characteristic habitats. The Birds Directive and Habitats Directive protect the most 
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Member States to take a proactive and creative approach to habitat and 
species protection. In a number of cases including Commission v. Spain
162
 
and Commission v. Ireland,
163
 the ECJ held that the Article 6.2 obligation 
arises even before any reduction or risk to a protected species materializes, 
for example, in cases of imminent threats to protected species or habitats.
164
 
The Commission may examine how Article 6.2 is implemented for 
particular habitats and species and, if the measures taken are inadequate, it 





 the ECJ held that French measures adopted to 
comply with similar obligations under Article 4 of the Birds Directive were 
inadequate.
167
 Likewise, in Commission v. Ireland,
168
 the ECJ ruled that 
Ireland had contravened Article 3 of the Birds Directive and Article 6.2 of 
the Habitats Directive by not taking adequate proactive measures to protect 
and to prevent the deterioration of the habitats of red grouse in the 
Owenduff-Nephin Beg Complex Special Protection Area and by not taking 
the necessary measures to prevent damage to a blanket bog protected under 
the Habitats Directive.
169
 The Article 6.2 obligation is imposed on the State; 





                                                                                                                                      
important habitats of migratory species and of over 194 particularly threatened species and 
designated wetlands habitats.  
 162. See Case C-355/90, Comm’n v. Kingdom of Spain, 1993 E.C.R. I-4286, I-4271 
(finding that Spain had failed to fulfill its obligations under the EEC treaty by not taking 
adequate measures to prevent deterioration and pollution of marsh habitats used by wild 
birds by permitting wastewater discharges, roads, and industrial projects in the Santona 
marshes). 
 163.  See Case C-117/00, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2002 E.C.R. 1, I-5355 (finding that 
Ireland had failed to take adequate measures to avoid the deterioration of the bog habitats 
populated by the red grouse protected species in special protection areas). 
 164.  See Comm’n v. Ireland, at I-5352 (finding Ireland responsible for failure to 
prevent situations causing the deterioration of habitats by overgrazing); Comm’n v. Spain, at 
I-4271 (holding that Spain failed to fulfill its obligations by not taking appropriate steps to 
avoid pollution or deterioration of important bird habitats by permitting projects which cause 
the deterioration of marsh habitats). 
 165.  Id.  
 166.  See Case C-374/98, Comm’n v. France, 2000 E.C.R. I-1512, 10836. 
 167.  See id. (finding that France failed to adopt special conservation measures sufficient 
for geographical protection of wild birds). 
 168.  See Case C-117/00, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2002 E.C.R. at I-5355 (finding that 
Ireland had failed to take adequate measures to prevent deterioration of habitats in special 
protection areas).  
 169.  Id.  
 170.  See Habitats Directive, supra note 160, art. 6 (“Member States shall take 
appropriate steps to avoid, in the special areas of conservation, the deterioration of natural 
habitats . . . .”). 
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VI. The Regulation of Mining  
 
It is generally recognized that liability regimes are not the only or 
even the best way of preventing or dealing with environmental damage 
from mining or mining waste activities or major accidents connected with 
such waste.
171
 The insurance industry’s experience is that a greater focus on 
risk management is the best means of reducing risks of environmental 
damage.
172
 The EU has enacted a number of Directives which operate to 
ensure that mining and mining wastes do not pose a risk to the environment 
or human health or safety.
173
 Individuals who have standing may enforce 
the requirements of these Directives in national courts
174
 and national courts 
must take them into consideration and enforce them.
175
 
                                                                                                                                      
 171.  See COMM. OF EUROPEAN ASSURANCES, CEA RESPONSE TO EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION’S PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON IMPROVING OFFSHORE SAFETY IN EUROPE 2 (2011), 
available at http://www.cea.eu/uploads/Modules/Publications/european_commissions_ 
consultation_on_improving_eu_offshore_safety.pdf (“[T]hese risks are covered by 
specialised policies offered by the marine and energy lines of the insurance market. . . . 
[T]hese types of insurers have effectively offered related liability cover under the primary 
international conventions dealing with sea pollution.”). 
 172.  See id. at 3 (“The insurance industry’s experience has revealed that a better focus 
on such risk management is the best means of reducing environmental damage risks.”). The 
CEA is the European insurance and reinsurance federation, representing undertakings that 
account for around 95% of total European premium income. Id at 5. 
 173.  See supra notes 155–60 and accompanying text (describing Directives designed to 
ensure that mining and mining waste do not pose a risk to the environment or human health 
or safety). 
 174.  See Case 118/94, Comm’n v. Italy, 1996 E.C.R 1-01223 (holding that whenever 
the provisions of a Directive are sufficiently clear and precise, those provisions can be relied 
upon by an individual against any Member State where the State has failed to implement the 
Directive in national law correctly or by the end of the period prescribed); see also 
Aannemersbedrijf P. K. Kraaijeveld BV and Others v. Zuid-Holland, 1996 E.C.R. I-5403, 
5431, ¶ 56 (stating the obligation on a national court called upon to implement Community 
Law to do all within the limits of its power to do so.) 
 175.  See Directive 2003/35, art. 3(7)(b), 2003 O.J. (L 156) 17, 20 (EC) (requiring 
Member States to provide access to justice—meaning access to the courts when 
appropriate—in all cases involving EIA and IPPC projects). Moreover, the ECJ has held, in 
Case C-435/97, World Wildlife Fund and Others v. Autonome Provinz Bozen and Others, 
1999 E.C.R. I-5637, ¶ 69, that: 
[I]t would be incompatible with the binding effect conferred on directives . . . 
for the possibility for those concerned to rely on the obligation which 
directives impose to be excluded in principle. Particularly where the 
Community authorities have, by directive, imposed on Member States the 
obligation to pursue a particular course of conduct, the effectiveness of such 
an act would be diminished if individuals were prevented from relying on it in 
legal proceedings and if national courts were prevented from taking it into 
consideration as a matter of Community law in determining whether the 
national legislature, in exercising its choice as to the form and methods for 
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A. Strategic Control of Mining 
 
At a strategic level, Directive 2001/42/EC on Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (SEA)
176
 encourages a more integrated 
approach to territorial planning where environmental considerations are 
taken into account at an early stage in the planning process. Article 3 of the 
SEA Directive requires SEA for plans and programmes, as well as certain 
modifications to them, prepared and/or adopted by an authority
177
 pursuant 
to legislative, regulatory, or administrative provisions which set the 
framework for future development consent in respect of projects under, 
inter alia, the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive,
178
 or which 
require an assessment under the Habitats Directive.
179
 SEA may result in 
the identification of locations or development constraints where operators 
                                                                                                                                      
implementing the directive, had kept within the limits of its discretion set in 
the Directive.  
Id.; see also Case C-201/02, Wells v. Sec’y of State for Transp., Local Gov’t and the 
Regions, 2004 E.C.R. I-723, ¶ 57 (holding that an individual can invoke directly effective 
provisions of a directive against a Member State in national courts); Case C-287/98, 
Luxembourg v. Berthe Linster, 2000 E.C.R. I-6917, ¶ 32 (noting that the effectiveness of 
Directives would be reduced if individuals could not make directive-based claims in national 
courts); Case C-72/95, Aannemersbedrijf P. K. Kraaijeveld BV and Others v. Zuid-Holland, 
1996 E.C.R. I-5403, 5431, ¶ 56 (noting the right of an individual to invoke provisions in a 
directive and the obligation of the national courts to enforce Directives). 
 176.  See Directive 2001/42, pmbl. ¶ 7, 2001 O.J. (L 197) 30 (EC). This Directive 
implements the Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the United 
Nations/Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment in a Transboundary Context. 
 177.  See Implementation of Directive 2001/42 on the Assessment of the Effects of 
Certain Plans and Programmes on the Environment, ENVIRONMENT DIRECTORATE-GENERAL 
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, ¶¶ 3.12, 3.13, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/pdf/030923_sea_guidance.pdf (noting that the concept 
of “authority” has been given a large scope in the case law of the ECJ). 
 178.  See generally Council Directive 85/337, 1985 O.J. (L 175) 40 (EEC) [hereinafter 
EIA Directive] (strengthening previous directives concerning transboundary environmental 
impact). Most substantial mining projects commenced since July 5, 1987, the date the EIA 
Directive came into force, fall within its scope. Id. Additionally, since the decision in Case 
C-201/02, Wells v. Sec’y of State for Transp., Local Gov’t and the Regions, 2004 E.C.R. I-
723, older mining projects subject to an environmental re-authorization must also be subject 
to an environmental impact assessment (EIA).  
 179.  See Habitats Directive, supra note 160, at 7 (requiring measures for the 
conservation of natural habitats and of wild flora and fauna). In practice, many mining 
projects located in remote or rural areas are liable to affect protected habitats. See HAKAN 
TARRAS-WAHLBERG, MINING AND SUSTAINABILITY IN THE ACP COUNTRIES 1–2, available at 
http://www.acpsec.org/mines/Mining%20and%20Sustainability.pdf (explaining that “[w]hen 
mines are established in previously undisturbed areas, the environmental impacts are 
considerable”). 
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of proposed mining projects may, or will, encounter difficulties in obtaining 
the required environmental authorizations.
180
 
Mining and waste plans and programmes are among those for 
which SEA is required under Article 3 either because they are often 
components of the various plans (notably land use and natural resources 
plans) listed in Article 2.2 for which SEA is mandatory, or because they are 
other listed types of plans or programmes for which Member States are 
obliged to require SEA,
181
 and/or because mining and mining waste projects 
are almost invariably subject to EIA or are often liable to have effects in 
environmentally sensitive areas protected under the Birds, Habitats, Urban 
Wastewater Treatment, and the Water Framework Directives.
182
 Where 
properly implemented, SEA enables alternatives to be considered at a 
macro level, allowing EIA of individual projects to focus more on location-
specific or operational alternatives.
183
 The SEA of a mining, waste, land 
                                                                                                                                      
 180.  See id. art. 5 (requiring the filing of an environmental report in which the likely 
significant effects on the environment of implementing the plan or programme, and 
reasonable alternatives taking into account the objectives and the geographical scope of the 
plan or programme, are identified, described, and evaluated). Note that Annex 1 requires the 
report to deal, inter alia, with  
(c) the environmental characteristics of areas likely to be significantly 
affected; (d) any existing environmental problems which are relevant to the 
plan or programme including, in particular, those relating to any areas of a 
particular environmental importance, such as areas designated pursuant to 
Directives 79/409/EEC and 92/43/EEC; and (e) the environmental protection 
objectives, established at international, Community or Member State level, 
which are relevant to the plan or programme and the way those objectives and 
any environmental considerations have been taken into account during its 
preparation. 
Id. Annex I. The evaluation should show environmental and other constraints on plans and 
projects in particular areas. 
 181.  See Directive 2001/42, supra note 176, art. 2.2(a) (listing sectors for which SEA is 
mandatory and including plans and programmes for energy, industry, waste management, 
water management, town and country planning, and land use). Official mining plans and 
programmes feature in many of these, and in any case would normally come under Article 
2.4 as other plans “likely to have significant environmental effects.” See id. art. 1 (requiring 
environmental assessment for plans with significant environmental effects). When 
PROTOCOL ON STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT TO THE UNECE CONVENTION ON 
EIA IN TRANSBOUNDARY CONTEXT (Kiev, 2003), approved by Council Decision 2008/871, 
2008 O.J. (L 308) 33 (EC), is fully implemented, SEA will be required for policies and 
legislation.  
 182.  See Council Directive 79/409, 1979 O.J. (L 103) 1 (EEC) (requiring stricter 
standards for waters discharged directly or indirectly into identified sensitive areas), and Water 
Framework Directive, arts. 6 and 8 (requiring registration and protective measures for protected 
areas listed in Annex IV); Habitats Directive, supra note 160, art. 6 (same); Council Directive 
91/271, art. 3, O.J. (L 135) 41 (EEC) (same).  
 183.  See William Sheate et al., The Relationship between the EIA and SEA Directives 
(2005), 17–18, available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/pdf/final_report_0508.pdf 
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use, or industry plan or programme may result in the identification of areas 
where mining is prima facie to be encouraged, areas where mining must be 
restricted, and areas where it will be discouraged or disallowed completely. 
(This is the typical result of SEA of major land use and industry plans in the 
EU so that, for example, land use plans adopted after the SEA process often 
prohibit mining in national parks.)  
The recognition of suitable or unsuitable areas for mining may also 
occur when competent authorities in Member States are implementing the 
Water Framework Directive (WFD), under which protection/conservation 
areas for economically significant shellfish and freshwater fish species, 
bathing waters, water dependent conservation areas, and drinking water 
protection areas are established pursuant to various EU Water Directives.
184
 
Particularly relevant to mining are obligations in Article 4.1 of the WFD 
requiring Member States to achieve a good ecological and chemical status 
of all bodies of surface water and groundwater by 2015 and in Article 4.4 
requiring them to draw up river basin management plans to achieve this.
185
 
If a mining-related activity was likely to compromise the objectives in these 
                                                                                                                                      
(discussing which assessment procedures are most appropriate in an EIA and SEA context). 
If an area is considered suitable for mining or mining waste under a SEA, the task of 
justifying that location in an EIA is much reduced. Id. (discussing the overlap in EIA and 
SEA assessment and approval procedures).  
 184.  See WFD, supra note 79, at 12 (requiring Member States to establish a register, or 
registers, of protected areas). The register, or registers, must comprise areas lying within 
each river basin district designated as requiring special protection under specific Community 
legislation for the protection of their surface water and groundwater or for the conservation 
of habitats and species directly depending on water. Id. Annex IV lists the types of areas that 
must be included in the register: 
(i) Areas designated for the abstraction of water for human consumption; (ii) 
Areas designated for the protection of economically significant aquatic 
species; (iii) Bodies of water designated as recreational waters, including areas 
designated as bathing waters; (iv) Nutrient-sensitive areas, including areas 
identified as Polluted Waters under the Nitrates Directive and areas designated 
as sensitive under Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive; (v) Areas 
designated for the protection of habitats or species where the maintenance or 
improvement of the status of water is an important factor in their protection 
including relevant Natura 2000 sites designated under Directive 92/43/EEC(1) 
and Directive 79/409/EEC(2).  
Id. Annex IV. See generally UK Technical Advisory Group on the Water 
Framework Directive, Guidance on Objectives and Standards for Protected Areas, 
http://www.wfduk.org/tag_guidance/Article_06-07/guidance_protected_areas (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2011) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment). 
 185.  See WFD, supra note 79, arts. 4.1–4.4 (requiring the study and assessment of 
measures to protect groundwater). 
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plans, a SEA of any plan or programme dealing with mining would likely 
recommend that it should be prohibited or very rigidly controlled.
186
 
The WFD even addresses the quantitative status of groundwaters.
187
 
Member States must ensure that all bodies of groundwater are protected, 
enhanced, and restored; that there is a balance between abstraction and 
recharge of groundwater; that the groundwater resource does not decrease; 
and that it is managed sustainably.
188
 Such obligations are particularly 
relevant in the context of authorising many mines. Similarly, although 
probably less relevant in practice, where Member States find that a 
particular zone exceeds or is at risk of exceeding the limit values and any 
relevant margin of tolerance for the various pollutants prescribed under 
Directive 2008/50/EC on ambient air quality and cleaner air for Europe,
189
 
and when they draw up air quality plans to achieve required air quality 
standards by relevant target dates, mining projects making it difficult to 
achieve these standards are liable to be refused operating permits.
190
  
Article 28 of Directive 2008/98/EC on waste
191
 (the Waste 
Framework Directive) requires Member States to draw up waste 
management plans for their territories, but this Directive does not apply to 
extractive waste as defined in the Mining Waste Directive (MWD).
192
 Plans 
for such waste must be made under the MWD discussed below. Both 
Directives require the management of general wastes and extractive wastes 




Obligations might exist under Directive 96/82/EC on the control of 
major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances (the Seveso II 
                                                                                                                                      
 186.  See id. art. 8 (providing for decision-making based on the environmental report); 
see also supra note 180. 
 187.  See WFD, supra note 79, pmbl. ¶ 19 (stating that although the control of water 
quantity is an ancillary element in securing good water quality, measures on quantity, 
serving the objective of ensuring good quality, should also be established); id. ¶ 41 (stating 
that for water quantity, overall principles should be laid down for control on abstraction and 
impoundment in order to ensure the environmental sustainability of the affected water 
systems). 
 188.  Id. arts. 4.1(ii), 11.1(e),  
 189.  See generally Directive 2008/50, 2008 O.J. (L 152) 1 (EC) (defining and 
establishing objectives for ambient air quality). 
 190.  See id. art. 17.1 (requiring Member States to take necessary measures to meet 
targets for achieving prescribed ambient air quality standards). 
 191.  See Waste Framework Directive, supra note 77, at 17–18 (requiring states to 
create waste management plans). 
 192.  See id. art. 2.2(d) (excluding extractive waste from the scope of the directive). 
 193.  See id. art. 28 (requiring the establishment and enforcement of waste management 
plans); MWD, supra note 81, at 21–22 (stating requirements for waste management plans 
under the Directives). 
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Directive) requiring Member States to identify hazardous wastes,
194
 assess 
the risks which they pose, and state measures to be taken to address any 
risks. Directive 2003/105/EC amended Seveso II to cover the processing 
and storage of minerals containing dangerous substances extracted in 
mining, quarrying, and tailings disposal and other mining waste facilities.
195
 
Implementation of the Seveso II Directive, which had to be transposed by 
July 1, 2005, may also mandate either the prohibition of tailings disposal 
facilities, tailings ponds or dams containing dangerous substances, and 
storage of certain dangerous substances in certain areas or, if they are 
permitted, separating them appropriately from other areas. Article 12(a), 
inserted by Article 1 of Directive 2003/105/EC, requires Member States to 
ensure that:  
 
[T]heir land-use and/or other relevant policies and the 
procedures for implementing those policies take account of 
the need, in the long term, to maintain appropriate 
distances between establishments covered by [Seveso II] 
and residential areas, buildings and areas of public use, 
major transport routes as far as possible, recreational areas 
and areas of particular natural sensitivity or interest and, in 
the case of existing establishments, of the need for 
additional technical measures in accordance with Article 5 




B. Permit Systems for Mining and Mining Waste Activities 
 
At a non-strategic level, mining and mining waste is primarily 
controlled by permit systems designed to impose operational and risk 
management controls in order to ensure that mining and waste and ancillary 
activities do not endanger the environment or human health or safety. 
Almost all mines and many associated waste activities of any 
environmental significance are subject to environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) when they apply for authorizations to develop and operate because 
they are projects for which EIA is prima facie required or because, although 
they might not be listed as projects for which EIA is required, they are an 
                                                                                                                                      
 194.  See id. art. 19 (defining hazardous waste in Art. 3.2 of Directive 2008/98/EC as 
“waste which displays one or more of the hazardous properties listed in Annex III” thereto). 
 195. See Directive 2003/105, art. 1(a), 2003 O.J. (L 345) 97, 98 (EC) (amending Article 
4 of Seveso II by Article 1 of Directive 2003/106/EC to cover: operational tailings disposal 
facilities, including those containing dangerous substances used in connection with chemical 
and thermal processing, operations, and storage of minerals and chemicals related to 
operations involving dangerous substances, listed in Annex I).  
 196.  Id. 
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integral part of a project for which EIA is obligatory.
197
 Many kinds of 
mining and many projects which facilitate mining are listed as Annex 1 or 
Annex II projects under the EIA Directive and Member States have the 
discretion to set thresholds below which mining projects listed in Annex 11 
                                                                                                                                      
 197.  See EIA Directive, supra note 178, art. 1 (requiring an EIA for certain projects 
likely to have significant effects on the environment). The following projects, which could 
conceivably be associated with mining, are listed in Annex I of the Consolidated Directive 
as being mandatorily subject to an EIA: waste disposal installations for hazardous waste, 
waste disposal installations for non-hazardous waste (with a capacity of more than 100 
tonnes per day), groundwater abstraction or artificial groundwater recharge schemes where 
the annual volume of water abstracted or recharged is equivalent to or exceeds 10 million 
cubic meters, construction of overhead electrical power lines with a voltage of 220 kV or 
more and a length of more than 15 km, quarries and open-cast mining where the surface of 
the site exceeds 25 hectares, or peat extraction where the surface of the site exceeds 150 
hectares, extraction of natural gas where the amount abstracted exceeds 500,000m3 per day. 
Id. Annex I. Article 4(2) gives Member States, within certain limits, power to define the 
types of projects within Annex II which will require an EIA. Id. art. 4.2. Annex II provides, 
in material part, that EIA is required for the following:  
2. Extractive industry (a) Quarries, open-cast mining and peat extraction 
(projects not included in Annex I); (b) Underground mining; (c) Extraction of 
minerals by marine or fluvial dredging; (d) Surface industrial installations for 
the extraction of coal, petroleum, natural gas and ores, as well as bituminous 
shale; 3. Energy industry (b) Transmission of electrical energy by overhead 
cables (projects not included in Annex I); (c) Surface storage of natural gas; 
(d) Underground storage of combustible gases; (e) Surface storage of fossil 
fuels; (f) Industrial briquetting of coal and lignite; 10. Infrastructure projects 
(c) Construction of railways and intermodal transshipment facilities, and of 
intermodal terminals (projects not included in Annex I); (d) Construction of 
airfields (projects not included in Annex I); (e) Construction of roads, harbors 
and port installations, including fishing harbors (projects not included in 
Annex I); (f) Inland-waterway construction (projects not included in Annex I); 
(g) Dams and other installations designed to hold water or store it on a long-
term basis (projects not included in Annex I); (i) Oil and gas pipeline 
installations and pipelines for the transport of CO2 streams for the purposes of 
geological storage (projects not included in Annex I); (j) Installations of long-
distance aqueducts; (l) Groundwater abstraction and artificial groundwater 
recharge schemes not included in Annex I; II. Other projects (b) Installations 
for the disposal of waste (projects not included in Annex I). The ECJ has held 
that even if one of the above projects is merely ancillary to a project for which 
EIA is not required under Annex I or I1, an EIA may still be required for the 
entire project.  
Id. See also Case C-215/06, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2008 E.C.R. I-4911, where EIA was not (then) 
required for a wind farm under Directive 85/337/EEC but might have been required for ancillary 
development (minor roads to the site and the displacement of peat) necessary to build the wind 
farm. The ECJ held that EIA was required for the entire project. Id.; see also Interpretation Line 
Suggested by the Commission as Regards the Application of Directive 85/337/EEC to 
Ancillary/Associated Works (2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ 
eia/pdf/Note%20-%20Interpretation%20of%20Directive%2085-337-EEC.pdf (providing guidance 
on when EIA for ancillary works triggers an obligation to do an EIA for the entire project). The 
main test is whether the ancillary works are an integral part of the main works. 
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need not be subjected to EIA if they are unlikely to have significant 
environmental effects.
198
 However, this freedom has been largely 
undermined by successive ECJ decisions giving a very expansive 
interpretation to the concept of “projects” in the Directive
199
 and a very 
restrictive scope to Member States’ exclusionary discretion.
200
 
Consequently, it is difficult to conceive of any operator of a new mine or of 
a significant expansion to an existing mine neglecting to submit to EIA in 
an EU Member State without running a substantial risk of a judicial review 
of the mining permission in the Member State itself or of enforcement 
action by the EU Commission.
201
 ECJ decisions have also ensured that, 
even when the continued operation of existing mines and of their waste 
facilities was permitted before the EIA Directive came into force in 1987, 
                                                                                                                                      
 198.  See Joint Ministerial Order H.P. 11014/703/F104, Official Journal B 332 (March 
20, 2003) (setting the French threshold so as to exclude mining operations covering 
< 500,000 square meters, or about 125 acres). Some Member States (e.g., Ireland, Spain, 
Sweden) have not set any exclusion thresholds so that all mining is subject to EIA. See 
generally European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council on the Application and Effectiveness of the EIA Directive, EUROPA, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/pdf/report_en.pdf.  
 199.  See, e.g., Case C-2/07, Abraham v. Region Wallonne, 2008 E.C.R. I-1197, ¶ 86 
(stating the purposive definition of “construction . . . of airports with a basic runway length 
of 2,100m or more” in paragraph 7 of Annex I to the EIA Directive as including the 
restructuring and widening—but not the lengthening—of an existing runway at an airport 
which already exceeded 2,100m). As a result, EIA was required for an intensification of use 
because it was likely to have similar effects to the lengthening of a runway. Case C-72/95, 
Aannemersbedrijf P. K. Kraaijeveld BV and Others v. Zuid-Holland, 1996 E.C.R. I-5403, I-
5425 (stating projects below exclusion thresholds require EIA if they are likely to have 
significant effects on the environment); Case C-205/08, Umweltanwalt von Kärnten v. 
Kärntner Landesregierung, 2010 All ER (D) 31, ¶ 83 (requiring EIA for a transboundary 
overhead powerline project which was below the threshold in Austria but above it when the 
part in Italy was taken into account); Case C-215/06, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2008 E.C.R. 
¶¶ 110–12 (requiring EIA for a wind farm, although it was not a listed project in Annex I or 
II, because ancillary aspects of the project, including roads to facilitate transport of the wind 
turbine, involved projects which were listed in Annex II); Case C-142/07, Ecologistas en 
Acción-CODA v. Ayuntamiento de Madrid, 2008 E.C.R. I-6097, ¶¶ 30, 66 (stating express 
road could mean express road; and holding subsequently that small forest roads were 
projects for which EIA was required). 
 200.  See Case C-392/96, Comm’n v. Ireland, 1999 E.C.R. I-5901, ¶ 66 (“Even a small-
scale project can have significant effects on the environment if it is in a location where the 
environmental factors set out in Article 3 of the EIA Directive, such as fauna and flora, soil, 
water, climate or cultural heritage, are sensitive to the slightest alteration.”). 
 201.  See Commission Interpretation of Definitions of Certain Project Categories of 
Annex I and Annex II of the EIA Directive 4 (2008), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/pdf/interpretation_eia.pdf (“Experience gathered in the 
application of the EIA Directive shows that, in practice, it can prove problematic to decide if 
individual projects fall within its scope.”). 
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these projects must be subjected to EIA if they require a fresh 
environmental consent after then to continue operating.
202
 
Any project submitting an environmental impact statement for a 
mine must identify, inter alia, its likely significant effects on the 
environment, including its direct effects and any indirect, secondary, short-, 
medium- and long-term, permanent and temporary, positive and negative 
effects, its cumulative effects, and a strategy to prevent or minimize those 
effects.
203
 Environmental risk management and accident prevention 
proposals are regarded as essential components of any environmental 
impact statement,
204
 and the requirements of Seveso 11 on the prevention of 
major accidents must be ensured (when applicable) by all permits for mine 
waste and storage facilities.
205
 Comprehensive EU guidelines,
206
 often 
amplified by guidelines issued by Member States themselves, elaborate on 
the nature and extent of these obligations.
207
 In Landelijke Vereniging tot 
                                                                                                                                      
 202.  See Case C-201/02, Wells v. Sec’y of State for Transp., Local Gov’t and the 
Regions, 2004 E.C.R. I-723, I-747 (requiring an EIA for a project commenced before July 3, 
1988 before a new consent to continue operating after that date is given); Case C-81/96, 
Burgemeester en wethouders van Haarlemmerliede en Spaarnwoude and Others v. 
Gedeputeerde Staten van Noord-Holland, 1998 E.C.R. I-3923, ¶¶ 25–28 (holding that 
projects commenced before but requiring fresh environmental consents after July 3, 1988 
also required an EIA).  
 203.  See EIA Directive, supra note 178, Annex IV.4 (specifying information to be 
contained in an environmental impact statement); id. art. 5.3(c) (requiring an EIS to include 
a description of the measures envisaged in order to avoid, reduce, and, if possible, remedy 
significant environmental effects); Commission Guidance On EIA: EIS Review (June 2001), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/eia-guidelines/g-review-full-text.pdf. 
 204.  See EIA Directive, supra note 178, art. 4.3 (referring to Annex III which specifies 
the characteristics of projects including the risk of accidents having regard in particular to 
substances and technologies to be used to be considered in an environmental impact 
statement). Note, in particular, the attitude of the Irish Planning Appeals Board (An Bord 
Pleanála) to the Corrib Gas Project when it refused permission for an onshore terminal 
because measures to deal with risks associated with displaced peat bog had not been 
properly described in the environmental impact statement. See An Bord Pleanála, Corrib 
Gas Pipeline, Case Ref. No. 16.GA.004, 340–41 (2009), available at 
http://www.pleanala.ie/news/ga0004/rga0004d.pdf. 
 205. See generally Land Use Planning Guidelines in the Context of Article 12 of the 
Seveso II Directive 96/82/EC as Amended by Directive 105/2003/EC (Sept. 2006), available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/seveso/pdf/landuseplanning_guidance_en.pdf. 
 206.  See supra note 203. 
 207.  See, e.g., Guidelines on the Information to be Contained in Environmental Impact 
Statements 2002 (Ir.), available at http://www.epa.ie/downloads/advice/ea/guidelines/ 
EPA_Guidelines_EIS_2002.pdf (setting out guidance from Ireland’s Environmental 
Protection Agency); Environmental Impact Assessment: A Guide to Procedures 2001 (U.K.), 
available at http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/planningandbuilding/pdf/ 
157989.pdf (providing the U.K.’s Department for Communities and Local Government’s 
procedures for preparing environmental impact statements).  
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Behoud van de Waddenzee v. Staatssecretaris van Landbouw,
208
 the ECJ 
ruled that the meaning of the phrase “likely to have significant effects” in 
the Habitats Directive was, as required by the precautionary principle, to be 
understood in the sense that such a likelihood existed if the possibility of 
harm could not be excluded on the basis of objective information.
209
 In EU 
law, therefore, “likely” is nearer to the spectrum of possible risk than 
probable risk though it is not a hypothetical risk.
210
 In practice, if every 
possible effect, whether or not it is “likely” or “significant,” is not 
described, and if proposals to identify and manage risks to the environment 
and to prevent major accident hazards are not adequately described, a mine 
promoter will very likely be exposed to regulatory interrogation, requests 
for further information and questioning by the public, NGOs, and bodies 
with specialist expertise in any Member State properly implementing EIA 
requirements. 
Permits granted must be conditional on compliance with conditions 
(often envisaged in the EIS and advanced in proposals to satisfy 
requirements in Directive 96/82/EC on the prevention of major accident 
hazards) designed to ensure, inter alia, that mine operators take all 
necessary measures to prevent, or reduce as far as possible, adverse effects 
on the environment and human health from mining and extractive waste 
when in operation and after the mine closes, and that appropriate measures 
are taken for the prevention or limitation of major accidents involving the 
mine and mining and tailings facilities.
211
 Otherwise, however, the EIA 
Directive itself does not guarantee (although in practice it is often 
                                                                                                                                      
 208.  See Case C-127/02, Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee v. 
Staatssecretaris van Landbouw, 2005 E.C.R I-07405, I-7446–47. 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id. See Boggis v. Natural England, [2009] EWCA Civ. 1061 (holding that a 
“claimant who alleges that there was a risk which should have been considered by the 
authorizing authority so that it could decide whether that risk could be ‘excluded on the basis 
of objective information,’ must produce credible evidence that there was a real, rather than a 
hypothetical, risk which should have been considered”). 
 211.  This is required for projects subject to IPPC licensing and is one of the indirect 
requirements of the EIA Directive. See Directive 2008/1, art. 3.1(e), 2008 O.J. (L 24) 8 (EC) 
[hereinafter IPPC Directive], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:024:0008:0029:en:PDF (requiring the operator to 
demonstrate that “the necessary measures are taken to prevent accidents and limit their 
consequences”), EIA Directive, supra note 178, art. 3 (requiring an assessment of the likely 
effects of projects on the environment including human beings). See MWD, supra note 81, 
art. 4.2 (obliging Member States to ensure that operators take all necessary steps to prevent 
or reduce effects on the environment and human health from extractive waste, including 
from waste facilities following closure, and the prevention of major accidents involving that 
facility and the limiting of their consequences for the environment and human health). 
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implemented so as to ensure)
212
 that appropriate conditions to deal with the 
environmental risks of mining and mining waste will be attached to 
permits.
213
 It merely provides procedural mechanisms structuring the 





C. Appropriate Assessments for Mining Plan and Projects 
 
The Habitats Directive, unlike the EIA and SEA Directives, 
imposes substantive requirements on operators seeking permits for mining 
and waste projects likely to have significant effects on protected habitats 
and protected flora and fauna. Article 6.3 of the Habitats Directive 
mandates an “appropriate assessment” of any plan or project that, in itself 
or in combination with other plans and projects, is likely to significantly 
affect a habitat protected under the Directive.
215
 This includes a mining or 
mining waste plan or project.
216
 A requirement for an appropriate 
assessment for projects is usually imposed in the context of a permit system 
and is additional to any requirement for EIA. Appropriate assessments of 
plans and programmes is usually carried out in the context of land-use 
legislation and/or under other legislation implementing Directive 
2001/41/EC on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and 
programmes on the environment. Almost 14% of EU land territory is 
designated for over 15,500 individual Natura sites,
217
 many of which are in 
rural and wilderness areas where mining projects are commonly initiated. 
Moreover, the appropriate assessment will be required not only for plans 
and projects in protected habitats, but for projects outside habitats that 
                                                                                                                                      
 212. See, e.g., Case C-201/02, Wells v. Sec’y of State for Transp., Local Gov’t and the 
Regions, 2004 E.C.R. I-723, I-747 (stating that EIA requirement applied to applications for 
the renewal of old mining permits).  
 213.  See EIA Directive, supra note 178. 
 214.  See Case C-418/04, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2007 E.C.R. 1-10947 (distinguishing 
between the objectives of assessments made under the EIA and Habitats Directives). 
 215.  See Habitats Directive, supra note 160, art. 6.3. 
 216. Id. 
 217.  See Questions and Answers Environmental Liability Directive, EUROPA (Apr. 1, 
2004), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/04/78 (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2011) (“These protected species and areas represent biodiversity that has been found 
to be particularly rich and socially valuable in the EU.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). Designation of offshore areas as 
Natura sites is not common but can also be required under the Directive. See R v. Sec’y of 
State for Trade & Indus. ex parte Greenpeace Ltd., [2000] Env. L. R. 221 (concluding that 
requirements of the Habitats Directive extended to a site beyond the territorial waters of the 
UK but within the UK Continental Shelf). This article is concerned with onshore mining 
only. Id. 
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could impact them.
218
 Mining is also banned or heavily regulated in many 
national parks and other areas for ecological or heritage reasons under 
Member State municipal laws, and there are many instances where mining 
permits have been refused because the location was deemed unsuitable.
219
 
Consent may only be given for a mining (or any) project which has 
significant adverse effects on the integrity of a protected habitat for reasons 
of overriding public interest,
220
 and then only if there is no alternative 
solution and provided compensatory measures are taken.
221
 The EU 




Consideration of alternatives is a mandatory and is a major part of 
the process of assessing the impacts of plans and programmes on habitats 
and of tailoring applications for permits for projects affecting protected 
habitats and species. If the protected habitat or species is not a priority site 
or the habitat of a priority species, the reasons of “overriding public 
interest” which may justify permitting it notwithstanding its adverse 
impacts include social and economic reasons, such as providing 
employment or contributing towards the achievement of important EU or 
national programmes for providing infrastructure or other important policy 
                                                                                                                                      
 218.  It is entirely possible that a mining project outside a protected habitat could affect 
it. For example, dewatering, a fairly common impact of mining, could affect the 
hydrogeology of a wetland far from the mining site, reduce water levels in a protected river 
or lake downstream, or affect spawning grounds of protected fish species. See European 
Commission, Managing Natura 2000 Sites: The Provisions of Article 6 of the ‘Habitats’ 
Directive 92/43/EEC 34, EUROPA 36 (2000), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/management/docs/art6/provision_of_art6
_en.pdf (providing an example of a drainage project located outside a site which affects a 
wetland). Dust blow offs from tailings ponds and could affect protected species of flora and 
fauna growing in areas far from the mine. Id. 
 219.  For example, in Ireland, in 1991, planning permission was refused for a talc mine 
near Westport, Co. Mayo. See Mayo Talc Mine is Rejected, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 15, 1991, at 14 
(reporting on the refusal of planning permission for a talc mine because of its location near a 
heritage town) (on file with the author). Similarly, authorities rejected a gold mine in 
Cregganbaun, Co. Mayo. See Glencar Cautious After Mayo Planning Decision, IRISH TIMES, 
Sep. 1, 1993, at 12 (commenting on the refusal of permission for a gold mine near a holy 
mountain) (on file with the author). In Scotland, planning permission to re-open a gold mine 
in a national park was refused in 2010. See Cononish Gold Mine Application Turned Down, 
BBC NEWS (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-tayside-central-
11019781 (last visited Nov. 6, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of 
Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 220.  Habitats Directive, supra note 160, art. 6.4. 
 221.  Id. 
 222.  See generally Commission Guidance Document on Article 6(4) of the ‘Habitats 
Directive’ 92/43/EEC (2007) [hereinafter Habitats Directive Comm’n Guidance], available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/management/docs/art6/guidance_art6_ 
4_en.pdf. 
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objectives.
223
 However, if the site is a priority natural habitat or hosts a 
priority species, the only considerations that may be taken into account in 
deciding whether to permit a plan or project which could significantly 
adversely affect the integrity of the site in view of its conservation 
objectives are reasons of public health and safety, or of “beneficial 
consequences of primary importance for the environment or, further to an 
opinion from the Commission, other imperative reasons of overriding 
public interest.”
224
 Ultimately, therefore, the Commission has a role in 




It is difficult to envisage the authorization of any mine that 
significantly adversely affects the integrity of a priority site, save in the 
most exceptional circumstances.
226
 This is because it is unlikely that the 
Commission would approve a private sector mining project in or adversely 
affecting a priority site.
227
 Article 6.4 of the Directive requires a Member 
State contemplating the authorization of mining in such circumstances to 
obtain the prior opinion of the EU Commission.
228
 By 2009, the 
Commission had given favorable opinions on 10 of 11 proposed projects in 
                                                                                                                                      
 223.  See Habitats Directive, supra note 160, art. 6.4, Comm’n Opinion 96/15, art. 4.2, 
1996 O.J. (L 6) 14 (EC) (concluding that extension of the A-20 motorway through 
Germany’s Peene Valley was justified by “exceptionally high unemployment” and the lack 
of any alternative solution); Draft Comm’n Opinion, 95/C 178/03, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1995:178:0003:0006:EN:PDF 
(discussing a similar justification for the A-20 motorway’s intersection through the Trebel 
and Recknitz Valley). 
 224. Habitats Directive, supra note 160, art. 6.4; see also Ludwig Kramer, The 
European Commission’s Opinions under Article 6(4) of the Habitats Directive, 21 J. ENVTL. 
L. 59 (2009) (examining the Commission’s assessment of Member States’ justifications for 
applying Article 6.4 of the Habitats Directive to projects likely to significantly affect the 
integrity of priority habitats). 
 225.  See id. 
 226.  This is because article 6.4 of the Habitats Directive provides that competent 
authorities may only permit projects which could significantly adversely affect the integrity 
of a priority habitat where there is a lack of alternatives and for reasons of “overriding public 
interest” which is narrowly defined to mean human health or public safety or other reasons 
condoned by the EU Commission.  
 227. See Habitats Directive Comm’n Guidance, supra note 222, at 7 (stating that 
“[p]rojects or plans that ensure only the interests of companies or individuals are not covered 
by imperative reasons of overriding public interest”). Cf. Opinion of the Commission of 
24/04/2003, available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/management/ 
docs/art6/prosper_haniel_en.pdf (issuing a favorable opinion on the extension of a coal mine 
likely to affect a priority site because it employed a significant number of people at Haniel, 
Germany, and because the Commission was satisfied with the compensatory measures 
proposed). 
 228. See Habitats Directive, supra note 160, art. 6.4 (stating that a project that may 
negatively impact a priority site may be permitted for reasons of overriding public interest 
“further to an opinion of the Commission”).  
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priority sites.
229
 This was probably because most of them were for public 
infrastructure projects (ports, airports, roads, and railways) and because 
Member States seeking its opinion went to great lengths to prove that 
considered alternatives were impracticable and to ensure that very good 
migratory and compensatory measures would reduce and compensate for 




D. Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Permits 
 
At the time of planning a mine opening, plans for its closure must 
also be drafted.
231
 Directive 2008/1/EC concerning integrated pollution 
prevention and control (the IPPC Directive)
232
 requires Member States to 
regulate certain industrial installations where one or more activities listed in 
Annex I, as well as any other directly associated activities having a 
technical connection therewith, are carried out.
233
 Although the list of 
                                                                                                                                      
 229.  See Kramer, supra note 224, at 81 (reporting that a negative opinion was issued in 
only one of the 11 cases referred to the Commission by 2009).  
 230.  The Commission envisages that compensatory measures for habitat damage should 
be taken before the project is commenced. See Habitats Directive Comm’n Guidance, supra 
note 222, at 11. 
 231. See EIA Directive, supra note 178, art. 5 (requiring a promoter of a project to 
describe the measures envisaged to prevent, reduce, and, where possible, offset any 
significant adverse effects on the environment and Mining Waste Directive); id. art. 4.2 
(requiring Member States to ensure that mine operators take all measures necessary to 
prevent or reduce as far as possible any adverse effects on the environment and human 
health due to the management of extractive waste, including “the management of a waste 
facility also after its closure”); see also id. art. 5.2(c) (requiring waste management plans to 
provide for the safe disposal of mining waste after closure “at the design stage”). 
 232.  See generally IPPC Directive, supra note 211. In December 2010, Directive 
2010/75/EU on industrial emissions replaced the IPPC Directive, but it does not have to be 
transposed by Member States until January 7, 2013. In general, the measures in Directive 
2010/75 will apply from January 7, 2013 for new sites which will require a licence, and from 
January 7, 2014 for sites which already have a licence under existing legislation or which 
have applied for one by 7 January 2013. See Directive 2010/75, supra note 76. 
 233.  See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 2.3 (defining “installation” for purposes 
of the directive). Activities listed in Annex I subject to IPPC include installations:  
[2.5] (a) for the production of non-ferrous crude metals from ore, concentrates 
or secondary raw materials by metallurgical, chemical or electrolytic 
processes; (b) for the smelting, including the alloyage, of non-ferrous metals, 
including recovered products, (refining, foundry casting, etc.) with a melting 
capacity exceeding 4 tonnes per day for lead and cadmium or 20 tonnes per 
day for all other metals. 2.6. Installations for surface treatment of metals using 
an electrolytic or chemical process where the volume of the treatment vats 
exceeds 30 m3. . . . 5. Waste management . . . Without prejudice to Article 11 
of Directive 2006/12/EC or Article 3 of Council Directive 91/689/EEC of 12 
December 1991 on hazardous waste . . .: 5.1. Installations for the disposal or 
recovery of hazardous waste as defined in the list referred to in Article 1(4) of 
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Annex I activities does not cover all or even most mines, many mines 
become subject to IPPC because of their directly associated activities 
(notably waste management activities) or because Member States 
implementing the IPPC Directive in their domestic laws have voluntarily 
extended its provisions to mining activities.
234
 Even when mines are not 
subjected to IPPC, analogous controls are often required under other less 
sophisticated authorization systems designed to ensure compliance with 
applicable EU environmental requirements, such as requirements to meet 
emission or environmental quality standards.
235
 Operating permits for IPPC 
activities must require operators to comply with best available techniques 
(BAT) when carrying out their operations.
236
 An operator seeking a permit 
must demonstrate to the competent authorities that BAT are, or will be, 
applied to the operation of a mine and all directly associated activities in 
order to reduce environmental impacts to air, water, and land, minimize 
impacts on local receptors, reduce waste, conserve energy, water, and 
materials, and prevent or limit the consequences of accidents.
237
 The EU 
                                                                                                                                      
Directive 91/689/EEC, as defined in Annexes II.A and II.B (operations R1, 
R5, R6, R8 and R9) to Directive 2006/12/EC and in Council Directive 
75/439/EEC of 16 June 1975 on the disposal of waste oils . . ., with a capacity 
exceeding 10 tonnes per day. . . . 5.3. Installations for the disposal of non-
hazardous waste as defined in Annex II.A to Directive 2006/12/EC under 
headings D8 and D9, with a capacity exceeding 50 tonnes per day. 5.4. 
Landfills receiving more than 10 tonnes per day or with a total capacity 
exceeding 25,000 tonnes, excluding landfills of inert waste.  
Id. Annex I. 
 234. A member State which has done this will most likely have included mining in the 
list of activities strictly liable for environmental damage under the ELD when transposing 
the ELD into its domestic legislation.  
 235.  For example, the programme of measures that Member States are obliged to adopt 
under article 11.3 of the Water Framework Directive for maintaining and improving water 
quality requires them to establish “as a minimum” a system of prior authorization of artificial 
recharges or augmentation of groundwaters and the prohibition, prior authorization, or 
registration of point source discharges liable to cause pollution of any waters. See WFD, 
supra note 79, art. 11.3. Article 11. 3 states that these measures must ensure compliance with 
all relevant EU measures for the protection of waters. See id.; see also MWD, supra note 81, 
art. 23 (stating that its requirements may be integrated into other domestic or EU permit 
procedures). 
 236.  See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 3.1(a), 9.4. BAT is basically the best way 
of operating from an environmental point of view, as recommended by the EU and Member 
States, including the use of the best available technologies and the best practices and 
procedures identified for the sector. See id. art. 2.12 (defining “best available techniques”).  
 237.  See id. art. 6 (requiring applicants for permits to demonstrate the proposed 
technology and other techniques for preventing or, where this not possible, reducing 
emissions from the installation); id. art. 3.1(e) (requiring the operator to demonstrate that 
“the necessary measures are taken to prevent accidents and limit their consequences”); id. 
arts. 9.4, 10 (requiring emission limit values and the equivalent parameters and technical 
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has published guidance on BAT in the form of reference documents 
(BREFs) for a number of activities associated with mining; these include 
Emissions from Storage (BREF 07.2006), Energy Efficiency (BREF 02.09), 
Waste (BREF 08.2006), and Management of Tailings and Waste-rock in 
Mining Activities (BREF 01.09).
238
  
In order to assist Member State authorities in determining BAT, 
Article 17(2) of the IPPC Directive requires the EU Commission to 
organize “an exchange of information” between Member States and the 
various stakeholders and interests concerning BAT, associated monitoring, 
and developments.
239
 Every three years the Commission must publish the 
results of these exchanges.
240
 Information published pursuant to Article 
17(2) must be taken into account when determining BAT in specific 
cases.
241
 The information obtained is coordinated by the European 
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Bureau (EIPPCB) in Seville, 
Spain.
242
 For this purpose, the EIPPCB has set up Technical Working 
Groups (TWGs) for thirty different industrial sectors covered by the 
Directive, including mining.
243
 TWGs consist of nominated experts from 
EU Member States, EFTA countries, Accession countries, industry, 
environmental NGOs, the services of the Commission, and the European 
Environmental Bureau, an NGO.
244
  
Bettina Lange has noted that the drafting of BREFs often generates 
coalitions of interests which transcend conventional distinctions between 
the economic interests of industry and the regulatory interests of Member 
                                                                                                                                      
measures to be based on BAT unless this is insufficient to meet environmental quality 
standards in which case additional and stricter measures are required). 
 238.  See Reference Documents, EUROPEAN IPPC BUREAU [hereinafter Reference 
Documents, EUROPEAN IPPC BUREAU], http://eippcb.jrc.es/reference/ (last visited Nov. 7, 
2011) (cataloguing all adopted reference documents by industry) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
 239. IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 17.2. 
 240. See id. 
 241.  See id. Annex IV, ¶ 12 (listing considerations relevant to the determination of best 
available techniques including Commission reports). 
 242. See Bettina Lange, Searching for the Best Available Techniques—Open and 
Closed Norms in the Implementation of the EU Directive on Integrated Pollution Prevention 
and Control, 2 INT’L J.L. CONTEXT 67, 83 (2006) (describing the process by which BAT is 
determined).  
 243. See Reference Documents, EUROPEAN IPPC BUREAU, supra note 238 (listing 
BREFs adopted for each industry). 
 244. See Who’s Who in the EID (ex IPPC Directive), EUROPEAN IPPC BUREAU, 
http://eippcb.jrc.es/about/who_is_who.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
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States.
245
 She describes the process of writing the BREFs as one of 
“iterative expert judgment.”
246
 It “welds together the political and technical 
dimensions” of BAT determinations, such as the subjective evaluation of 
techniques through ongoing negotiation between all interested parties—
“iterative judgment”—and “the reasoned application of structured and 
documented scientific and engineering knowledge”—“expertise.”
247
 
Member States must ensure that the competent authority 
implementing the IPPC Directive follows or is informed of developments in 
BAT.
248
 The techniques to be taken into account may also include those 
used in other Member States, as long as they are reasonably accessible to 
the operator at a reasonable cost.
249
 The EU maintains a website for 
competent authorities to share experiences.
250
 In this manner, less 
developed Member States become aware of best practice in mining and 
waste regulation throughout the EU.
251
 BAT is defined at sectoral-level for 
the sector as a whole and not for individual installations.
252
 Sectoral-level 
BAT takes into account costs, economic viability, multi-media aspects, and 
technical issues, whereas local-level BAT applied by regulators in Member 
States to individual installations on a case-by-case basis takes account of 
the “technical characteristics of the installation concerned, its geographical 
location and the local environmental conditions.”
253
 This latter element of 
BAT has been criticized on the grounds that it leads to varying levels of 
environmental protection across the EU but, although it allows for tailoring 
                                                                                                                                      
 245.  See Lange, supra note 242, at 84 (“Industry, Member States and environmental 
NGOs were not three unified and opposed power blocs in BAT determinations, but there 
were a number of different interests linkages between them.”). 
 246.  Id. at 82. 
 247. Id.  
 248. See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 11. 
 249.  See id. art. 2.12(b) (defining “available techniques” as “those developed on a scale 
which allows implementation in the relevant industrial sector . . . whether or not the 
techniques are used or produced inside the Member State in question”). In practice, in the 
UK and Ireland, competent authorities tend to consider that, whatever the cost, operators of 
mining projects can afford to implement BAT. 
 250.  See Welcome to the European IPPC Bureau (EIPPCB), EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE INSTITUTE FOR PROSPECTIVE TECHNOLOGICAL STUDIES, 
http://eippcb.jrc.es/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (providing access to adopted BREFs, as well 
as current drafts and meeting reports, and allowing registered members to exchange views 
on TWG draft texts before they become publicly available) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 251.  See id. pmbl. ¶ 27 (noting that the exchange of information at Community level on 
BAT “will help to redress the technological imbalances in the Community” and help 
Member States “in the efficient implementation of the Directive”). 
 252.  See id. art. 2 (defining BAT and referring to the fact that available techniques 
means those developed on a scale which allows implementation in the relevant industrial 
sector). 
 253.  IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 9.4. 
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a permit to individual circumstances, it does not permit deviation from 
mandatory EU environmental emission and quality standards.
254
 The 
finalized reference documents (BREFs) are intended to give guidance to 
national authorities and set parameters for BAT requirements to be imposed 
at State level.
255
 Member States may publish their own BAT documents for 
the different regulated sectors, having regard to the appropriate BREF 
documents.
256




The IPPC Directive itself provides only limited guidance on how 
BAT is to be determined at Member State level; it establishes only two 
“baselines” for determining BAT.
258
 First, where environmental quality 
standards require stricter conditions than those achievable by using BAT, 
additional measures must be included in the permit.
259
 Second, the permit 
must, in all circumstances, “ensure a high level of protection for the 
environment as a whole.”
260
 Member States still have wide discretion, as 
the Directive fails to specify what constitutes “a high level of protection.” 
Nonetheless, Annex IV (which lists the considerations to be taken into 
account when determining BAT requirements) cites “the principles of 




                                                                                                                                      
 254.  Id., arts. 9.4, 10; see also Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Market Access, 
Competitiveness, and Harmonization: Environmental Protection in Regional Trade 
Agreements, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 308 (1997) (“In response to this criticism, EC 
Environment Commissioner Ritt Bjerregaard has made it clear that the Commission would 
not allow national permitting authorities to abuse the flexibility built into this provision by 
setting low requirements designed to give local companies a competitive advantage.”). 
 255.  See Don Litten, BAT Reference Documents: What Are They and What Are They 
Not, in EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON “THE SEVILLA-PROCESS: A DRIVER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
PERFORMANCE IN INDUSTRY” 92 (Apr. 6–7, 2001), available at 
http://www.umweltdaten.de/publikationen/fpdf-l/1823.pdf (stating that BREFs “represent a 
collection of information for the guidance of decision makers involved in implementation of 
the IPPC Directive”). 
 256.  See, e.g., Best Available Techniques (BAT) (Ir.), available at 
http://www.epa.ie/downloads/advice/bat (setting out the Irish Environmental Protection 
Agency’s BAT Guidance Notes). 
 257. See Litten, supra note 255, at 92 (“BREFs are not prescriptive. They do not set nor 
propose emission limit values either at sector, national, regional, local or site specific level. 
They do not provide any legal interpretation of the Directive itself.”). 
 258.  See Martina Doppelhammer, More Difficult than Finding the Way Round 
Chinatown? The IPPC Directive and its Implementation, 9 EUR. ENVTL. L. REV. 199, 204 
(2000) (noting the two provisions of the IPPC Directive which guard against any potential 
“race to the bottom” among Member States). 
 259.  See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 10. 
 260. Id. art. 9.4. 
 261. Id. Annex IV. 
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In any case, the obligation to ensure a “high level” of 
environmental protection, including “the minimisation of long-distance or 
transboundary pollution,” implies that the most appropriate techniques 
cannot be set solely on the basis of local considerations.
262
 Transboundary 
consultation is obligatory where applications for new installations or 
substantial changes to existing installations are likely to have significant 
negative transboundary effects.
263
 Such applications must be made available 
to the public in the Member State likely to be affected and the result of the 




The various BREFs relevant to mineral extraction and related 
activities form the agenda between regulators and regulated for permit 
applications. In practice, the application process usually involves an 
element of negotiation, especially when permits are reviewed and 
updated—as they must be—at specified intervals or for specified reasons.
265
 
A specific BREF for tailings and waste-rock was published in 2009.
266
 The 
permit application must demonstrate that the operator of the 
installation/facility will take all appropriate preventative and mitigation 
measures against pollution, save energy, manage waste appropriately,
267
 
and prevent accidents through the application of BAT.
268
 If necessary, the 
                                                                                                                                      
 262.  Id. art. 9.4; see also id. pmbl. ¶¶ 10, 17, 18 (noting the Directive’s goal of 
achieving “a high level of protection for the environment as a whole”); id. art. 18 (stating 
Member States’ obligations with regard to transboundary effects); Directive 2003/35, supra 
note 175, at 19–20 (amending certain provisions of the IPPC Directive and requiring 
consultation in transboundary IPPC cases). 
 263. See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, pmbl. ¶ 29, arts. 4.5, 17. 
 264.  Id.; see also Directive 2003/35, supra note 175, art. 4.5 (empowering Member 
States “likely to be significantly affected” to request consultation in transboundary IPPC 
cases). 
 265.  See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 13 (requiring periodic updating of permit 
conditions and setting forth specific instances which trigger such reconsideration); see also 
MWD, supra note 81, pmbl. ¶ 16 (noting the “special nature of the management of waste 
from the extractive industries,” and requiring “necessary measures to ensure that the 
competent authorities periodically reconsider and, where necessary, update permit 
conditions”). 
 266.  See Reference Documents, EUROPEAN IPPC BUREAU, supra note 238. 
 267.  See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 2.12, Annex IV (stating that the need to 
use low waste technology and to further the recycling and recovery of substances generated 
and used in the process when determining BAT at sectoral and local levels); see also Waste 
Framework Directive, supra note 77, art. 4 (mandating States to implement the waste 
hierarchy requiring waste prevention and minimization before recovery or disposal when 
authorizing waste activities unless a departure from the hierarchy can be justified for specific 
waste streams for reasons of technical feasibility, economic viability and environmental 
protection.)  
 268.  See id. arts. 3.1(e), 6(h) (requiring competent authorities to ensure that “necessary 
measures are taken to prevent accidents and limit their consequences”).  
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permit must “include appropriate requirements ensuring protection of the 
soil and ground water and measures concerning the management of waste 
generated by the installation.”
269
 Member States assessing applications for 
permits ensure compliance with EC Regulation 1272/2008 and apply the 
UN Globally Harmonised System of Classification and Labelling of 
Chemicals.
270
 Guidelines on Metals Environmental Risk Assessment, which 
embody EU and UN requirements, were issued by the International 
Commission on Mining and Metals in 2008 for “assessing risks posed by 
metals and inorganic metal compounds in the environment.”
271
 In many 
Member States, applicants will be required to justify all but the most 
stringent emission limit values in the range for their installations and 
facilities. Regulators in the UK, Sweden, and Ireland typically raise the 
targets for improved environmental performance, waste management, 
conservation of resources, accident prevention, and energy saving with each 
permit review or permit for substantial changes, a practice which somewhat 
deters operators from seeking licence reviews.
272
  
In EU law, Member States and competent authorities (including 
IPPC permitting authorities) are obliged to do “all within their powers” to 
ensure compliance with relevant EU legislation, including legislation on, 
for example, emissions, environmental quality standards, accepted 
standards/guidelines for protected areas (e.g., drinking waters, water-
dependent conservation sites, nutrient-sensitive areas, shellfish waters, and 
bathing areas), resource use, biodiversity protection, waste management,
273
 
dangerous substances, and accident prevention when issuing an IPPC or 
indeed any environmental permit required under EU law for any activity 
associated with mining.
274
 They must also ensure controls over the injection 
of waters containing substances resulting from mining into geological 
formations from which substances have been mined and pumped and of 
groundwater injections and re-injections when authorized as required by 
                                                                                                                                      
 269.  Id. art. 9.3.  
 270. See Regulation 1272/2008, pmbl. ¶ 6, 2008 O.J. (L 353) 1, 1 (EC) (integrating 
internationally agreed GHS criteria into Community law). 
 271.  INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON MINING AND METALS, METALS ENVIRONMENTAL RISK 
ASSESSMENT GUIDANCE, available at http://www.icmm.com/page/45830/.  
 272.  See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, arts. 12, 13 (requiring Member States to 
ensure that no substantial change planned by the operator is made without a permit issued in 
accordance with the IPPC Directive and to ensure that competent authorities reconsider and, 
where necessary, update permit conditions). 
 273.  See MWD, supra note 81, at 61 (stating that special rules apply to extractive waste 
as defined in this Directive, which are described in the next section). 
 274.  See Case C-72/95, Aannemersbedrijf P. K. Kraaijeveld BV and Others v. 
Gedeputeerde Staten van Zuid-Holland, 1996 E.C.R. I-5403, I-5420 (holding that 
compliance with EU environmental standards is a general obligation on competent 
authorities in Member States under EU law). 
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Article 11(3)(j) of the WFD.
275
 Appropriate conditions in permits must 
require compliance with applicable environmental protection and accident 
prevention provisions in numerous Directives.
276
 Article 9.3 of the IPPC 
Directive obliges competent authorities to include conditions on emission 
limit values based on BAT for polluting substances (particularly those listed 
in Annex III) likely to be emitted in significant quantities from the 
installation or directly associated facilities, having regard to their nature and 
to their potential to transfer pollution from one medium to another.
277
 
Where appropriate, competent authorities may supplement or replace limit 
values by equivalent parameters or technical measures.
278
 If necessary, 
Article 9.3 provides that “the permit must include appropriate requirements 
ensuring protection of the soil and ground water and measures concerning 
the management of waste generated by the installation.”
279
  
Permits must contain measures relating to abnormal conditions 
such as start-ups, leaks, malfunctions, momentary stoppages, and definitive 
cessation of operations, and provisions for temporary derogations (up to six 
months) to enable operators to implement approved pollution abatement 
programmes.
280
 They must also contain monitoring and measurement 
provisions for checking compliance; these are determined on a case-by-case 
basis, taking account of each installation’s unique operating requirements 
and environment.
281
 Self-reporting, external independent audits, and 
regulatory inspections are often required to monitor and ensure compliance 
with BAT and permit conditions.
282
  
                                                                                                                                      
 275.  See WFD, supra note 79, art. 11.3(j) (requiring specific provisions for the 
prohibition of discharging pollutants directly into the groundwater). 
 276.  See, e.g., IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 3(e), Annex IV; WFD, supra note 
79, art. 11(l); MWD, supra note 81, pmbl. ¶¶ 14, 28, arts. 4.2, 5.3(a), 6, 16, Annex I. 
 277.  See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 9.3 (stating mandatory conditions for 
permits authorizing the operation of an installation).  
 278.  See id. (stating that emission limits cannot currently be set for emissions of 
greenhouse gas from an installation specified in Annex I to Directive 2003/87/EC, 
establishing a scheme for the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading relating to activity 
in a mine, scheme unless it is necessary to ensure no significant local pollution is caused, 
and providing for derogation for energy saving requirements for some combustion plants 
listed in Annex I to Directive 2003/87/EC).  
 279.  Id. Appropriate measures will include measures to ensure compliance with all 
applicable environmental Directives.  
 280.  See id. art. 9.6. 
 281.  See id. art. 9.5. 
 282.  See id. art. 14(b), (c) (stating that the operator must regularly inform the competent 
authority about the results of monitoring releases as well as provide the authority with all 
necessary assistance to enable the carrying out of inspections).  
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There is an ongoing obligation to ensure that operators meet BAT 
standards.
283
 Given that these standards do not remain static—they may or, 
in specified cases, must be revised to incorporate new scientific knowledge 
and experience—operators have to achieve corresponding improvements.
284
 




There must be public participation and access to specified relevant 
information in the IPPC permitting and review process.
286
 Any person who 
has a sufficient interest or who maintains the impairment of a right is 
entitled to access to a procedure before a court or independent and impartial 
tribunal to challenge the substantive and/or procedural merits of decisions, 
acts, or omissions subject to the public participation provisions of the 
Directive.
287
 If there are likely trans-boundary negative effects or another 
Member State so requests, the public and competent authorities in other 
Member States have rights to information and to participate.
288
  
The above requirements relate to mining and mining waste 





VII. Special Rules for Extractive Waste  
 
A. Definition of MWD Wastes 
 
The MWD was passed in 2006 to deal with characteristic waste 
from the extractive industries
290
 resulting from “the prospecting, extraction, 
                                                                                                                                      
 283.  See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, arts. 12, 13.2 (“Member States shall take the 
necessary measures to ensure that competent authorities periodically reconsider and, where 
necessary, update permit conditions . . . .”). 
 284.  See id. arts. 9.6, 12, 13.2 (outlining when reconsideration and updating of the 
permit should be required). 
 285.  See id. arts. 9.6, 13.  
 286.  See id. art. 15, Annex V (prescribing requirements for the access to information 
and public participation during the permit procedure and emphasising the need for Member 
States to ensure that the public is given an early and effective opportunity to participate in 
the decision-making procedure). See also Directive 2003/35, supra note 175, art. 4 
(extending public participation requirements to decision-making on IPPC permits and 
reviews). 
 287.  See id. art. 16.1. 
 288.  See id. art. 18 (discussing the steps to be taken when there could be negative 
transboundary effects).  
 289.  See MWD, supra note 81, at 15 (outlining the methods of managing waste from 
extractive industries). 
 290.  See id. art. 3.6 (stating that “‘extractive industries’ means all establishments and 
undertakings engaged in surface or underground extraction of mineral resources for 
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treatment and storage of mineral resources and the working of quarries,” 
which it terms “extractive waste.”
291
 Broadly speaking, this means topsoil, 
tailings, waste rock, and overburden moved to access the ore or mineral 
body, including pre-production and topsoil. Certain wastes are excluded 
from the application of the MWD altogether.
292
 Member States are 
permitted to impose less stringent requirements relating to inert waste, non-
hazardous prospecting waste, unpolluted soil, waste resulting from the 
extraction, treatment, and storage of peat, and non-hazardous, non-inert 
waste, unless deposited in Category A facilities.
293
 This is due to their lower 
environmental risks. Likewise, lighter regulation is permitted for the 
deposit of non-hazardous waste generated from the prospecting of mineral 
resources, except oil and evaporites other than gypsum and anhydrite, as 
well as for the deposit of unpolluted soil and of waste resulting from the 
extraction, treatment, and storage of peat as long as the requirements of 
Article 4 of the MWD are met.
294
  
The MWD does not apply at all to specifically mentioned wastes 
regulated by other means, such as offshore extractive waste, pumped 
groundwater injections and re-injections authorized by Article 11(3)(j) of 
the Water Framework Directive,
 
or to those aspects of radioactive wastes 
that are specific to radioactivity and are regulated under EURATOM.
295
 
Wastes not covered by Article 2 of the MWD may be regulated pursuant to 
different EU legislation, including the Waste Framework Directive, 
Directive 99/31/EC on the landfill of waste, Directive 200/60/EC on 
Community action in the field of water policy and the IPPC Directive.
296
 
Article 3(1) of the MWD provides that, for the purposes of that Directive, 
“waste” is as defined in Article 1(a) of Directive 75/442/EEC, now Article 
                                                                                                                                      
commercial purposes, including extraction by drilling boreholes, or treatment of the 
extracted material”). 
 291.  Id. art. 2.1.  
 292.  See id. art. 2.2 (excluding the following from the scope of the Directive: (a) waste 
which is generated by the prospecting, extraction, and treatment of mineral resources; (b) 
waste resulting from the offshore prospecting, extraction, and treatment of mineral 
resources; (c) the injection of water and re-injection of pumped groundwater). 
 293.  See id. pmbl. ¶ 9 (stating that “[f]or non-hazardous prospecting waste, Member 
states may reduce or waive certain requirements.”); see also art. 2.3 (explaining that lighter 
regulation means exemption from Articles 7, 8, 11.1 and .3, 12, 12.6, 14, and 16). Of course, 
these wastes must be regulated to comply with any other applicable waste laws, including 
Directive 2008/98/EC on waste. Id. 
 294.  See id. art. 2.3 (explaining that lighter regulation means exemption from Articles 
11.3, 12.5 and .6, 13.6, 14, and 16). These wastes must be regulated to comply with any 
other applicable waste laws including Directive 2008/98/EC on waste. Id. 
 295.  See id. pmbl. ¶ 10 (mentioning this exception, but it is not referred to in the main 
text of the MWD).  
 296.  See id. art. 2.4 (providing that waste which falls within the scope of MWD shall 
not be subject to Directive 1999/31/EC on landfill).  
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1(1)(a) of the Waste Framework Directive.
297
 The case law of the ECJ 
indicates that “waste” placed in voids may not actually be waste at all if the 
objective is to reuse it and save on other natural resources, and the MWD 
excludes excavation voids into which waste is replaced, after extraction of 
the mineral, for rehabilitation and construction purposes from the definition 
of a waste facility.
298
 However, some of this waste (if it is regarded as waste 
by competent authorities) may be subject to other waste controls, including 
Directive 1999/31/EC on landfill (the Landfill Directive),
299
 in order to 
protect surface water and/or groundwater, secure the stability of such waste, 
and ensure appropriate monitoring upon cessation of mining.
300
 The MWD 
had to be implemented in all Member States by May 1, 2008 at the latest.
301
 
The provisions in the Waste Framework Directive on waste do not apply to 






                                                                                                                                      
 297.  See id. art. 3.1 (providing that, for the purposes of that Directive, “waste” is as 
defined in Article 1(a) of the Waste Framework Directive). There is now a substantial body 
of case law by the ECJ on the interpretation of the definition of waste and the meaning of 
“discard.” See Case C-9/00, Palin Granit Oy and Vehmassalon kansanterveystyön 
kuntayhtymän hallitus, 2002 E.C.R. I-3533, 3562 (implying that if definite plans had been 
made for the use of the stored waste rocks in the short or medium term, they might not have 
been classified as wastes).  
 298.  See id. art. 3.15. On one reading of ECJ jurisprudence, such waste would not 
qualify as waste at all. For example, in the AvestaPolarit case, 2003 E.C.R. I-8725, I-8773, 
the ECJ held that “if a mining operator can identify physically the residues which will 
actually be used in the galleries and provides the competent authority with sufficient 
guarantees of that use, those residues may not be regarded as waste.” Scottish authorities do 
not regard mining waste used to fill galleries/voids as wastes if the operator physically 
identifies them, provides a sufficient guarantee that they will be so used, if they are not 
stored for too long in the opinion of the competent authority, if their use is necessary and 
lawful, and if they can be used without prior processing. See DIRECTORATE FOR THE BUILT 
ENVIRONMENT, MINING WASTE DIRECTIVE CONSULTATION PAPER 13, 2008 (Scot.), available 
at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/219188/0058826.pdf; see also Council 
Directive 1999/31, art. 3.2, 1999 O.J. (L 182) 1, 8 (EC) [hereinafter Landfill Directive] 
(excluding “the deposit of unpolluted soil or of non-hazardous inert waste resulting from 
prospecting and extraction, treatment, and storage of mineral resources as well as from the 
operation of quarries” from its scope). 
 299.  See Council Directive 1999/31, 1999 O.J. (L 182) 1 (EC); MWD, supra note 81, 
art. 2.4 (providing that waste which falls within the scope of MWD shall not be subject to 
Directive 1999/31/EC on landfill). 
 300.  See, e.g., MWD, supra note 81, arts. 5.2(a)(iii), 10, 11, 13.5, pmbl. ¶ 20. 
 301.  See id. art. 25.1. 
 302.  See Waste Framework Directive, supra note 77, art. 2.2(d) (excluding “waste 
resulting from prospecting, extraction, treatment and storage of mineral resources and the 
working of quarries covered by Directive 2006/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 15 March 2006 on the management of waste from extractive industries”).  
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B. Obligations on Member States  
 
Member States have a general obligation to ensure that extractive 
waste is managed without endangering human health, without using 
processes or methods which could harm the environment, and without 
adversely affecting the landscape or places of special interest.
303
 Failure to 
comply with this obligation can lead to enforcement action in the ECJ.
304
 
Member States must prohibit the abandonment, dumping, or uncontrolled 
depositing of extractive waste.
305
 Furthermore, they must have application 
and permit procedures for waste facilities
306
 used for receiving specified 
extractive wastes.
307
 The MWD approves of the integration of the procedure 
for obtaining MWD permits with other environmental authorizations, 
provided all the requirements of Articles 5 and 7 are complied with.
308
 Its 
requirements are often incorporated in the IPPC or waste or some other 
environmental permitting system capable of meeting the requirements of 
MWD. If the extractive waste is not subject to an environmental 
authorization implementing EU requirements in these areas, an equivalent 
system implementing MWD requirements must be established to deal with 
MWD waste facilities. 
Member States are required to indicate clearly the requirements for 
incumbent waste facilities servicing the extractive industry as regards 
location, management, control, closure, and preventive and protective 
measures to be taken against environmental threats in the long and short 
term and especially against groundwater pollution by leachate infiltration 
into the soil.
309
 They must also clearly define Category A (the more 
environmentally dangerous) waste facilities.
310
 Moreover, they must ensure 
that waste facilities are designed, located, and managed by technically 
                                                                                                                                      
 303.  See MWD, supra note 81, art. 4.1. 
 304.  See Case C-494/01, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2005 E.C.R. I-3331, 3381 (condemning 
Ireland for its failure to comply with a similarly worded obligation in Directive 75/446/EEC 
on waste).  
 305.  See MWD, supra note 81, art. 4.1. 
 306.  See id. pmbl. ¶ 15.  
 307.  See id. pmbl. ¶ 16, art. 7. 
 308.  See id. art. 5.5 (specifying that plans pursuant to other legislation may be used 
provided that certain conditions are met under this Directive); id. art. 7.1 at 23 (stating that 
permits produced pursuant to other legislation can be combined to form a single one, 
provided that it complies with all the requirements under that Article). 
 309.  See id. pmbl. ¶ 18, arts. 13, 19. 
 310.  See id. pmbl. ¶ 19 (expressing the necessity in clearly defining Category A waste 
facilities); id. art. 9 (stating that authorities should classify a waste facility as Category A 
according to criteria in Annex III); id. Annex III (stating the criteria for determining the 
classification of waste facilities). 
THE REGULATION OF MINING AND MINING WASTE IN THE EU 233 
competent persons and that operators and staff are appropriately skilled.
311
 
Competent authorities must draw up external emergency plans which 
involve the public specifying measures to be taken off-site in case of an 
accident and operators must have major accident policies, safety 
management systems implementing them, and internal emergency plans.
312
 
MWD permits must be reviewed every five years (or earlier when the 
conditions in Article 7.4 of the MWD apply) and if there are substantial 
changes to the operation of the waste facility or to the waste deposited.
313
 
Member States must provide for effective public participation (including, 
when appropriate, participation by the public in other Member States) in the 
mining facility permitting process.
314
 Where there are likely to be 
significant adverse effects for the environment or human health in the other 
Member State and/or if the State likely to be so affected requests, it must be 




C. The Extractive Waste Permit 
 
 Many of the requirements of the MWD relating to permits can be 
imposed under existing EU legislation, especially under legislation 
implementing the IPPC, Waste Framework, and Water Framework 
Directives.
316
 The procedure for obtaining an extractive waste permit is 
similar to the procedure for obtaining an IPPC permit described above, 
except that much more specific detail is required relating to extractive 
waste, and greater emphasis is placed on accident prevention and the long 
term effects of the mining activities.
317
 Conditions to secure the MWD 
objectives and to implement the Directive (and indeed all the appropriate 
                                                                                                                                      
 311.  See id. pmbl. ¶ 21, art. 11.1. 
 312.  See id. art. 6.3 (stating that each operator must have a major accident prevention 
policy prior to the start of operations for managing extractive wastes, draw up a major-
accident prevention policy for the management of extractive waste, and put into effect a 
safety management system implementing it in accordance with Section 1 of Annex I, and 
shall also put into effect an internal emergency plan specifying the measures to be taken on 
site in the event of an accident). 
 313.  See id. art. 5.4. 
 314.  See id. pmbl. ¶¶ 24, 25, 26, 29, art. 15; Doppelhammer, supra note 258, at 201. 
 315.  See MWD, supra note 81, arts. 8, 16. 
 316.  See id. art. 7.1 (stating that permits issued pursuant to other legislation can be 
combined to form a single one, provided that it complies with all the MWD requirements). 
Note that art. 2.5 provides that waste covered by the MWD cannot be subject to Directive 
1999/31/EC on landfill and that the Landfill Directive, in Article 3.2, excludes “the deposit 
of unpolluted soil or of non-hazardous inert waste resulting from prospecting and extraction, 
treatment, and storage of mineral resources as well as from the operation of quarries” from 
its scope.  
 317.  See id. art. 7.2 (stating the elements necessary to complete an application for a 
permit). 
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requirements of EU environmental law relevant to the installation/s) must 
be attached to permits.
318
 Effective, proportionate, and dissuasive penalties 
must be provided for breach of any laws implementing the MWD and 
indeed all EU Directives.
319
 
Operators seeking a MWD permit under MWD (which they may do 
contemporaneously with or by integrating the application for a MWD 
permit with an application for an IPPC or waste or other environmental 
permit, if a Member State’s regulatory system allows this) are required to 
draw up a very detailed waste management plan fulfilling the objectives in 
Article 5.2.
320
 The plan must take account of the principle of sustainable 
development for extractive waste, deal with its prevention or minimisation, 
treatment, recovery, and disposal, and ensure that waste generation and 
harmfulness is minimized and that waste is recovered.
321
 The plan must, 
inter alia,  
 
[E]nsure the short and long term safe disposal of the waste, 
in particular by considering waste management during the 
design, management, operation, and after-closure of the 
facility and by choosing a design which (a) requires 
minimal and, if possible, ultimately no monitoring, control 
and management of the closed facility, (b) prevents or at 
least minimizes any long term negative effects and (c) 
ensures the long term geotechnical stability of any dams or 




Mines are categorized into Category A mines and other mines.
323
 
Category A mines are defined in Annex III as mines with waste which if the 
mines failed or were incorrectly operated would (a) give rise to a major 
accident or (b) are mines containing wastes classified as hazardous under 
Directive 91/6898/EEC or dangerous substances or preparations as defined 
in Directives 67/548/EEC or 1999/45/EC, above certain thresholds.
324
 
                                                                                                                                      
 318.  See id. arts. 7.1, 7.3; see also C-72/95 Aannemersbedrijf P. K. Kraaijeveld BV and 
Others v. Zuid-Holland, 1996 E.C.R. I-5403 (stating that competent authorities in Member 
States must do all within their powers to implement environmental Directives). 
 319.  See MWD, supra note 81, art. 19; Case C-387/97 Comm’n v Greece, 2000 E.C.R. 
I-5047, I-5090–91 (finding that Greece failed to enforce the Waste Directive and requiring 
the payment of a daily penalty for delay in implementing the necessary measures). 
 320.  See MWD, supra note 81, art. 5.5. 
 321. See id. pmbl. ¶ 13, art. 5. 
 322.  Id. art. 5.2(c). 
 323. See id. pmbl. ¶¶ 14, 19, arts. 6, 7, 9. 
 324.  See id. Annex III (stating the criteria for classification of waste under category A); 
id. pmbl. ¶ 19 (“It is necessary to define clearly Category A waste facilities used to service 
waste from the extractive industries, taking into account the likely effects of any pollution 
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Operators must justify why their facilities do not fall within Category A, 
but must nonetheless identify possible accident hazards.
325
 (Only Category 
A facilities are governed by MWD insofar as accident risks are concerned; 




Article 5.3 provides that waste management plans for Category A 
facilities shall at least: 
 
(i) demonstrate that a major-accident prevention policy, a 
safety management system for implementing it, and an 
internal emergency plan will be put in place in accordance 
with Article 6(3); (ii) characterize the waste in accordance 
with Annex II and estimate the total quantity to be 
generated in the operational phase; (iii) describe the 
operation generating the waste and its treatment; (iv) 
describe how the environment and human health may be 
adversely affected by the waste and the preventive 
measures to be taken during operation and after-closure, 
including the construction aspects (location of the facility, 
its management, operation and aftercare, rehabilitation and 
closure, and arrangements for after-closure phase); (v) 
describe proposed control, and monitoring and corrective 
measures if there are indications of instability, soil or water 
contamination; (vi) supply the closure and rehabilitation 
plan and how provision will be made for after-closure 
procedures and monitoring as required for after-closure in 
Article 12; (vii) describe the measures to be taken to 
prevent water status deterioration in accordance with 
Directive 2000/60/EC (the Water Framework Directive) 
and for preventing or minimizing air and soil pollution in 
                                                                                                                                      
resulting from the operation of such a facility or from an accident in which waste escapes 
from such a facility.”). 
 325.  See MWD, supra note 81, art. 5.3(a). Accidents from non-Category A facilities 
may be subject to ordinary IPPC and EIA Directive requirements or to Directive 96/82/EC 
on the control of major-accident hazards or indeed to ordinary planning requirements, 
depending on the nature and extent of the facility. See EIA Directive, supra note 178, Annex 
IV (listing the characteristics of projects to be described including accident prevention 
measures); IPPC Directive, supra note 211, arts. 3.1(e), 6(h) (requiring competent authorities 
to ensure that “necessary measures are taken to prevent accidents and limit their 
consequences”); WFD, supra note 79, art. 11(l) (requiring programmes of measures to 
prevent or reduce the impact of accidental pollution incidents to waters).  
 326. See MWD, supra note 81, art. 5.3 (listing the operator’s obligations with respect to 
a waste management plan). 
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accordance with Article 13; (viii) provide a base line study 




In particular, the waste management plan must justify how the 
design for waste management and the choice of method for extracting and 
treating minerals will meet the objectives of the waste management plans 
prepared to comply with Article 5.2.
328
 Competent authorities must ensure 
that operators take all necessary measures based, inter alia, on BAT to 
prevent or reduce as far as possible any adverse effects on the environment 
or human health resulting from the management of extractive waste, 
including the management of the facility post-closure and the prevention 
and limitation of major accidents and limiting their consequences.
329
 They 
usually do this by conditions in various permits required for mining 
activities including IPPC permits issued in relation to the mine or the 
mining waste facility.
330
 BREF Notes have been published for Tailings and 
Waste.
331
 BAT Notes in Member States are based on these.
332
 Waste 
management plans must be reviewed every five years and/or amended as 
appropriate if there are substantial changes to the operation of the waste 




                                                                                                                                      
 327. See id. arts. 5.3(a)–(h) (prescribing the minimum requirements of the waste 
management plan). 
 328. Id. 
 329.  See id. arts. 4.2–4.3 (explaining requirements for Member States to ensure that 
BAT are used to “prevent or reduce as far as possible any adverse effects on the environment 
and human health brought about as a result of the management of extractive waste”). 
 330. See id. art. 7.1 (discussing permit requirements).  
 331.  See Management of Tailings and Waste-rock in Mining Activities, EUROPEAN IPPC 
BUREAU, http://eippcb.jrc.es/reference/mmr.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2011) (listing 
published BREF Notes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, 
and the Environment). The BREF Notes for Tailings and Waste Rock cover the following 
metals irrespective of the amounts produced or the mineral processing method used (e.g., 
whether mechanical methods are used, such as flotation, or whether they are produced by 
chemical or hydrometallurgical methods, such as leaching: aluminum, cadmium, chromium, 
copper, gold, iron, lead, manganese, mercury, nickel, silver, tin, tungsten, and zinc. Id. The 
following industrial minerals are also included: barites, borates, feldspar (if recovered by 
flotation), fluorspar, kaolin (if recovered by flotation), limestone (if processed), phosphate, 
potash, strontium, and talc (if recovered by flotation). Id. Coal is only included when it is 
processed and there are tailings produced. Id. Generally, this means that hard coal (or rock 
coal or black coal) is covered, whereas lignite (or brown coal), which is usually not 
processed, is not covered, and oil shale. Id. 
 332. See MWD, supra note 81, art. 4.3 (“The measures referred to in paragraph 2 shall 
be based, inter alia, on the best available techniques, without prescribing the use of any 
technique or specific technology, but taking into account the technical characteristics of the 
waste facility, its geographical location and the local environmental conditions.”). 
 333.  See id. art. 5.4. 
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VIII. The Prevention of Major Accidents 
 
A number of Directives deal with the risk of mining accidents. The 
most important is Directive 96/82/EC on the control of major-accident 
hazards involving dangerous substances which was amended by Directive 
2003/105/EC specifically to cover the processing and storage of minerals 
containing dangerous substances extracted in mining and quarrying and the 
tailings disposal facilities used in these activities.
334
 Directive 96/82/EC had 
to be transposed in Member States by February 3, 1999.
335
 It imposes 
stringent obligations on establishments holding dangerous substances, 
including requiring information to be notified to the public authorities and 
the preparation of a major-accident prevention policy, a safety report, and 
internal and external emergency plans.
336
 It also sets requirements relating 
to land-use, planning, and public information, as well as requirements for 
dealing with an accident if one occurs.
337
 Some mines are subject to this 
Directive, but accidents from Category A mining waste facilities are 
specifically regulated under the MWD and not under Directive 96/82/EC as 
amended by Directive 203/105/EC.
338
  
All applicants for IPPC permits have a general duty to take all the 
necessary measures to prevent all major accidents involving dangerous 
substances, to limit their consequences, to identify risks of accidents, to 
submit plans to prevent them, to minimize their effects on humans and the 
environment, and to notify competent authorities without delay of any 
incident or accident significantly affecting the environment.
339
 Persons who 
have compiled an environmental impact statement for any mining or mining 
related project in order to comply with Directive 85/337/EEC on EIA must 
also identify the risks of accidents and propose measures to prevent and 




The need to prevent accidents and to minimize their environmental 
consequences is one of the considerations to be taken into account when 
                                                                                                                                      
 334.  See generally Council Directive 96/82, 1997 O.J. (L 10) 13 (EC), amended by 
Council Directive 2003/105, 1997 O.J. (L 345) (concerning the control of major-accident 
hazards involving dangerous substances). 
 335. See id. art. 24 (setting a two-year time limit from February 3, 1995 for 
transposition of the Directive by Member States). 
 336. See id. arts. 6–7, 9, 11–14. 
 337. Id. 
 338. See MWD, supra note 81, art. 2 (describing the scope of the Directive). 
 339.  See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, arts. 3.1(e), 14(b). 
 340.  See EIA Directive, supra note 178, Annex III ¶ 1 (requiring the EIS to identify the 
risk of accidents, having regard in particular to substances or technologies used); id. Annex 
I, II (listing projects subject to art. 4); id. art. 5, Annex IV (requiring a description of 
measures to prevent, reduce, or offset any significant adverse effects on the environment.). 
238 3 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV’T 177 (2012) 
BAT is being determined in specific cases.
341
 Requirements to prevent or 
reduce the risks of accidents in Directive 96/82/EC are usually integrated 
into the procedures for obtaining permits for mines such as IPPC or waste 
licences or water pollution licensees and/or planning or other environmental 
permissions for developments and/or consents for projects covered by the 
EIA Directive.
342
 Guidelines on metals environmental risk assessment 
issued by the ICMM in 2008 are often used in risk assessments, and EU 
Regulation 1272/2008 applying the UN Globally Harmonised System of 




The MWD, as described above, contains specific procedures 
governing accidents from Category A extractive waste facilities.
344
 Member 
States are obliged to “ensure that major-accident hazards are identified and 
that the necessary features are incorporated into all aspects of the extractive 
waste facility (design, construction, operation, closure and aftercare) to 
prevent such accidents and to limit their consequences for human health 
and/or the environment, including transboundary impacts.”
345
 They must 
draw up an external major-accidents plan, and operators are obliged to 
supply the competent authority with the information necessary to do this.
346
 
Member States must also ensure that operators immediately inform 
competent authorities if there is a risk of a major accident in order to help 
minimize its consequences for human health and to assess and minimize the 
                                                                                                                                      
 341.  See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 2.12 (defining the meaning of “best 
available techniques” for the purposes of the directive); id. Annex IV (detailing the 
“considerations to be taken into account generally or in specific cases when determining best 
available techniques, as defined in Article 2(12)”; these include “11. the need to prevent 
accidents and to minimize the consequences for the environment”). 
 342.  See supra notes 339–41 and accompanying text (discussing the duties and 
responsibilities of IPPC permit applicants and those who have compiled environmental 
impact statements).  
 343. See generally U.N. ECON. COMM’N EUR., GLOBALLY HARMONIZED SYSTEM OF 
CLASSIFICATION AND LABELLING OF CHEMICALS, U.N. DOC. ST/SG/AC.10/30/Rev.2, U.N. 
Sales No. E.07.II.E.5 (2008), available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/ 
danger/publi/ghs/ghs_rev02/English/03e_part3.pdf. The system is an internationally agreed-
upon system of hazard classification created by the United Nations designed to harmonize 
classification and labeling standards worldwide by using consistent criteria for classification 
and labeling on a global level. Id. It superseded the relevant European Union standards since 
it was adopted into EU law by Regulation 1272/2008. Id. 
 344.  See MWD, supra note 81, art. 6.1 (describing major-accident prevention and 
information requirements for those Category A waste facilities not falling within the scope 
of Directive 96/82/EC). Note that wastes deposited in voids falls within the scope of 
Directive 96/82/EC on major accident hazards as does other waste which does not come 
within the definition of extractive waste in the MWD, Article 2. Id. 
 345.  Id. art. 6.2. 
 346.  See id. art. 6.3. 
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extent of the environmental damage.
347
 This is normally done by requiring 
the attachment of appropriate conditions to various permits for extractive 
waste facilities.
348
 Operators are required to draw up major-accident 
prevention policies for extractive waste, to put safety systems (as set out in 
Section 1 of Annex II to the MWD) and an internal emergency plan (in 
accordance with the objectives listed in Article 6.4) into place specifying 
measures to be taken on site if there is an accident.
349
 The public must be 
given an opportunity to participate effectively in formulating the external 
emergency plans and must be given specified information, including 
information listed in Section 2 of Annex II, free of charge.
350
 The 




IX. Mine Closures and Mining Waste Issues 
 
A. Legislation Regulating Mine Closures 
 
Mine closures involve the closure of the mine itself and usually 
(although not necessarily contemporaneously) the closure of directly 
associated activities. One of these directly associated activities is 
sometimes a mine waste facility such as a tailings pond. The closure of 
the mine and directly associated activities is often carried out as required 
in permits such as those implementing the IPPC, Water and Waste 
Framework Directives, and the Landfill Directive, which also, when 
appropriate, may be designed or applied to ensure compliance with the 
MWD.
352
 If mining is not regulated under an IPPC or some other 
appropriate environmental permit, a specific authorization must regulate 
those aspects of mine closure subject to the MWD.
353
 Alternatively or 
additionally, if the mine or any directly associated activity was subject to 
EIA or to an appropriate assessment under the Habitats or the Water 
Framework Directives, the closure must be carried out in accordance 
with the permit or other environmental authorization
354
 implementing 
these, which (particularly in the case of appropriate assessments) may 
                                                                                                                                      
 347.  See id. art. 6.4. 
 348. See id. art. 7. 
 349.  See id. art. 6.4.  
 350.  See id. arts. 6.5, 6.6 (detailing requirements for public involvement). 
 351.  See id. art. 6.6. 
 352. See generally WFD, supra note 79; Waste Framework Directive, supra note 77; 
IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 5; MWD, supra note 81, art. 7.1. 
 353.  See MWD, supra note 81, art. 7.1 (stating that no waste facility shall be allowed to 
operate without a permit granted by the competent authority). 
 354.  In the UK and Ireland, this is often as required in the planning permission for the 
project. 
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also ensure compliance with various EU environmental and accident 
prevention requirements.
355
 The entire permitting system for a mine (and 
certainly for a large mine) normally requires the coordination of 
requirements under various Directives.
356
 This is not always efficiently 
ensured in practice, and there can be contradictory requirements where 
there are multiple permits granted at different times and when older 
permits, such as those authorizing the initial project, cannot be (or are 
not) updated. 
The IPPC Directive does not deal in detail with the cessation of 
activities at permitted installations.
357
 However, references in Article 3 to 
the obligation on Member States to ensure that necessary measures are 
taken “to prevent accidents and limit their consequences” and, “upon 
definitive cessation of activities, to avoid any pollution risk and return 
the site of operation to a satisfactory state,” as well as the requirement in 
Article 6.6 that permits make appropriate provision for definitive 
cessation of operations, empower Member States to prescribe (and 
competent authorities to implement), via transposing legislation, 
                                                                                                                                      
 355.  The EIA Directive, Annex I requires EIA for open-cast mining and quarries where 
the surface of the site exceeds 25 hectares. See EIA Directive, supra note 178, Annex I ¶ 19 
(listing projects that are subject to Article 4(1) requiring assessments under the Directive, 
some of which are often associated with mining). Waste resulting from prospecting, 
extraction, treatment, and storage of mineral resources and the working of quarries is 
covered by the MWD. See Waste Framework Directive, supra note 77, pmbl. (excluding 
waste covered by the MWD Directive but not other waste generated by mining from its 
scope). The deposit of waste from the processing of minerals (tailings) in a pond may be 
covered by Directive 99/31/EC on the landfill of waste unless covered by the MWD. See 
MWD, supra note 81, art. 2.4 (“Without prejudice to other Community legislation, waste 
which falls within the scope of this Directive shall not be subject to Directive 1999/31/EC.”). 
Minerals processing is sometimes covered by the IPPC Directive. See IPPC Directive, supra 
note 211, Annex I (referring to industries governed). Specified mining wastes are governed 
by the MWD. See generally MWD, supra note 81. The operations of the extractive industry 
are also covered by the Water Framework Directive. See WFD, supra note 79, art. 11.3 
(stating that Member States must authorize and set conditions for certain extraction-related 
activities). 
 356. See generally WFD, supra note 79; Waste Framework Directive, supra note 77; 
IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 5; MWD, supra note 81, art. 7. 
 357.  See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 3 (requiring operators to ensure that the 
necessary measures are taken upon definitive cessation of activities to avoid any pollution 
risk and return the site of operation to a satisfactory state). Directive 2010/75/EU on 
industrial emissions, Article 22, has more specific requirements as to closure and, although 
not yet obliged to do so, many competent authorities are implementing its requirements 
under their general discretion in Article 9.7 of the IPPC Directive. See Directive 2010/75, 
supra note 76, art. 14.1(f) (requiring permit conditions to deal with permanent closure); id. 
art. 22.3 (prescribing closure requirements, base line reports, and an obligation to return site 
to baseline condition on permanent closure). 
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requirements governing all aspects of mine closures if these are subject 
to an IPPC licence.
358
  
Article 4.1 of the MWD requires Member states to take all 
measures necessary to regulate the management of extractive waste in 
order to prevent harm to the environment and to human health. This 
general obligation is supported by a number of specific measures in the 
MWD that may or may not be required, depending on the nature of the 
waste and whether there is a “waste facility” (hereafter called a MWD 
waste facility) at the site. The classification of waste facilities under the 
MWD will also determine what measures are necessary because the 
Directive permits Member States to apply less stringent measures to non-
Category A facilities and non-hazardous and inert materials if they so 
choose.
359
 However, the operator of every extractive waste facility must 
draw up and obtain approval for a waste management plan that includes 
proposals
360
 for “closure, including rehabilitation, after-closure 
procedures and monitoring” as provided for in Article 12.
361 
A number of 
other directives also mandate Member States to require procedures and 
secure objectives designed to prevent or minimize the risk of accidents 
and environmental pollution arising from the closure and aftercare of 




The important questions relating to the closure of mining waste 
facilities are as follows: (i) who is responsible for complying with 
                                                                                                                                      
 358.  See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 9.7 (“The permit may contain such other 
specific conditions for the purposes of this Directive as the Member State or competent 
authority may think fit.”). 
 359.  See id. art. 2.3 (exempting from Category A requirements facilities “[i]nert waste 
and unpolluted soil resulting from the prospecting, extraction, treatment and storage of 
mineral resources” and stating that they “shall not be subject to Articles 7, 8, 11(1) and (3), 
12, 13(6), 14 and 16, unless deposited in a Category A waste facility”).  
 360.  See id. art. 5.1 (“Member States shall ensure that the operator draws up a waste 
management plan for the minimisation, treatment, recovery and disposal of extractive waste, 
taking account of the principle of sustainable development.”). “Operator” in Article 5.1 is 
defined as any “person responsible for the management of extractive waste,” including its 
temporary storage, as well as the operational and after-closure phases. Id. art. 3.24. 
 361. Id. 5.3(f).  
 362. See EIA Directive, supra note 178, Annex IV (listing the characteristics of projects 
to be described including accident prevention measures); IPPC Directive, supra note 211, 
arts. 3.1(e), 6(h) (requiring competent authorities to ensure that “necessary measures are 
taken to prevent accidents and limit their consequences”); WFD, supra note 79, art. 11(l) 
(requiring programmes of measures to prevent or reduce the impact of accidental pollution 
incidents to waters); Waste Framework Directive, supra note 77, art. 28 (requiring waste 
management procedures after closure); Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 13 (providing 
closure and after-care procedures). Note that the Landfill Directive does not apply to wastes 
covered by the MWD. See id. 
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closure requirements? (ii) what are the closure procedures? (iii) who will 
implement and be responsible for the aftercare of mine facilities? (iv) 
what is the duration of aftercare? (v) what standards of remediation are 
expected? (vi) what, if any, financial provision must be made for 
environmental liabilities? These issues are addressed in the next 
paragraphs.  
 
B. Who is Responsible for Closing a Mine and Associated Activities? 
 
The IPPC Directive does not state who is responsible for closing 
a regulated installation but, as its obligations apply to “operators,” it can 
be assumed that the operator/s of a mine or waste facility or facilities 
licenced under legislation transposing the IPPC Directive is/are 
responsible for its/their closure and aftercare.
363
 An operator of an IPPC 
facility is “any natural or legal person who operates or controls the 
installation or, where this is provided for in national legislation, to whom 
decisive economic power over the technical functioning of the 
installation has been delegated.”
364
  
Article 7 of the Landfill Directive, which may regulate aspects of 
mining waste management not subject to the MWD,
365
 states that the 
application for a landfill permit must contain certain minimum 
particulars, including “the proposed plan for the closure and after-care 
procedures.”
366
 Although the Directive recognizes in Article 7 that 
applicants for landfill permits and operators may be “different entities,” 
Article 8 refers to the obligations of the operator under the permit and 
Article 13(a)(ii) refers to the closure of sites “at the request of the 
operator,” so it must be assumed that operators are responsible for 
complying with closure requirements. Article 3.9 of the Waste 
Framework Directive defines waste management as including “the after-
care of disposal sites,”
367
 and Article 23.1(f) states that waste permits 
must contain “such closure and after-care provisions as may be 
                                                                                                                                      
 363. See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 3 (prescribing the obligations of 
“operators”). IPPC permits often implement waste management requirements in Directive 
2008/98/EC on waste. See Waste Framework Directive, supra note 77, art. 23.5 (stating that 
as long as the requirements of the Directive are complied with, they may be imposed by 
permits issued under other domestic or EU legislation). 
 364.  Id. art. 2.13. 
 365.  See, e.g., MWD, supra note 81, pmbl. ¶ 8 (stating that the MWD does not apply to 
those waste streams which, albeit generated in the course of mineral extraction or treatment 
operations, are not directly linked to the extraction or treatment process); id. art. 10.2 
(providing that the Landfill Directive shall continue to apply to waste other than extractive 
waste used for filling in excavation voids as appropriate). 
 366. Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 7. 
 367. Waste Framework Directive, supra note 77, art. 3.9.  
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necessary.” Article 23.5 refers to saving operators from dealing with 
multiple environmental applications. Article 5 of the MWD specifically 
obliges the operator to include, inter alia, a waste facility closure plan in 
the facility’s waste management plan, and Article 12(3) refers to closure 
reports submitted by the operator.
368
 From the above, it is clear that 
responsibility for the closure of installations regulated under the IPPC, 




C. Procedures for Closing Mines and Mining Waste Facilities 
 
The BREF Notes for the Management of Tailings and Waste-
rock in Mining Activities
370
 refer to the common practice of competent 
authorities in the EU regulating the closure of waste facilities: 
 
Usually, at least for the past few decades, plans for closure 
and site clean-up will have been part of the permitting of the 
site, right from the planning stage onwards, and should 
therefore have undergone regular updating with every 
substantial change in the operation and in negotiations with 
environmental authorities and other stakeholders. The 
concept of ‘design for closure’ implies that the closure of the 
site is taken into account in the feasibility study of a new 
mine site and is then continuously monitored and updated 




An IPPC permit must prescribe the conditions for closing any 
regulated or directly associated installation.
372
 These must comply with 
                                                                                                                                      
 368. See MWD, supra note 81, art. 5 (discussing closure procedures in conjunction 
with the waste management plan); id. art. 12.3 (“A waste facility may be considered as 
finally closed only after the competent authority has, without undue delay, carried out a final 
on-site inspection, . . . certified that the land affected by a waste facility has been 
rehabilitated and communicated to the operator its approval of the closure.”). 
 369.  See id. art. 3.24 (defining “operator” as “the natural or legal person responsible for 
the management of extractive waste, in accordance with the national law of the Member 
State in which the waste management takes place, including in respect of temporary storage 
of extractive waste [and] the operational and after-closure phase”). 
 370. See Commission Reference Document on BAT for Management of Tailings and 
Waste-Rock in Mining Activities (January 2009) [hereinafter BREF Notes], available at 
ftp://ftp.jrc.es/pub/eippcb/doc/mmr_adopted_0109.pdf. 
 371.  Id. at iv. Note this statement certainly reflects the practice in the UK and Ireland. 
 372.  See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 2.6(a) (defining BAT as including “the 
way an installation is . . . decommissioned”). Article 5.3(f) of the MWD applicable to waste 
management plans also has requirements relating to closures. See MWD, supra note 81, art. 
5.3(f) (requiring waste management plans to contain “the proposed plan for closure, 
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BAT, which requires the implementation of approved environmental 
management systems.
373
 The criteria for BAT established under the IPPC 
Directive relate, inter alia, to the way an installation is “designed, built, 
maintained, operated and decommissioned.”
374
 Other environmental 
permits, such as those ensuring compliance with the EIA Directive, the 
Water Directives, and the Habitats Directives may (but are not explicitly 
required to), depending on transposing legislation, prescribe conditions 
for dealing with the closure of facilities. However, legislation transposing 




The various EU BREF notes on waste and mining wastes and 
Member State BAT notes provide guidance on closure and after-care 
requirements.
376
 Depending on transposing legislation in Member States, 
most IPPC permits and other environmental authorizations for mining 
installations and waste management facilities require operators to submit 
residual management plans, updated regularly, in pursuance of their 
obligations to ensure that “the necessary measures are taken upon 
definitive cessation of activities to avoid any pollution risk and return the 
site of operation to a satisfactory state.”
377
 Such plans will usually be 
                                                                                                                                      
including rehabilitation, after-closure procedures and monitoring as provided for in Article 
12”). 
 373.  See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 3. (specifying the basic obligations of 
operators). Likewise, Article 5.3(a) of the MWD requires management systems in waste 
management plans. See MWD, supra note 81, art. 5.3(a) (“[W]here a Category A waste 
facility is required, a document demonstrating that a major-accident prevention policy, a 
safety management system for implementing it and an internal emergency plan will be put 
into effect in accordance with Article 6(3).”). 
 374.  See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 2.12(a). 
 375. See generally Waste Framework Directive, supra note 77; IPPC Directive, supra 
note 211, art. 5; MWD, supra note 81, art. 7.1. 
 376.  See supra notes 331, 370; Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 9(c) (providing 
that a landfill permit must include contingency plans and provisional requirements for the 
closure and after-care operations); see also ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 
GUIDANCE FOR THE LANDFILL SECTOR 51 (U.K. 2007), available at 
http://publications.environment-agency.gov.uk/PDF/GEHO0407BMHO-E-E.pdf (advising 
on “the closure requirements for landfills[] and the requirements leading up to surrender of 
the permit”); ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, BAT GUIDANCE NOTES FOR THE WASTE 
SECTOR: LANDFILL ACTIVITIES 41 (Ir. 2003) [hereinafter Irish BAT Notes], available at 
http://www.epa.ie/downloads/advice/bat/bat%20landfill%20final%20april%202003.pdf 
(discussing the cessation of waste disposal, restoration and aftercare, and maintenance of 
environmental pollution and control systems). 
 377.  IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 3.1(f); see also BREF Notes, supra note 370, 
at iv (commenting on general practices for the last two decades). A Residuals Management 
Plan is a fully costed and detailed plan for decommissioning or closure of a facility or part 
thereof. See EPA, Guidance on Environmental Liability Risk Assessment, Residuals 
Management Plans and Financial Provisions [hereinafter EPA, Guidance on Environmental 
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modeled on the plans required for the closure of landfills or mining waste 
facilities described in the next paragraphs. 
Specific procedures apply to the closure of those extractive waste 
facilities governed by the MWD that are closed after transposition of the 
MWD by Member States, i.e., after May 1, 2008, at the latest.
378
 
Exemptions from the MWD’s stringent requirements apply to specified 
extractive waste facilities listed in Article 2 of the MWD, but they may 
be subjected to other waste management controls, notably under the 
Waste Framework and Landfill Directives.
379
 Article 5 of the MWD 
requires regulated waste facility operators to draft waste management 
plans containing proposals for closure, including rehabilitation, after-
closure procedures, and monitoring. Even operators of facilities listed in 




The procedures for closing landfills and mining waste facilities 
are similar.
381
 The operator of a landfill or part of a landfill (which could 
be ancillary to a mining activity) or of a mining waste facility specified 
in Article 2.1 of the MWD (and other waste facilities specified in Article 
2 if Member States so choose) must begin the closure procedure in 
accordance with the permit for the facility
382
 and can only start the 
procedure if one of the following conditions is satisfied: (a) the relevant 
conditions in the permit are met; (b) the competent authority has 
authorized the closure at the request of the operator; or (c) the competent 
authority issues a reasoned decision to that effect.
383
  
Permits for mine waste facilities and landfills (and indeed many 
other permits covering installations with the potential to cause damage to 
human health or the environment after closure) require operators to 
supply monitoring results,
384
 to undertake audits, to commission 
                                                                                                                                      
Liability], available at http://www.epa.ie/downloads/advice/licensee/elra%20guidance%20 
document.pdf (outlining the requirements of a Residuals Management Plan). 
 378.  See id. art. 25.1 (“Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive before 1 May 2008.”).  
 379. See supra notes 359, 360, 362.  
 380.  See supra note 359 and accompanying text (explaining that Article 2.3 of the 
MWD permits Member States to apply less stringent measures to certain kinds of facilities 
and materials—mostly inert waste facilities).  
 381. Compare Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 13 (prescribing closure and after-
closure procedures for landfill waste facilities), with MWD, supra note 81, art. 12 
(prescribing closure and after-closure procedures for mine waste facilities). 
 382.  See Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 7 (discussion application for a permit 
for a landfill); MWD, supra note 81, art. 5 (discussing waste management plans). 
 383.  See Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 13(a), MWD, supra note 81, art. 12(a). 
 384.  See MWD, supra note 81, pmbl. ¶ 9(22) (stating that it is necessary to establish a 
monitoring procedure during the operation and after‐closure of waste facilities and requiring 
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independent verification of results,
385
 to notify of accidents, incidents, 
and events likely to affect waste stability or harm the environment 
revealed by monitoring, to implement internal emergency plans for 
extractive waste facilities when appropriate,
386
 to maintain records,
387
 to 
prepare and to update environmental and risk assessments at regular 
intervals, and to ensure that the facility will meet required standards for 
closure.
388
 Furthermore, operators of authorized landfills and MWD 




A competent authority cannot consider a landfill or mining waste 
facility definitively closed until it has carried out a final on-site 
inspection assessing all the reports submitted by the operator and 
certified that the waste facility has been rehabilitated.
390
 In practice, 
competent authorities, in addition to their own investigations, require 
operators to commission independent reports by reputable consultants 
(usually respected multinational consultancies) reviewing the 
environmental status of the facilities; they will not agree to closure unless 
                                                                                                                                      
an after‐closure period for monitoring and control of Category A waste facilities 
proportionate to the risk they pose, “in a way similar to that required by Directive 
1999/31/EC”); id. arts. 5(3)(e), 11(2)(c); Landfill Directive, supra note 298, pmbl. ¶ 23 
(stating that it is necessary to establish common monitoring procedures during the operation 
and after-care phases of a landfill in order to identify any possible adverse environmental 
effect of the landfill and take the appropriate corrective measures); id. arts. 7(f), 9(c)–(d). 
 385.  Independent verification is also required by the London Stock Exchange Rules and 
is recommended in many BREF and BAT Notes. See, e.g., Reference Document on Best 
Available Techniques for Management of Tailings and Waste Rock (January 2009), 
available at http://eippcb.jrc.es/reference/BREF/mmr_adopted_0109.pdf.  
 386.  See Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 13(c); MWD, supra note 81, art. 11.3. 
 387.  See Landfill Directive, supra note 298, arts. 9(d), 10, 11.2, 13(b); MWD, supra 
note 81, art. 17.2. 
 388.  See Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 13(b) (stating that a landfill or part of it 
may only be considered as definitely closed after the competent authority has carried out a 
final on-site inspection, has assessed all the reports submitted by the operator, and has 
communicated to the operator its approval for the closure); MWD, supra note 81, art. 5.4, 
(requiring operators to review the waste management plan every five years); id. art. 12.6 
(requiring operators to report after closure). 
 389.  See Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 8(a)(ii) (requiring that landfill permits 
not be issued without ensuring that landfill sites will be managed by competent persons); 
MWD, supra note 81, art. 11.1 (requiring States to take appropriate measures to ensure that 
the management of a waste facility is in the hands of a competent person and that technical 
development and training of all staff are provided”). This is also BAT. Member States may 
modify this obligation for facilities specified in art. 2.3, paragraph 1 of the MWD (i.e., “Inert 
waste and unpolluted soil from . . . prospecting, extracting, treatment and storage of peat and 
mineral resources and quarry waste”). Id. art 2.3. 
 390.  See Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 13(b) (requiring a final on-site 
inspection and approval for closure); MWD, supra note 81, art. 12.3 (same). 
THE REGULATION OF MINING AND MINING WASTE IN THE EU 247 
satisfied with rehabilitation. IPPC permits and other authorizations 
regulating mining and mining waste normally require mine rehabilitation 
on a progressive basis wherever possible so that the rate of restoration is 
similar to the rate of exploration or exploitation. 
 
D. After-Care Requirements 
 
Both landfill facilities and extractive waste facilities governed by 
the MWD (except those listed in Article 2.3) must be subjected to after-
care procedures.
391
 Operators of both are responsible for maintenance, 
monitoring, control, and corrective measures in the after-closure phase 
“for as long as may be required by the competent authority,”
392
 taking 
into account the nature and duration of the hazard.
393
 The MWD 
envisages that competent authorities may take over after-care of the 
facilities, but this has been resisted in Ireland.
394
 Landfill operators must, 
without prejudice to any Community or national legislation as regards 
the liability of the waste holder, for as long as the competent authority 
considers the landfill a hazard to the environment, monitor and analyze 
landfill gas and leachate from the site, as well as the groundwater regime 
in the vicinity of the site in accordance with Annex III to the Landfill 
Directive.
395
 Where considered necessary by the competent authority to 
comply with Community legislation, especially relating to water quality, 
MWD waste facility operators must, inter alia, control the physical and 
chemical stability of the facility and minimize negative environmental 
effects on waters by ensuring that the facility structures are monitored 
and conserved, with control and measuring apparatus always ready for 






                                                                                                                                      
 391.  See Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 13 (listing procedures for closure and 
after-care); MWD, supra note 81, art. 12 (same). 
 392.  Landfill Directive, supra note 298, arts. 13(c)–(d) (requiring that the operator of a 
site shall be responsible for monitoring for as long as the competent authority considers that 
a landfill is likely to cause a hazard); MWD, supra note 81, art. 12.4 (stating that the 
operator “shall be responsible for the maintenance, monitoring, control and corrective 
measures in the after-closure phase for as long as may be required . . . .”). 
 393.  See Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 13(d).  
 394.  See MWD, supra note 81, art. 12.4 (“The operator shall be responsible . . . in the 
after-closure phase . . . save where the competent authority decides to take over such tasks 
from the operator . . . .”). Insofar as can be determined, only the Netherlands does this for 
landfills. 
 395.  See Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 13(d). 
 396.  See MWD, supra note 81, art. 12.5. 
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E. Duration of After-Care 
 
The Landfill Directive states that “it is necessary to indicate 
clearly the requirements with which landfill sites must comply as regards 
. . . closure and preventive and protective measures to be taken against 
any threat to the environment in the short as well as in the long-term 
perspective, and more especially against the pollution of groundwater by 
leachate infiltration into the soil,”
397
 but it does not stipulate a definite 
after-care period. Article 13(c) holds the operator responsible for “the 
after-care phase for as long as may be required by the competent 
authority, taking into account the time during which the landfill could 
present hazards.”
398
 Moreover, Article 13(d) states, “for as long as the 
competent authority considers that a landfill is likely to cause a hazard to 
the environment . . ., the operator of the site shall be responsible for 
monitoring and analyzing landfill gas and leachate from the site and the 
groundwater regime in the vicinity of the site in accordance with Annex 
III.”
399
 Clearly, therefore, the duration of the after-care period is a matter 
for the discretion of the competent authorities in each Member State, and 
clearly some time limit proportionate to the risk involved is envisaged.
400
 
The UK landfill guidelines recommend a minimum of 50 years for after-
care.
401
 However, competent authorities in some other Member States do 
not accept a finite period.
402
  
The MWD is no more informative about recommended periods 
for after-care. Article 3(24) refers to the “after-closure phase,” thus 
implying a finite period, and the Preamble envisages that the after-
closure period for Category A facilities should be “proportionate to the 
risk posed by the individual waste facility, in a way similar to that 
required by Directive 1999/31/EC.”
403
 Yet competent authorities in some 
                                                                                                                                      
 397.  Landfill Directive, supra note 298, pmbl. ¶ 12 (emphasis added). 
 398.  Id. art. 13(c). 
 399.  Id. art. 13(d). 
 400.  See id. pmbl. ¶ 30 (stating that when a competent authority considers that a landfill 
is unlikely to cause a hazard to the environment for longer than a certain period, the 
estimated costs to be included in the price to be charged by an operator may be limited to 
that period). 
 401.  See ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON MONITORING OF LANDFILL LEACHATE, 
GROUNDWATER AND SURFACE WATER 8 (U.K.), available at http://www.environment-
agency.gov.uk/static/documents/Business/report_1_533191.pdf (“Landfill sites that contain 
biodegradable or other polluting wastes may need to be monitored for periods of up to 50 
years or more . . . .”). 
 402.  The Netherlands adopts an unlimited period for landfill waste but relieves 
operators of responsibility after 30 years. Irish authorities currently consider that the 
aftercare period is indefinite citing the lack of statutory guidance on the matter. 
 403. Id. pmbl. ¶ 22. 
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Member States require perpetual monitoring of very long aftercare 
periods. For example, all Irish IPPC mining licences to date refer to 
“perpetual” after-care of the site and require that a programme for this be 
submitted to the EPA.
404
 The 2009 UK draft Guidance on Financial 
Guarantees for Mining Waste Facilities envisages detailed costing of 




A World Bank Report on Mine Closures states that, although the 
duration of post-closure monitoring should be determined on a risk basis, 
site conditions typically require after-care monitoring for a period of five 
years or longer.
406
 However, the report found no jurisdiction which 
prescribed a definite period for after-care.
407
 Article 12.4 of the MWD 
envisages the possibility that a competent authority may take over a mine 
waste facility from an operator after it has finally closed without 
prejudice to any national or Community legislation governing the 
liability of the waste holder.
408
 But, insofar as can be determined, no EU 
country to date makes provision for this in respect of closed mines, 
                                                                                                                                      
 404.  See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ARCON MINES INTEGRATED 
POLLUTION CONTROL LICENSE 517, at 22–24 (2008), available at 
http://www.epa.ie/terminalfour/ippc/ippc-view.jsp?regno=P0517-01 (requiring that the 
licensee include a programme for perpetual aftercare in its closure plans at Galmoy mines); 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, BOLIDEN MINES LIMITED INTEGRATED POLLUTION 
CONTROL LICENSE 516, at 19–21 (2006), available at 
http://www.epa.ie/terminalfour/ippc/ippc-view.jsp?regno=P0516-01 (requiring that the 
licensee include a programme for perpetual aftercare in its closure plans at Tara mines); 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, VEDANTA LISHEEN MINES INTEGRATED POLLUTION 
CONTROL LICENSE 88, at 19–21 (1997), available at 
http://www.epa.ie/terminalfour/ippc/ippc-view.jsp?regno=P0088-01 (requiring that the 
licensee include a programme for perpetual aftercare in its closure plans).  
 405.  See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON FINANCIAL 
GUARANTEES FOR MINING WASTE FACILITIES 5 (U.K. 2010) 5, available at 
http://www.environment-
agency.gov.uk/static/documents/Research/Guidance_Financial_Guarantees_for_MWD_sites
_v4_FPSG__Final_170609.pdf (“We consider that is it appropriate to estimate detailed costs 
for an aftercare period of 60 years, with a further contingency fund available thereafter.”). 
 406.  See THE WORLD BANK GROUP OIL, GAS AND MINING POLICY DIVISION, GUIDANCE 
NOTES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FINANCIAL SURETY FOR MINE CLOSURE 2 [hereinafter 
WORLD BANK GUIDANCE NOTES], available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOGMC/Resources/financial_surety_mine-.pdf (“The 
duration of post-closure monitoring should be defined on a risk basis; however, site 
conditions typically require a minimum period of five years after closure or longer.”). 
 407.  See id. 
 408.  See MWD, supra note 81, art. 12.4 (“The operator shall be responsible . . . save 
where the competent authority decides to take over such tasks from the operator, after a 
waste facility has been finally closed and without prejudice to any national or Community 
legislation governing the liability of the waste holder.”). 
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although the Netherlands does it for ordinary landfills.
409
 This is an issue 
of great practical importance for mining companies who often want a 
finite termination to their obligations; yet there is no EU guidance in the 
area and each Member State has its own (sometimes incoherent) rules.  
 
F. Financial Provision for Environmental Performance and After-Care 
 
Referring to mine closure costs, The World Bank estimated in 
2002: 
 
Closure costs for environmental issues range from less than 
US$1 million each for small mines in Romania to hundreds 
of millions of dollars for large lignite mines and associated 
facilities in Germany. More typically, closure costs will 
range in the tens of millions of dollars. Preliminary 
research indicates that medium-size open pit and 
underground mines operating in the past 10 to 15 years cost 
US$5–15 million to close, while closure of open pit mines 
operating for over 35 years, with large waste and tailings 




Banks adhering to the Equator Principles will not lend to operators who do 
not comply with the World Bank/IFC Environmental Guidelines, which 
require the provision of financial guarantees for the environmental 
performance of mining projects.
411
  
 Although the MWD refers to the need for Member States to adopt a 
uniform approach to implementation and notes that differing national 
applications may lead to substantial disparities in the financial burden on 
economic operators,
412
 no uniform position on financial liabilities has yet 
                                                                                                                                      
 409.  Insofar as can be determined, only the Netherlands assumes responsibility for 
after-care after 30 years. See Aftercare, ROYAL HASKONING, 
http://www.royalhaskoning.com/landfills/themes/aftercare/Pages/default.aspx (last visited 
Dec. 13, 2011) (“The Dutch government decided to introduce a policy to cover aftercare not 
for a period of 30 years, but everlasting aftercare.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).  
 410.  See WORLD BANK GUIDANCE NOTES, supra note 406, at 1.  
 411.  See C. GEORGE MILLER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON MINING AND METALS, 
FINANCIAL ASSURANCE FOR MINE CLOSURE AND RECLAMATION 42 (2005), available at 
http://www.icmm.com/document/282 (“Adherents to these principles have undertaken not to 
finance any project anywhere in the world unless the project meets World Bank/IFC 
environmental guidelines.”). 
 412.  See MWD, supra note 81, pmbl. ¶ 34 (“[I]mproving the management of waste 
from the extractive industries, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states acting 
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been agreed. Commission Decision 2009/335/EC on technical guidelines 
for the establishment of the financial guarantee in accordance with the 
MWD has been published.
413
 It merely sets out how the financial guarantee 
is to be calculated, clarifies that the calculation must be made by 
independent qualified parties, and requires that account must be taken of the 
possibility of unplanned or premature closures.
414
  
 Several directives require or give Member States discretion to 
require operators of mines, waste facilities, and directly-associated facilities 
to provide financial security for environmental liabilities at closure and for 
after-care.
415
 The IPPC Directive does not require operators to provide 
financial security for performance of their obligations,
416
 although some 
Member States (including Ireland and the UK) do so under their 
implementation laws or in permits granted for the mining operation.
417
 A 
                                                                                                                                      
alone . . . . [D]ifferent national applications of that principle may lead to substantial 
disparities in the financial burden on economic operators.”). 
 413.  See Comm’n Decision 2009/335, 2009 O.J. (L 101) 25 (EC) (setting out technical 
guidelines for calculating the financial guarantee, taking into account the possibility of 
premature closure). 
 414.  See id. art. 1. 
 415.  See ELD, supra note 62, art. 14 (“Member states shall take measures to encourage 
the development of financial security instruments . . . , with the aim of enabling operators to 
use financial guarantees to cover their responsibilities under this Directive.”); see also 
MWD, supra note 81, art. 14 (“The competent authority shall . . . require a financial 
guarantee . . . , so that . . . all obligations under the permit issued pursuant to this Directive, 
including after-closure provisions, are discharged . . . .”); Landfill Directive, supra note 298, 
pmbl. ¶ 28, art. 8(a)(iv) (requiring operators of landfills “to make adequate provision by way 
of financial security or other equivalent to ensure that the obligations in the permit are 
performed including those relating to the closure and aftercare of the site”). 
 416. See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 3(2) (prescribing the operator’s basic 
obligations). However, IPPC licences often transpose requirements in the Landfill and 
MWD Directives and when doing so, they must require the provision of financial security. 
 417.  See, e.g., Irish Protection of the Environment Act 2003, § 15: 
The Agency may . . . require the applicant for the licence, the licensee in the 
case of a review . . . to (i) furnish to it such particulars in respect of such 
matters affecting his ability to meet the financial commitments or liabilities 
that the Agency reasonably considers will be entered into or incurred by him 
in carrying on the activity to which the licence or revised licence relates or 
will relate, as the case may be, in accordance with the terms of the licence or 
in consequence of ceasing to carry on that activity as it may specify, and (ii) 
make, and furnish evidence of having so made, such financial provision as it 
may specify (which may include the entering into a bond or other form of 
security) as will, in the opinion of the Agency, be adequate to discharge the 
said financial commitments or liabilities. 
In practice the EPA requires the financial provision provided (be it a bond or closure fund or 
insurance or a combination of some or all of these) to be updated regulatory to reflect 
predicted costs and liabilities calculated by independent assessors. Conditions in planning 
permissions under section 34 of the Planning and Development Act 2000 may also require 
developers to establish closure funds “for the satisfactory completion of the development.” 
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requirement for regularly updated Environmental Liability Risk 
Assessments and financial provisions to cover these risks is a common 
feature of IPPC licences for activities with post-closure environmental risks 
in the UK, Ireland, and Sweden.
418
 However, the requirement to make 
financial provision for closure does not encompass the attenuation of social 
and economic impacts of mine closure on local populations, although 
mining companies may address this issue voluntarily.
419
 
 The ELD merely requires Member States to encourage the 
development of financial security instruments and markets with the purpose 
of enabling operators to use financial guarantees to cover their 
responsibilities under the ELD.
420
 The ELD directs the EU Commission to 
submit a report on conditions of insurance and other financial security 
mechanisms by April 30, 2010, a deadline it did not meet.
421 
The report is to 
consider a gradual approach to financial security requirements, establishing 
a ceiling for financial guarantees and excluding low-risk activities.
422 
If 
appropriate in view of the report and an extended impact assessment that 
                                                                                                                                      
These closure funds provide the funding for planned closures. The amounts are estimated to 
be about 5% of capital costs. They must normally be kept separate from other company 
accounts and the consent of the regulatory agencies is required for withdrawals. See Ben 
Dhonau, Irish Experience of Financial Mechanisms for Remediation and Restoration, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF A SEMINAR ON FINANCIAL GUARANTEES AND SECURITIES IN THE EXTRACTIVE 
INDUSTRY 2007, available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1
143482 (last visited Feb. 21, 2012). There is no formal system demanding hard financial 
guarantees for mining operations in the UK. However, there are individual cases where hard 
guarantees have been required due to the special location of the mine site in environmentally 
sensitive locations. Furthermore, within the UK there is an accounting standard (FRS 12) 
that requires all extraction industries to make provisions for liabilities (e.g., for closure) on 
their balance sheets. The amount provided for is required to correspond to the actual 
liability. See Lars-Ake Lindhal, Financial Securities—an Industry Perspective, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF A SEMINAR ON FINANCIAL GUARANTEES AND SECURITIES IN THE EXTRACTIVE 
INDUSTRY 2007, available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1
143484 (last visited Feb. 21, 2012). 
 418.  See Landfill Directive, supra note 298, pmbl. ¶ 28 (stating that operators of 
landfills should make adequate provision by way of financial security or other equivalent to 
ensure that the obligations in the permit are performed, including those relating to the 
closure and aftercare of the site). Of course the Landfill Directive does not apply to mining 
waste as defined in the MWD, but it may apply to other mining waste. 
 419.  The Galmoy Mine in Ireland has done so in the process of closing in 2010–11.  
 420.  See ELD, supra note 62, art. 14, § 1 (“Member States shall take measures to 
encourage the development of financial security instruments and markets . . . with the aim of 
enabling operators to use financial guarantees to cover their responsibilities under this 
Directive.”). 
 421.  See id., art. 14, § 2. 
 422.  Id.  
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includes a cost-benefit analysis, the Commission will also submit a 
proposal for a system of “harmonised mandatory financial security.”
423
  
 The first Directive to clearly mandate financial security was the 
Landfill Directive. Article 7 requires that landfill permit applications
424
 
contain certain minimum particulars, including “the financial security by 
the applicant, or any other equivalent provision, as required under Article 
8(a)(iv) of this Directive.”
425
 The said Article 8(a)(iv) requires Member 
States to ensure that: 
 
[A]dequate provisions, by way of a financial security or 
any other equivalent, . . . has been or will be made by the 
applicant prior to the commencement of disposal 
operations to ensure that the obligations (including after-
care provisions) arising under the permit issued under the 
provisions of this Directive are discharged and that the 
closure procedures required by Article 13 are followed. 
This security or its equivalent shall be kept as long as 
required by maintenance and after-care operation of the site 
in accordance with Article 13(d). Member States may 
declare, at their own option, that this point does not apply 




 The MWD Directive also encourages (but does not oblige) Member 
States to adopt financial security mechanisms to ensure that operators of 
activities involving potential pollutants have the financial means to address 
future environmental issues.
427
 The scope of this is evidenced by a draft 
Spanish proposal in 2006 that would require €1 million in cash reserves, 
insurance, or a bond to cover the lowest-risk activity.
428
 Article 14 requires 
mining waste facility operators to lodge a “financial guarantee or 
equivalent” ensuring that all obligations flowing from the permit will be 
discharged, including those relating to the closure and after-closure of the 
                                                                                                                                      
 423.  Id. 
 424.  This application can be integrated into an application for an IPPC permit or a 
waste permit. The competent authorities will implement the Landfill requirements when 
setting the conditions for these permits.  
 425.  Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 7(i). 
 426.  Id. art. 8(a)(iv). 
 427.  See MWD, supra note 81, pmbl. ¶ 25 (stating that Member States should adopt 
measures ensuring that operators have the financial means to address future environmental 
issues). 
 428.  See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON MINING AND METALS, GUIDANCE PAPER: 
FINANCIAL ASSURANCE FOR MINE CLOSURE AND RECLAMATION (March 2006), available at 
http://www.icmm.com/page/1232/guidance-paper-financial-assurance-for-mine-closure-and-
reclamation. 
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waste facility.
429
 The guarantee must be sufficient to cover the cost of “any 
rehabilitation work needed to be carried out on the land affected by the 
waste facility, including the waste facility itself as described in the waste 
management plan prepared pursuant to Article 5 and required by the Article 
7 permit.”
430




Landfill and MWD guarantees must both be provided prior to the 
commencement of deposition operations in any landfill and/or mining 
waste facilities respectively and be periodically adjusted.
432
 The MWD 
guarantee must be sufficient to ensure that all obligations in the permit, 
including the after-care provisions, can be discharged and that there are 
funds available at any given time for the rehabilitation of the land affected 
by the waste facility.
433
 In practice, some Member States ensure the 
sufficiency of financial guarantees to reflect the current level of known or 
predicted environmental liabilities by conditions in permits requiring that 
financial provision for liabilities be updated and appropriately adjusted in 
closure and after-care plans incorporating environmental risk assessments 
and risk management plans.
434
  
Article 14.4 of the MWD envisages that an operator will be 
released from the financial guarantee or equivalent, and presumably entitled 
to a refund of any monies deposited or in escrow, when the competent 
authority authorizes the mine closure, except for so much of it as is 
necessary to finance the after-care obligations specified in Article 12.4.
435
 
Issues have arisen over the calculation of this residual financial amount 




                                                                                                                                      
 429.  See MWD, supra note 81, art. 14. 
 430.  Id. art. 14(2)(b). 
 431.  See id. pmbl. ¶ 25 (“[A]n operator of a waste facility servicing the extractive 
industries is subject to appropriate liability in respect of environmental damage cause by its 
operations or the imminent threat of such damage.”).  
 432.  See Landfill Directive, supra note 298, art. 7(i); MWD, supra note 81, art. 14.3. 
 433.  See MWD, supra note 81, art. 14.1. 
 434.  See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
LIABILITY, RISK ASSESSMENT, RESIDUALS MANAGEMENT PLANS AND FINANCIAL PROVISION 
37–41 (Ir. 2006), available at http://www.epa.ie/downloads/advice/licensee/ 
ELRA%20Guidance%20Document.pdf (outlining the method of calculation of financial 
provision for liabilities). 
 435.  See MWD, supra note 81, art. 14.4. 
 436.  See ARCON MINES LICENSE, supra note 404, at 23 (requiring that the licensee 
include a programme for perpetual aftercare in its closure plans at Arcon Mines); 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, TARA MINES INTEGRATED POLLUTION CONTROL 
LICENSE 516, at 20 (2006), available at http://www.epa.ie/terminalfour/ippc/ippc-
view.jsp?regno=P0516-01 (requiring that the licensee include a programme for perpetual 
aftercare in its closure plans at Tara Mines); VEDANTA LISHEEN MINES LICENSE, supra note 
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G. Expected Remediation Standards  
 
No fewer than three Directives may be relevant to the issue of 





 and the MWD.
439
 The ELD requires that Annex III 
facility operators liable for the restoration of waters or habitats return them 
to “baseline condition”
440
 by essentially returning them to the condition 
they would have been in had the damage not occurred.
441
 Unfortunately, the 
guidelines provided to Member States offer consistently vague descriptions 
of that standard.
442
 Instead of expanding upon the meaning of “baseline 
condition,” they tend to repeat the phrase and state that the result is subject 
to the decision of the regulator.
443
  
The EU-sponsored REMEDE Project
444
 has stated that this 
obligation can account for natural fluctuation.
445
 Thus, if environmental 
damage occurs during an unusually high period of conservation which 
would not naturally exist at the time of restoration, the remediation of the 
habitat is not expected to reach that augmented standard.
446
 REMEDE has 
stressed that Member States have significant discretion in choosing 
                                                                                                                                      
404, at 20 (requiring that the licensee include a programme for perpetual aftercare in its 
closure plans). 
 437.  See ELD, supra note 62, pmbl. (concerning environmental liability with regard to 
the prevention and remedying of environmental damage). 
 438. See IPPC Directive, supra note 211. 
 439.  See MWD, supra note 81, at 15 (regarding the management of waste from 
extractive industries).  
 440.  See ELD, supra note 62, art. 2.14 (“‘[B]aseline condition’ means the condition at 
the time of the damage of the natural resources and services that would have existed had the 
environmental damage not occurred, estimated on the basis of the best information 
available.”). 
 441.  See id. Annex II.1 (setting the framework for returning environmentally damaged 
areas to baseline condition). 
 442.  See id. Annex II (listing the measures to a return to baseline condition with regard 
to water and land damage). 
 443.  See, e.g., Georgina Crowhurst, The Environmental Liability Directive: A UK 
Perspective, 15 EUR. ENVTL. L. REV. 266, 271 (2006). 
 444.  See Resource Equivalency Methods for Assessing Environmental Damage in the 
EU, About REMEDE, ENVLIABILITY.EU, http://www.envliability.eu/pages/about.htm (last 
visited Nov. 29, 2011) (explaining the purpose and goal of REMEDE) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 445. See REMEDE, DELIVERABLE NO. 5: LEGAL ANALYSIS 12 (November 30, 2006) 
[hereinafter REMEDE Deliverable No. 5], available at 
http://www.envliability.eu/docs/LegalAnalysis_D5_PRDF_071206_FINAL.pdf (explaining 
why natural fluctuations should be taken into account when establishing the baseline 
condition and determining whether or not the damage is beyond the thresholds of Article 2 
of the ELD). 
 446.  See id. (explaining that remediation is limited to a baseline of the condition of the 
site before the damage occurred and not requiring remediation beyond that point). 
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restoration measures and in determining the baseline condition.
447
 Costs can 
be expressly considered as part of Member State discretion over remedial 
actions.
448
 If full restoration is deemed disproportionately expensive, the 
regulatory authority is entitled to require only the prevention of significant 
adverse effects to, inter alia, human health.
449
 Lucas Bergkamp has argued 
that this will make the process “very inefficient and unworkable.”
450
 Yet 
such discretion is inevitable given that establishing a baseline requires a 
highly localized knowledge of the conditions prior and subsequent to the 
environmental damage.
451
 Although the measures chosen are necessarily 
somewhat discretionary, the standard to be achieved ought to be consistent. 
Regrettably, however, that does not seem to be the case. At least a partial 
cause of this is the paucity of case law, which REMEDE attributes to delays 
in implementing the ELD and other frameworks.
452
 Such discretion permits 
the relaxation of restoration standards in practice. This is exacerbated by the 
fact that operators are under no obligation under ELD to restore damage 
they did not cause or damage for which natural fluctuation is 
accountable.
453
 The ELD requires that soil be remediated so that significant 
risks capable of adversely affecting human health are removed.
454
  
Under the IPPC Directive, when an IPPC licenced activity is ended, 
the site must be returned to a “satisfactory state.”
455
 The IPPC Directive is 
prospective in that it focuses on licensing activities to prevent future 
harm.
456
 This forward-oriented approach is also apparent in the vagueness 
                                                                                                                                      
 447.  See id. at 16 (“The competent authority then evaluates the various options and 
selects the most appropriate one on the basis of a set of criteria.”).  
 448.  See ELD, supra note 62, Annex II.1.3.1. 
 449.  See id. Annex II.1.3.3.  
 450.  LUCAS BERGKAMP, THE EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY DIRECTIVE AND ITS 
EFFECTS ON INDUSTRY AND THE ECONOMY, in LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO NATURE 119 (R. 
Mellenbergh ed., 2005). 
 451.  See G.M. Van den Broek, Environmental Liability and Nature Protection Areas: 
Will the EU Environmental Liability Directive Actually Lead to the Restoration of Damaged 
Natural Resources?, 5 UTRECHT L. REV. 117, 123–25 (2009). 
 452.  See REMEDE DELIVERABLE NO. 5, supra note 445, at 18 (“The lack of case law 
can be explained by the fact that Member States are behind schedule in implementing of the 
[directives].”).  
 453.  See id. at 12 (“[Negative variations due to natural causes . . . do not constitute a 
significant damage within the meaning of the ELD.”). 
 454. See ELD, supra note 62, Annex II.2 (“The necessary measures shall be taken to 
ensure . . . that the relevant contaminants are removed, controlled, contained, or diminished 
so that the contaminated land . . . no longer poses any significant risk of adversely affecting 
human health.”). 
 455. See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 3.1(f) (stating that member states shall 
ensure necessary measures are taken to avoid pollution risk and return the site to a 
satisfactory state upon cessation of activities). 
 456. See id. art. 1 (stating that the directive “lays down measures designed to prevent 
or, where that is not practicable, to reduce emissions in the air, water and land”). 
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of the guidelines available on required restoration.
457
 For example, the 
Northern Ireland (NI) guidelines fail to define “satisfactory state”; they 
simply repeat the statutory language.
458
 Similarly, the Commission 
guidelines on IPPC pay little attention to restoration standards.
459
 
Nevertheless, the Directive seems to imply that “satisfactory” means at 
least the standard prevailing when the licence was granted; Recital 10 in the 
Preamble endorses the principle of sustainable development and the NI 
guidelines require the operator to “put things right.”
460
 
In determining what constitutes a “satisfactory state,” it is 
suggested that this should mean, at a minimum, that the site and emissions 
from it on cessation of the IPPC activity comply with all appropriate and 
applicable environmental standards for the relevant environmental medium 
when activities cease.
461
 Moreover, the precautionary and “polluter pays” 
principles, combined with Recital 10 committing to a high level of 
environmental protection, could (and does in Ireland and the UK) 
encourage competent authorities to err on the side of caution and set higher 




The MWD is similar to the IPPC Directive. Its Preamble speaks of 
restoring the land “to a satisfactory state, with particular regard to soil 
quality, wild life, natural habitats, freshwater systems, landscape and 
appropriate beneficial uses.”
463
 Article 12(3) stipulates that, before a site 
can be closed, the competent authority must certify its rehabilitation to a 
“satisfactory state.”
464
 As with the IPPC Directive, however, some 
                                                                                                                                      
 457. See id. art. 3.1 (detailing the obligations of the site operator, including restoration). 
 458. See DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT, INTEGRATED POLLUTION PREVENTION AND 
CONTROL (NORTHERN IRELAND): A PRACTICAL GUIDE 43–47 (2003) [hereinafter INTEGRATED 
POLLUTION PREVENTION AND CONTROL], available at 
http://www.doeni.gov.uk/niea/txt/ippc_practical_guide.pdf (discussing the specifics of site 
assessment and restoration). 
 459. See European Commission, Guidance on Interpretation and Implementation of the 
IPPC Directive, EUROPA, 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/air/pollutants/stationary/ippc/general_guidance.htm (last 
updated June 21, 2011) (containing no information on restoration) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment). 
 460. See INTEGRATED POLLUTION PREVENTION AND CONTROL, supra note 458, at 45 
(“Where an operator breaches a permit condition, causing pollution, the Chief Inspector may 
issue enforcement notices to make the operator put things right while the installation is still 
in operation.”). 
 461. See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, pmbl. ¶ 10. 
 462. See id.  
 463. MWD, supra note 81, art. 3(20).  
 464. See id. art. 12(3) (“A waste facility may be considered as finally closed only after 
the competent authority has . . . certified that the land affected by a waste facility has been 
rehabilitated.”). 
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guidelines on restoration employ vague language or repeat the 
“satisfactory” requirement without elaboration.
465
 General practice in 
authorizations in the UK and Ireland is to require restoration to a state 
suitable for permitted uses and to require compliance with all relevant 
environmental standards at the time of closure.
466
 In many cases, 
constructions which facilitated mining (e.g., mills, sheds, etc.) must be 




All applicable Directives require “necessary” rather than 
“practicable” steps to be taken.
468
 According to Jan Jans and Hans Vedder’s 
analysis, in a different context, this tightens the discretion of authorities and 
thus strengthens standards.
469
 Furthermore, the standard of soil remediation 
required under the MWD (i.e., to a satisfactory state defined by the 
competent authority) can be higher than the standard for soil restoration 
under the ELD, which merely requires that significant risks of adversely 




                                                                                                                                      
 465. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT FOR ENVIRONMENT, FOOD, AND RURAL AFFAIRS, 
ENVIRONMENTAL PERMITTING GUIDANCE: THE MINING WASTE DIRECTIVE 28 (U.K. 2010), 
available at 
http://archive.defra.gov.uk/environment/policy/permits/documents/ep2010miningwaste.pdf 
(lacking any elaboration on the requirements for restoration beyond the satisfactory 
standard). The Irish requirements state that the  
[U]ltimate aim of the closure plan should be to leave the mine and the tailings 
management facility (TMF) site in an acceptable condition which ensures 
public health and safety, minimises the risk of contamination and, where 
possible, allows productive use of the land or otherwise creates a stable 
environment capable of integration into surrounding land uses. 
Minerals and the Environment, DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS, ENERGY, AND NATURAL 
RESOURCES (Ir.), 
http://www.dcenr.gov.ie/Natural/Exploration+and+Mining+Division/Environmental+Consid
erations/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2011) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, 
Climate, and the Environment).  
 466. See DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS, ENERGY, AND NATURAL RESOURCES, 
supra note 465 (describing how the land should be left after closure).  
 467. This is typically required in planning permissions for mines. In one Irish case, a 
well-built shed was donated to a sporting club for recreational facilities.  
 468. See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, art. 3.1(f). 
 469. See JANS & VEDDER, supra note 8, at 343 (“Determining necessity accepts the 
environmental protection objective whereas practicability involves a balance between the 
environmental protection objective and the practical (economic) possibilities of the operator 
and may thus result in a less ambitious environmental objective.”). 
 470. See ELD, supra note 62, Annex II.2 (“The necessary measures shall be taken to 
ensure . . . that the contaminated land . . . no longer poses any significant risk of adversely 
affecting human health.”). 
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H. Forms of Financial Guarantee 
 
Neither the Landfill Directive nor the MWD nor any other 
Directive specifies the form of guarantee required; this is a matter for 
Member States.
471
 Article 14.1 of the MWD mentions “a financial deposit, 
including industry-sponsored mutual guarantee funds or equivalent.”
472
 
Financial guarantees take a number of forms, including upfront cash 
deposits, trusts, accumulating cash deposits, bonds, letters of credit, escrow 
accounts, parent company guarantees, and insurance policies.
473
 The latter 
are sometimes favored by competent authorities, but mining companies find 
it difficult or impossible to obtain them and the market for liability 
insurance is weak in the UK and Ireland.
474
 The Irish EPA will normally 
only accept cash or an escrow account for known liabilities in MWD, IPPC, 
and Waste Site Closure and After-Care Plans, and insurance for a certain 
sum for unknown liabilities.
475
 The four major mining projects in Ireland all 
have substantial sums in escrow accounts to cover mine closures and after-
care.
476
 This was a requirement in the initial planning permissions for the 
projects (most of which were commenced before the ELD, MWD, and 
Landfill Directives came into force) and, with adjustments to the amounts 
and liabilities covered, under conditions in the IPPC licences.
477
  
Parent company guarantees, although common in the past, are 
declining in popularity in light of stock market vagaries and growing 
distrust of rating agencies.
478
 There is only a very limited market for 
financial security instruments (such as letters of credit, surety bonds, 
insurance, and trust funds) in the EU unless, reports Professor Fogleman, a 
company is required to have evidence of financial security.
479
 Apparently 
liabilities under ELD are not generally covered under standard general 
                                                                                                                                      
 471. See, e.g., MWD, supra note 81, art. 14.1. 
 472. Id. art. 14(1). 
 473. See EPA, Guidance on Environmental Liability, supra note 377, 37–51 (detailing 
various types of financial guarantees); C. GEORGE MILLER ET AL, Surveys of Current 
Practice, INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON MINING AND METALS, FINANCIAL ASSURANCE FOR 
MINE CLOSURE AND RECLAMATION 42 (2005), available at 
http://www.icmm.com/document/282. 
 474. See id. at 44 (detailing the advantages and disadvantages of insurance as a 
guarantee).  
 475. See id. at 8 (detailing the financial instruments acceptable for known and unknown 
liabilities). 
 476. See IPPC Directive, supra note 211, at 26. 
 477. See id. (detailing the financial provisions necessary to cover environmental 
liabilities).  
 478. See Fogleman, Environmental Liability Directive, supra note 93, at 1455–56 
(discussing insurance coverage of ELD liabilities). 
 479. See id. at 1444. 
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liability insurance, but certain general liability insurers have developed new 
wordings designed to extend coverage for ELD liabilities.
480
 Marsh Insurers 
report that it is possible to get cover for primary, complementary, and 
compensatory remediation required under ELD.
481
 Marsh also reported that 
in 2010 only four EU Member States had compulsory financial insurance 
requirements for ELD liabilities.
482
  
Under the ELD, where there is more than one operator, Member 
States may impose joint and several or proportionate liability for preventing 
or remedying environmental damage.
483
 The UK and Ireland make 
operators jointly and severally liable, with the result that insurers are 
reluctant to insure one operator where others involved in the mining waste 




I. Recovery of Costs for Environmental Damage Under the ELD 
 
As discussed above, most mining, including the management of 
mining waste, is probably covered by the ELD.
485
 Under the ELD, a 
competent authority may recover costs incurred for taking preventive or 
remedial measures in respect of environmental damage within five years 
from the date on which it completes the measures or identifies the liable 
operator or a “third party who has caused the damage or the imminent 
threat of damage,” whichever is later.
486
 This latter could be a third party 
who has caused environmental damage despite appropriate preventive 
measures taken by an operator or it could be a third party acting on behalf 
of a competent authority.
487
 The ELD specifically directs Member States to 
                                                                                                                                      
 480. See id. at 1456. 




 482. See id. (stating that Hungary, Latvia, Slovenia, and Sweden have compulsory 
financial security requirements). 
 483. See ELD, supra note 63, art. 9 (“This Directive is without prejudice to any 
provisions of national regulations concerning cost allocation in cases of multiple party 
causation.”). See also John Ronan & Sons Ltd. v. Clean Build and Others, [2011] IEHC 350, 
available at 
http://courts.ie/Judgments.nsf/09859e7a3f34669680256ef3004a27de/ffb8dd3ef7be7ae58025
7918004ddbaa?OpenDocument, for an important Irish case on the allocation of costs 
between multiple parties for decontaminating land.  
 484. See Fogleman, Environmental Liability Directive, supra note 93, at 1451. 
 485. See supra note 69. 
 486. ELD, supra note 63, art. 10. 
 487. See id. art. 11.3 (“[T]he competent authority may empower or require third parties 
to carry out the necessary preventive or remedial measures.”). In the former case, under 
Article 8, paragraph 3(a), the operator would not be liable for the environmental damage 
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ensure that a competent authority can empower or order a third party to 
carry out preventive or remedial measures, as well as to authorize a 




Costs can include legal, enforcement, supervisory, and other 
general costs.
489
 Member States have discretion to provide for a flat rate 
calculation of administrative, legal, enforcement, and other general costs to 
be recovered.
490
 An operator may be liable for both its own and a competent 
authority’s costs; these can include the costs of assessing actual damage or 
the imminent threat of damage, assessing alternative preventive or remedial 





X. Closed and Abandoned Extractive Waste Facilities 
 
One of the problems with mining waste is that mining companies 
may not have the resources necessary to fulfill their closure and after-care 
obligations or they may have entered into liquidation or have simply 
disappeared. There are many closed and abandoned mines in the EU. This 
is an issue addressed in Article 20 of the MWD which requires Member 
States to: 
 
[E]nsure that an inventory of closed waste facilities, 
including abandoned waste facilities, located on their 
territory which cause serious negative environmental 
impacts or have the potential of becoming in the medium or 
short term a serious threat to human health or the 
environment is drawn up and periodically updated. Such an 
inventory, to be made available to the public, shall be 
carried out by May 1, 2012, taking into account the 




The waste referred to is waste as defined in Article 2.1 of the 
MWD, i.e., “extractive waste,” meaning “waste resulting from the 
prospecting, extraction, treatment and storage of mineral resources and the 
                                                                                                                                      
caused by the third party. See id. art. 8.3(a) (“An operator shall not be required to bear the 
cost . . . when he can prove that the environmental damage . . . was caused by a third party 
and occurred despite the fact that appropriate safety measures were in place.”). 
 488. See id. arts. 10, 11.3. 
 489. See id. art. 2.16. 
 490. See id. pmbl. ¶ 19. 
 491. See id. art. 2.16. 
 492. Id. art. 20. 
262 3 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV’T 177 (2012) 
working of quarries.”
493
 It includes radioactive waste from the extractive 
industries except “such aspects as are specific to radioactivity, which are a 
matter dealt with under the Treaty establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom).”
494
 This means that closed and abandoned 
waste facilities must only be inventoried if they contain waste directly 
resulting from prospecting, extraction, treatment, and storage at land-based 
mines. The waste facilities to be inventoried are those defined in Article 
3.15.
495
 The MWD does not define what is meant by “closed” or 
“abandoned facilities” but an EU expert group considers “closed” waste 
facilities to be “facilities with an identified former owner or licensee and 
closed according to former licences or regulations” and “abandoned” waste 
facilities to be “facilities without an identified former owner/licensee and/or 
not having been closed in a regulated manner.”
496
 
The Article 21 “methodologies” referred to in Article 20 above 
which must be taken into account relate to the compilation of inventories 
and the rehabilitation of closed and abandoned facilities in order to satisfy 
the requirements of Article 4.
497
 Article 21.1 states that these methodologies 
                                                                                                                                      
 493. Id. art. 2.1. 
 494. See id. pmbl. ¶ 10 (“[T]his Directive should not cover such aspects as are specific 
to radioactivity, which are a matter dealt with under the Treaty establishing the European 
Atomic Energy Community.”).  
 495. Article 3, paragraph 15 of the MWD defines “waste facility” as  
[A]ny area designated for the accumulation or deposit of extractive waste, 
whether in a solid or liquid state or in solution or suspension, for the following 
time-periods: no time-period for Category A waste facilities and facilities for 
waste characterized as hazardous in the waste management plan; a period of 
more than six months for facilities for hazardous waste generated 
unexpectedly; a period of more than one year for facilities for non-hazardous 
non-inert waste; or a period of more than three years for facilities for 
unpolluted soil, non-hazardous prospecting waste, waste resulting from the 
extraction, treatment and storage of peat and inert waste. 
 Such facilities are deemed to include any dam or other structure serving to 
contain, retain, confine or otherwise support such a facility, and also to 
include, but not be limited to, heaps and ponds, but excluding excavation 
voids into which waste is replaced, after extraction of the mineral, for 
rehabilitation and construction purposes.  
Id. art. 3.15. 
 496. INVENTORY OF CLOSED WASTE FACILITIES AD-HOC GROUP, GUIDANCE DOCUMENT 
FOR A RISK-BASED PRE-SELECTION PROTOCOL FOR THE INVENTORY OF CLOSED WASTE 
FACILITIES AS REQUIRED BY ARTICLE 20 OF DIRECTIVE 2006/21/EC, at 7 (2011), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/mining/pdf/Pre_selection_GUIDANCE_FINAL.pdf.  
 497. See MWD, supra note 81, art. 4 (providing, inter alia, Member States shall take 
the necessary measures to ensure that extractive waste is managed without endangering 
human health and without using processes or methods which could harm the environment, 
and in particular without risk to water, air, soil and fauna and flora, without causing a 
nuisance through noise or odours and without adversely affecting the landscape or places of 
special interest.”). In addition, the MWD requires that “Member States shall also take the 
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are to be developed by the Commission, assisted by the Committee, 
referred to in Article 23, comprising representatives from each Member 
State.
498
 According to Article 21.1(b), methodologies shall allow for the 
establishment of the “most appropriate” risk assessment procedures and 
remedial actions “having regard to the variation of geological, 
hydrogeological and climatological characteristics across Europe.”
499
 The 
application of risk assessment methods is therefore required in compiling 
the inventory for closed waste facilities that have either known 
environmental impacts or potential environmental or human health 
impacts.
500
 It does not require the development and application of a 
harmonized risk assessment methodology.
501
  
In order to implement the Directive, the EU Commission and 
Member States established the Inventory of Closed Waste Facilities Ad-hoc 
Group (AHG), a Sub-Committee of the Technical Adaptation Committee 
for Directive 2006/21/EC. This group published a Guidance Document
502
 in 
February 2011 on the use of a pre-selection methodology established during 
its consultations for the development of the inventory required by Article 
                                                                                                                                      
necessary measures to prohibit the abandonment, dumping or uncontrolled depositing of 
extractive waste.” 
 498. See id. art. 23 (stating that this is the Committee established under Directive 
75/442/EEC on waste, as amended, Article 18). Article 18 provides that the Commission 
submit drafts of its proposed measures to the Committee, which must respond within a given 
time.  
[T]he Committee can decide] by the majority laid down in Article 205(2) of 
the [EEC] Treaty in the case of decisions which the Council is required to 
adopt on a proposal from the Commission. The votes of the representatives of 
the Member States within the Committee shall be weighted in the manner set 
out in that Article. The chairman shall not vote. The Commission shall . . . 
adopt the measures envisaged if they are in accordance with the opinion of the 
committee. If the measures envisaged are not in accordance with the opinion 
of the committee, or if no opinion is delivered, the Commission shall, without 
delay, submit to the Council a proposal relating to the measures to be 
taken . . . . The Council [shall] . . . act by a qualified majority. If, on the expiry 
of that period [three months] the Council has neither adopted the proposed 
implementing act nor indicated its opposition to the proposal for 
implementing measures, the proposed implementing act shall be adopted by 
the Commission.  
Council Decision 1999/468, art. 5, 1999 O.J. (L 184) 23, 25 (EC). Note: Directive 
75/442/EEC on waste has been replaced by Directive 2008/98/EC on waste.  
 499. MWD, supra note 81, art. 21.1(b). 
 500. See id. (“Such methodologies shall allow for the establishment of the most 
appropriate risk assessment procedures and remedial actions having regard to the variation 
of geological, hydrogeological and climatological characteristics across Europe.”). 
 501. See id. art. 21 (discussing the need for risk assessment procedures and cooperation 
between Member States in finding best techniques, but not requiring a uniform set of 
procedures). 
 502. See INVENTORY OF CLOSED WASTE FACILITIES AD-HOC GROUP, supra note 496.  
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20 of the MWD.
503
 The guidance is not intended to be definitive or 
prescriptive; Member States were told that it should not replace work 
already undertaken by them and to use their own standards if desired.
504
 
The objective is to provide a methodology so that Member States can omit 
from the inventory of closed waste facilities those which do not cause a 
serious threat to human health or do not have the potential to cause a 
serious threat to human health and the environment.
505
 A precautionary 





 substances referred to in Annex III of the MWD is 




Thresholds for these hazardous and dangerous substances were 
fixed by Commission Decision 2009/337/EC.
509
 Facilities exceeding them 
must be listed.
510
 It may be that elevated levels of some hazardous or 
dangerous substances present at or near mines are not attributable to mining 
activities.
511
 In such cases, the Guidance Document recommends as 
follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                      
 503. See id. at 3 (“The objective of the present document is to provide guidance to 
Member States on the use of the Pre-selection Methodology established during consultations 
of the AHG for the development of the inventory required by Article 20 of the MWD.”). 
 504. See id. at 3, 13–15 (“The risk-based pre-selection protocol presented in this 
document should not replace the work already undertaken by Member States.”).  
 505. See id. at 4 (“This screening should result in the elimination of those facilities 
which do not cause a serious threat to human health or have the potential to cause a serious 
threat to human health and the environment from the inventory of closed waste facilities.”). 
 506. See MWD, supra note 81, Annex III (referring to “waste classified as hazardous 
under Directive 91/689/EEC above a certain threshold” when considering the classification 
of waste facilities under Category A). 
 507. See id. (referring to “substances or preparations classified as dangerous under 
Directives 67/548/EEC or 1999/45/EC above a certain threshold” when considering the 
classification of waste facilities under Category A). 
 508. See INVENTORY OF CLOSED WASTE FACILITIES AD-HOC GROUP, supra note 496, at 
4 (describing a precautionary principle for selecting waste facilities to investigate further). 
This is because the pre-selection protocol is relatively superficial and is not meant to involve 
field sampling or laboratory analysis. Id. The actual levels of these substances will often be 
unknown for closed mine waste facilities. Id. Further investigation may lead to the 
elimination of the facility from the inventory if the levels of prescribed substances detected 
are below the thresholds in Commission Decision 2009/337/EC. Id. 
 509. See Comm’n Decision 2009/337, art. 7, 2009 O.J. (L 102) 7, 9 (EC) (defining 
threshold ratios for wastes). 
 510. See INVENTORY OF CLOSED WASTE FACILITIES AD-HOC GROUP, supra note 496, at 
4 (discussing how facilities with substances above the threshold must be listed as a 
precautionary measure). 
 511. See id. at 5 (“It is important to understand that elevated levels or certain metals at a 
now closed mine site may be due to entirely natural processes and not due to the processes 
of mining.”). 
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In most mining situations prior to the middle of the 20
th
 
Century the pre-mining situation is both unknown and 
unknowable. It is important to understand that elevated 
levels or certain metals at a now closed mine site may be 
due to entirely natural processes and not due to the 
processes of mining. However, differentiating between 
geogenic and anthropogenic elevated levels is almost 
impossible at our current level of scientific understanding. 
Therefore, on the basis that it is likely that some of the 
elevated levels of metals are due to entirely natural 
processes it is inappropriate to attempt to remediate a site 





Commission Decision 2009/337/EC also defines what is meant by 
the expression “serious threat” to human health or the environment because 
only facilities posing a “serious” threat must be inventoried.
513
 Article 4.2 
states that “[i]njuries leading to disability or prolonged states of ill-health 
shall count as serious dangers to human health” but that “[t]he potential for 
loss of life or danger to human health shall be considered to be negligible or 
not serious if people other than workers operating the facility that might be 
affected are not expected to be present permanently or for prolonged 
periods in the potentially affected area.”
514
 Serious harm to the environment 
is not defined, but Article 4.3 states that a threat will not be serious if “(a) 
the intensity of the potential contaminant source strength is decreasing 
significantly within a short time; (b) the failure does not lead to any 
permanent or long-lasting environmental damage; [and] (c) the affected 




The AHG defines short term as six to twelve months, medium term 
as one to ten years, and long term as longer than ten years.
516
 The AHG 
Guidance provides detailed recommendations on the methodology for 
compiling the inventory.
517
 A question which arises is, what happens after 
                                                                                                                                      
 512. Id. at 5.  
 513. See Comm’n Decision 2009/337, supra note 509, art. 7 (discussing how to 
determine whether a facility is a serious threat or not). 
 514. Id. art. 4.2. 
 515. Id. art. 4.3. 
 516. See INVENTORY OF CLOSED WASTE FACILITIES AD-HOC GROUP, supra note 496, at 
8. 
 517. See id. at 3 (stating that the objective of the guidance is to “provide guidance to 
Member States on the use of the Pre-selection Methodology established during consultations 
of the AHG for the development of the inventory required by Article 20 of the MWD”). 
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compilation of the inventory of problematic mine waste facilities by 
Member States? It is clear that if an operator of such a facility can be 
located, Article 4.2 of the MWD obliges Member States to “ensure that the 
operator takes all measures necessary to prevent or reduce as far as possible 
any adverse effects on the environment and human health brought about as 
a result of the management of extractive waste.”
518
 This includes 
management of the facility after closure, the prevention of major accidents 
involving the facility, and the limitation of their consequences for human 
health and the environment.
519
  
Curiously, neither the Directive nor the Decision imposes any 
specific or clear obligation on Member States themselves to act where an 
abandoned mine waste facility (or a facility which the operator cannot 
rehabilitate) is causing serious negative environmental impacts or has the 
potential to become a serious threat to human health or the environment in 
the medium or short term. The purpose of the methodology for 
rehabilitation, required under Article 21.1(b), is stated to be “in order to 
satisfy the requirements of Article 4.”
520
 Article 4 requires Member States 
“to take the necessary measures” to ensure that extractive waste is managed 
so as not to harm the environment or endanger human health.
521
 The 
question which then arises is whether Article 4 requires a Member State 
itself to rehabilitate a closed mine listed in the Article 20 inventory. Given 
the ECJ’s propensity for expansive interpretation of Member State 
obligations under the Waste Directives,
522
 and the fact that a facility will 
only be listed in the Article 20 inventory if the Member State itself has 
determined that it is causing serious negative environmental impacts or has 
the potential to cause serious human health or environmental damage 
within 10 years,
523
 it is highly likely that the ECJ would interpret a Member 
State’s obligations under Article 4 to include the rehabilitation of closed or 
abandoned extractive waste facilities if no operators can be found or can be 
compelled to do so. This would certainly be the case if infringements of EU 




                                                                                                                                      
 518. MWD, supra note 81, art. 4.2. 
 519. Id. 
 520. Id. art. 21.1(b). 
 521. Id. art. 4.1; see also supra note 494. 
 522. See, e.g., Case C-188/08, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2009 E.C.R. I-172, ¶ 86; Case C-
286/08, Comm’n v. Greece, 2009 E.C.R. I-142; Case C-494/01 Comm’n v. Ireland , 2005 
E.C.R. I-3331, I-3381. 
 523. This is the period classified as short- to medium-term by the AHG. See INVENTORY 
OF CLOSED WASTE FACILITIES AD-HOC GROUP, supra note 496, at 8. 
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XI. Conclusions 
 
 Overall, it can be said that mining and mining waste are extensively 
regulated by EU legislation. There is no comprehensive study on the 
effectiveness of this legislation, and it is too early yet to judge this, but, if 
codified and properly implemented, the EU model could be emulated in 
other jurisdictions. The political structure of the EU has ensured that good, 
if not perfect, legislation was enacted to regulate mining and that there is 
support at EU level to enforce this legislation when Member States are 
patently failing to meet their obligations under EU law. The ECJ has 
consistently interpreted environmental laws so as to ensure a high level of 
protection for the environment in the EU and its purposive interpretative 
techniques fill the voids in Directives which of their nature are sometimes 
somewhat nebulous as to what is required in particular situations. The 
growing reliance on EU human rights law also augments the capacity of 
individuals and NGOs to compel individual Member States to comply with 
their obligations with respect to human rights which in practice often 
requires the enactment of laws providing for appropriate mining regulatory 
regimes and the proper enforcement of EU environmental laws applicable 
to mining in national courts. The jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights, and, recently, the rulings of the Committee on Social Rights 
have provided remedies to those affected by severe pollution from mining 
at supranational levels. However, there are still concerns about the proper 
implementation and enforcement of EU environmental laws in some 
Member States (especially in the newer Member States) and uncertainty 
about the nature, extent, and forms of financial provisions which competent 
authorities may require operators of mines to provide in respect of 
environmental damage from mining activities. A supranational inspectorate 
for mines of international significance or having the potential to cause 
significant transfrontier environmental damage with powers to question the 
performance of national enforcement authorities and the establishment of a 
fund to meet liabilities modeled somewhat on the fund established under 
the International Conventions on Liability and Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage 1969
524
 would go a long way to meet these concerns. 
Like democracy, the EU system is not perfect and it is still a work in 
progress but it is submitted that it does provide an embryonic model for the 
regulation of mining globally.  
                                                                                                                                      
 524. Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, Oct. 13, 1971, 
26 U.S.T. 765. 
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